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| - Q23 Art 4 O2 election is of things that exist. But predestination from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore, some are predestined without election. O3 election implies some discrimination. predestination which ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election. R1 in the conferring of grace and glory election is implied. R2 "Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His choice." Q23 Art 5 O2 Divine predestination includes the divine will, which by no means can be irrational; since predestination is "the purpose to have mercy," But there can be no other reason for predestination than the foreknowledge of merits. Therefore it must be the cause of reason of predestination. O3 God does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits. R1 The use of grace foreknown by God is not the cause of conferring grace, R2 Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of God as regards its effects in general. R3 God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, Q23 Art 6 O2 But it is possible that one predestined--e.g. Peter--may sin and then be killed. R1 two ways; Q23 Art 7 O1 But there can be an addition to the number of the predestined O2 Further, no reason can be assigned why God pre-ordains to salvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged by God without a reason. O3 If, then, the number of the saved were fixed by God at a certain figure, there would be more saved than lost. R1 For their number is increased and diminished, but not the number of the predestined. R2 The reason of the quantity of any one part must be judged from the proportion of that part of the whole. R3 The good that is proportionate to the common state of nature is to be found in the majority; Q23 Art 8 O1 nothing eternal can be preceded by anything temporal; O2 But neither of these things can be said of God when He predestines. O3 Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be hindered. But predestination cannot be hindered by anything. R2 two ways; R3 predestination can be furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by them. Q24 Art 1 O3 there should also be a book of death, as there is a book of life. two senses. It is the custom to inscribe, not those who are rejected, but those who are chosen. Therefore the book of life is so called in regard to divine life; and not only in regard to the life of the predestined. some are chosen to the life of grace who are not chosen to the life of glory; whence in His regard there is no election, and in consequence no book of life: For this reason those who, possessing grace, fail to obtain glory, are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively. nothing can be taken away from the foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination. book of life is something eternal and immutable. as regards things foreknown, which can change. For as primary matter is to power, so God, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. better than every power is its act. But nothing is better than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God, is God, of the essence of God there is no principle. Therefore there is no power in God. We ought not, therefore, to assign power to God; but only knowledge and will. passive power is contrary to act; for a thing is passive according as it is potential. Whence this potentiality is not in God, but only active power. God's action is not distinct from His power, for both are His divine essence; Thus in God the idea of power is retained, inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect; Power is predicated of God not as something really distinct from His knowledge and will, but as differing from them logically; everything that is infinite is imperfect If, then, the power of God were infinite, it could produce an infinite effect, but this is impossible. if the power of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would cause instantaneous movement. moves the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal creature in place and time, The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity in regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs to quantity. His effect is always less than His power. An incorporeal mover, however, is not a univocal agent; whence it is not necessary that the whole of its power should be manifested in motion, so as to move without time; For movement and passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God, for He is immovable, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin, If God, then, were omnipotent, all things would be possible; But if we take away the impossible, then we destroy also the necessary; God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active power, not to passive power, To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because of His omnipotence. the omnipotence of God does not take away from things their impossibility and necessity. God can do what is impossible in itself, Now for the past not to have been is impossible accidentally: He can so effect that what was corrupt should not have been corrupt. it is more impossible than the raising of the dead; in which there is nothing contradictory, some things are not subject to His power, because they fall short of being possible; the fact that she had been corrupt cannot be removed from her; in God, power and essence, will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. two ways: although no other order would be suitable and good to the things which now are, yet God can do other things and impose upon them another order. For whatever God does, He does in a most powerful and wise way. if God could have made better things than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He would have been envious. He can give to things made by Him a better manner of existence as regards the accidents, although not as regards the substance. But it is not of the nature of anything created, that it should be better than it was made by God. For if any one thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed; But the aggregation of goods has no place in God; nor has composition. But reward does not apply to God; as neither does merit. Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner not of composition, but of simplicity; He has beatitude, although not acquired by merit. beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to His essence, and not to His intellect. the object is understood as prior to the act of a power. beatitude is to be found in an act of the intellect. beatitude is the last end of the rational nature. But to be the last end of the rational nature belongs only to God. twofold, For there are some false beatitudes. But nothing false can be in God. Now none of these have to do with God, since He is incorporeal. A particular kind of beatitude is false according as it falls short of the idea of true beatitude; For procession signifies outward movement. But in God there is nothing mobile, But in God there is no diversity; whatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not necessarily distinct; For generation is change from non-existence to existence, Nothing of all this belongs to God. But such a process is not called generation in us; therefore neither is it to be so called in God. anything that is generated derives existence from its generator. no generated existence can be the divine existence. The Word proceeding therefore proceeds as subsisting in the same nature; and so is properly called begotten, and Son. Not everything derived from another has existence in another subject; Therefore we must stop at the first, and hold that there exists only one procession in God. as there is only one divine nature (Q. 11, A. 4), it follows that only one procession exists in God. Further, if any other procession but the intelligible procession of the Word existed in God, it could only be the procession of love, which is by the operation of the will. the procession which is accomplished within the agent in an intellectual nature terminates in the procession of the will. this does not apply to other natures. the nature of will and intellect requires the processions belonging to each of them to exist in a certain order. love should proceed by way of generation. each procession in God takes its name from the proper notion of will and intellect; Thus it does not follow that love is begotten, but that the one begotten is the principle of love. it can be called spiration, as it is the procession of the Spirit. Therefore, if two processions exist in God, of intellect and will, it seems that there must also be a third procession of power. Therefore there must be a procession of goodness in God. in us there is not only one procession of the word, but there are many: Therefore in God there are more than two processions. Thus the divine power does not imply the procession of a divine person; but is indicated by the procession therefrom of creatures. goodness belongs to the essence and not to the operation, God understands all things by one simple act; and by one act also He wills all things. Therefore the divine relations are not real relations, but are formed only by the mind. Therefore paternity in God is not a real relation; while the same applies for the same reason to the other relations in God. the relations following upon the operation of the intellect are logical relations. Relationship is not predicated of God according to its proper and formal meaning, Boethius likens the divine relations to a relation of identity, not in every respect, but only as regards the fact that the substance is not diversified by these relations, He does not produce the creature by necessity of His nature, but by His intellect and will, relations, however, which follow the operation of the intellect, and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding and the source whence it proceeds, are not logical relations only, but are real relations; Therefore, if relations exist in God, there must be something else besides relation in God. This can only be His essence. nothing that exists in God can have any relation to that wherein it exists or of whom it is spoken, except the relation of identity; and this by reason of God's supreme simplicity. Hence it does not follow that there exists in God anything besides relation in reality; but only in the various names imposed by us. every relation in God is really the same as the divine essence. Further, in God there is no real distinction but that of origin. But one relation does not seem to arise from another. they are considered as opposed according to the procession of one from another. in God there exist the relations of the intelligent agent to the object understood; and of the one willing to the object willed; intelligible relations are infinitely multiplied, ideas in God are eternal Therefore in God there are many more eternal relations. Further, equality, and likeness, and identity are relations: and they are in God from eternity. Therefore several more relations are eternal in God than the above named. By the same way of reasoning there is the same relation from the Father to the Son, that of paternity, and from the Son to the Father, that of filiation; and thus there are not four relations in God. In God, however, the intellect and its object are one and the same; He understands all things by one act alone. Hence it does not follow from their plurality that there are many relations in God; Equality and similitude in God are not real relations; but are only logical relations the mutual relations are not the same. For nothing singular can be subject to definition. But person exists in things immovable, as in God, and in the angels. Therefore the word "nature" ought not to enter into the definition of person, but the word should rather be "essence." the separated soul is an individual substance of the rational nature; but it is not a person. yet what belongs to the general idea of singularity can be defined; terms expressive of intention can be used in defining realities if used to signify things which are unnamed. So in the definition of "person," which means the singular in a determined genus, it is more correct to use the term "nature" than "essence," because the latter is taken from being, which is most common. as we say there are three persons in God, so we say there are three subsistences in God; which implies that "person" and "subsistence" have the same meaning. genera and species only subsist; whereas individuals are not only subsistent, but also substand. Among the Greeks the term "hypostasis," taken in the strict interpretation of the word, signifies any individual of the genus substance; but in the usual way of speaking, it means the individual of the rational nature, because the word "substance," which, properly speaking, corresponds in meaning to "hypostasis," is used among us in an equivocal sense, since it sometimes means essence, and sometimes means hypostasis, in order to avoid any occasion of error, it was thought preferable to use "subsistence" for hypostasis, rather than "substance." the essence is what is expressed by the definition. Now, the definition comprises the principles of the species, but not the individual principles. Hence in things composed of matter and form, the essence signifies not only the form, nor only the matter, but what is composed of matter and the common form, not because the species and genera themselves subsist; the matter is the principle of substanding, and form is the principle of subsisting. the word "person" is only applied to God metaphorically. it signifies what is the subject of