| abstract
| - The 1959 to 1963 phase of the Vietnam War started after the North Vietnamese had made a firm decision to commit to a military conquest of the South, a buildup phase began, between the 1959 North Vietnamese decision and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, which led to major U.S. escalation. The Communists saw this as a second phase of their revolution, substituting the U.S. for the French. This is in tune with the theories of Maoism that a revolution could be built in a stage by stage process. By this point the victory of Mao himself in 1949 and then of the Viet Minh over the French appeared to offer two validations of Maoist theory. That in practical terms both had been won in conventional campaigns using the methods of regular, conventional warfare was glossed over at the time and by later generations. Between the 1954 Geneva accords and 1956, the two countries were still forming; the influence of major powers, especially France and the United States, and to a lesser extent China and the Soviet Union, were as much an influence as any internal matters. There is little question that in 1957-1958, there was a definite early guerilla movement against the Diem government, involving individual assassinations, expropriations, recruiting, shadow government, and other things characteristic of Mao's Phase I. The actual insurgents, however, were primarily native to the south or had been there for some time. While there was clearly communications and perhaps arms supply from the north, there is little evidence of any Northern units in the South, although organizers may well have infiltrated. It can be established that there was endemic insurgency in South Vietnam throughout the period 1954–1960. It can also be established-but less surely- that the Diem regime alienated itself from one after another of those elements within Vietnam which might have offered it political support, and was grievously at fault in its rural programs. That these conditions engendered animosity toward the GVN seems almost certain, and they could have led to a major resistance movement even without North Vietnamese help. There is little doubt that there was some kind of Viet Minh-derived "stay behind" organization between 1954 and 1960, but it is unclear that they were directed to take over action until 1957 or later. Before that, they were unquestionably recruiting and building infrastructure, a basic first step in a Maoist protracted war mode. While the visible guerilla incidents increased gradually, the key policy decisions by the North were made in 1959. Early in this period, there was a greater degree of conflict in Laos than in South Vietnam. U.S. combat involvement was, at first, greater in Laos, but the activity of advisors, and increasingly U.S. direct support to South Vietnamese soldiers, increased, under U.S. military authority, in late 1959 and early 1960. Communications intercepts in 1959, for example, confirmed the start of the Ho Chi Minh trail and other preparation for large-scale fighting. North Vietnam declared its public support for communist insurgents in South Vietnam and first guerilla attacks against the South. The communist forces in South Vietnam established the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (Viet Cong) and Army for the Liberation of South Vietnam. At the same, the United States helped South Vietnam conducting special war strategy. However, the communist forces still won on the battlefield, fought several large campaigns next to the big cities. President Diem was unable to take control of political crisis and was overthrown by the Council of Revolutionary Military (some documents of both sides suggest that it was the United States which had turn the green light for this coup). After several years of chaos, the Ngo Dinh Diem government came to an end in 1963 and South Vietnam then fell into management crisis.
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