accidents, which do not exist in God. God cannot be said to have "a rational nature." Although the word "person" is not found applied to God in Scripture, either in the Old or New Testament, nevertheless what the word signifies is found to be affirmed of God the dignity of the divine nature excels every other dignity; and thus the name "person" pre-eminently belongs to God. the heretics used this term to deceive the simple, It may be said that God has a rational _nature,_ if reason be taken to mean, not discursive thought, but in a general sense, an intelligent nature. person signifies essence. "person" signifies substance. person in men and angels does not signify relation, in God essence is the same as the hypostasis, In God the individual--i.e. distinct and incommunicable substance--includes the idea of relation, The different sense of the less common term does not produce equivocation in the more common. If then there are several persons in God, there must be several substances; in God there is no plurality but of relations where number is, there is whole and part. if number in God is taken absolutely or abstractedly, there is nothing to prevent whole and part from being in Him, there are four relations in God as stated above (Q. 28, A. 4), paternity, filiation, common spiration, and procession. there are an infinite number of persons in God. so to infinity. spiration, is not separated from the person of the Father and of the Son, the procession of love is not called generation in God. the angels, who are more perfect and more simple, have fewer intrinsic operations than man, for they have no imagination, or feeling, or the like. Nor is there any distinction between them except by the personal relations. the notion of measure has no place, the numeral terms denote something real in creatures; therefore much more so in God. Multitude, which denotes something real in creatures, is a species of quantity, and cannot be used when speaking of God: this term "person" does not signify the essence directly. Therefore it is not common to all three. in God there is neither universal nor particular; neither genus nor species, the mode itself of incommunicable existence can be common to many. this name "Trinity" does not signify the substance; otherwise it would be predicated of each one of the persons: nor does it signify relation; "trinity" is a collective term, since it signifies multitude. in God there is not triplicity; otherwise there would be nine realities in God; trinity may mean trine-unity. Two things we do not place number in the unity of the essence, diversity requires a distinct substance in the sense of essence. "Difference" implies distinction of form. There is one form in God, God is with the angels and the souls of the saints. Therefore the society of angels and of souls does not take away absolute solitude from God; When we say, "Thee the only true God," we do not understand it as referring to the person of the Father, but to the whole Trinity, The philosophers did not know the mystery of the trinity of the divine persons by its proper attributes, such as paternity, filiation, and procession, We must not, however, think that the trinity of persons is adequately proved by such reasons. There are two reasons why the knowledge of the divine persons was necessary for us. It was necessary for the right idea of creation. The fact of saying that God made all things by His Word excludes the error of those who say that God produced things by necessity. When we say that in Him there is a procession of love, we show that God produced creatures not because He needed them, nor because of any other extrinsic reason, but on account of the love of His own goodness. So Moses, when he had said, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," subjoined, "God said, Let there be light," to manifest the divine Word; and then said, "God saw the light that it was good," to show proof of the divine love. The same is also found in the other works of creation. In another way, and chiefly, that we may think rightly concerning the salvation of the human race, accomplished by the Incarnate Son, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost. the notions do not concern the unity of the essence, nor the trinity of the persons; Although the notions are not mentioned in Holy Scripture, yet the persons are mentioned, comprising the idea of notions, In God the notions have their significance not after the manner of realities, but by way of certain ideas whereby the persons are known; But the relations in God are only four (Q. 28, A. 4). Therefore the notions are only four in number. if in God there are five notions, He may be called quinary; Besides the four relations, another notion must be admitted, the notions are signified as ideas notifying the persons. Person implies dignity, the persons are known by the notions. principle and cause are the same, if the Father is the principle of the Son, it follows that the Son is a person principled, and is therefore created; which appears false. in God there is no "before" and "after," "principle" is a wider term than "cause"; It is the custom with the Greeks to say that the Son and the Holy Ghost are principled. it does not signify priority, but origin. the name "Father" signifies relation. Moreover "person" is an individual substance. the more proper name of the divine person is begetter metaphorical term in God the relation signified by the name "Father" is a subsisting person. He is properly and not metaphorically called Son, "Father" comes first as an essential name before its personal sense. many ways; Word is applied to God metaphorically, no divine person is made. But the Word of God is something made. The Arians, who sprang from Origen, declared that the Son differed in substance from the Father. thought consists properly in the search after the truth, Anselm took the term "speak" improperly for the act of understanding; The term "word" is there taken figuratively, He proceeds from the Father, by way only of utterance; which is the heresy of Valentine; the Holy Ghost is the Son's Word. in God "to be" and "to understand" are one and the same: hence the Word of God is not an accident in Him, All these truths cannot be expressed by only one name. "word" is taken figuratively for the effect of the Word. Word is not said essentially, but personally. Word is said of God from eternity. if Word imports relation to creatures, it follows that in God there is not one Word only, but many. He knows also non-beings. Nor is it true that all names which import the relation of God to creatures are applied to Him in time; it is not necessary that the Word should proceed from creatures, God, by understanding Himself, understands every creature; and so there is only one Word in God, Image is said of God essentially, and not personally. species or form is said of God essentially. Imitation in God does not signify posteriority, but only assimilation. "The Holy Ghost is the Image of the Son." the Holy Ghost is an Image; man is also called the image of God, Damascene and the other Greek Doctors commonly employ the term image as meaning a perfect similitude. two ways. no name which is common to the three persons is the proper name of any one person. this name "Holy Ghost" is not a relative term. if Holy Spirit be taken as one word, it is thus that the expression, in the usage of the Church, is accommodated to signify one of the three persons, this name may be understood as including a relation, if we understand the Holy Spirit as being breathed [spiratus]. The Nestorians were the first to introduce the error that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son, as appears in a Nestorian creed condemned in the council of Ephesus. This error was embraced by Theodoric the Nestorian, and several others after him, among whom was also Damascene. The Word in God is not taken after the similitude of the vocal word, whence the breath [spiritus] does not proceed; for it would then be only metaphorical; but after the similitude of the mental word, whence proceeds love. Forasmuch as one power belongs to the Father and the Son; and because whatever is from the Father, must be from the Son unless it be opposed to the property of filiation; the Son is only from the Father, whereas the Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son; the Holy Ghost proceeds equally from both, although sometimes He is said to proceed principally or properly from the Father, because the Son has this power from the Father. the begetting of the Son is co-eternal with the begetter there is no order of power between Father and Son, but only order of 'supposita'; and hence we say that the Father spirates through the Son; and not conversely. the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as distinct from one another. unity in substance makes identity. If we consider the spirative power, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as they are one in the spirative power, which in a certain way signifies the nature with the property, as we shall see later (ad 7). Nor is there any reason against one property being in two _supposita_ that possess one common nature. But if we consider the _supposita_ of the spiration, then we may say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, as distinct; for He proceeds from them as the unitive love of both. It does not thence follow that by reason of the several properties the Father can be called several principles, for this would imply in Him a plurality of subjects. It is not by reason of relative properties that we speak of similitude or dissimilitude in God, but by reason of the essence. Some say that although the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, there are two spirators, by reason of the distinction of _supposita,_ as also there are two spirating, because acts refer to subjects. Yet this does not hold good as to the name "Creator"; because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two distinct persons, as above explained; whereas the creature proceeds from the three persons not as distinct persons, but as united in essence. It seems, however, better to say that because spirating is an adjective, and spirator a substantive, we can say that the Father and the Son are two spirating, by reason of the plurality of the _supposita_ but not two spirators by reason of the one spiration. For adjectival words derive their number from the _supposita_ but substantives from themselves, according to the form signified. As to what Hilary says, that "the Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son as His authors," this is to be explained in the sense that the substantive here stands for the adjective. love is not used to signify a subsisting person, but rather an action passing from the lover to the beloved. "Love is a unitive force." the Holy Ghost is the Love of the Father for the Son, As regards origin, therefore, the Holy Ghost is not the medium, but the third person in the Trinity; whereas as regards the aforesaid relation He is the bond between the two persons, as proceeding from both. He loves essentially as love proceeding; but not as the one whence love proceeds. to love is taken not only essentially, but also in a notional sense; when we say, "spirates" or "begets," this imports only a notional act. He loves Himself and every creature by the Holy Ghost, personal names are said of God from eternity; every proper name of a person signifies a property. As the Son is properly called the Image because He proceeds by way of a word, whose nature it is to be the similitude of its principle, although the Holy Ghost also is like to the Father; so also, because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father as love, He is properly called Gift, although the Son, too, is given. For that the Son is given is from the Father's love, according to the words, "God so loved the world, as to give His only begotten Son" The name Gift involves the idea of belonging to the Giver through its origin; and thus it imports the property of the origin of the Holy Ghost--that is, His procession. in God there is one essence and three persons, person is distinct, whereas essence is not. person is subject to essence; whence it is called _suppositum_ or "hypostasis." There cannot be a distinction of _suppositum_ in creatures by means of relations, but only by essential principles; because in creatures relations are not subsistent. But in God relations are subsistent, and so by reason of the opposition between them they distinguish the _supposita_; and yet the essence is not distinguished, because the relations themselves are not distinguished from each other so far as they are identified with the essence. individuals are called "subjects," _supposita,_ or "hypostases." it is not usual to say that the person is of the essence; but rather that the essence is of the person. Because "nature" designates the principle of action while "essence" comes from being [essendo], things may be said to be of one nature which agree in some action, as all things which give heat; but only those things can be said to be of "one essence" which have one being. So the divine unity is better described by saying that the three persons are "of one essence," than by saying they are "of one nature." The preposition "from" or "out of" does not designate the habitude of a formal cause, but rather the habitude of an efficient or material cause; the Hebrew original has "Elohim," which may be rendered "Gods" this word "person" signifies a being subsisting in an intellectual nature. the name "God" is used substantively; whereas "having Godhead" is used adjectively. Various languages have diverse modes of expression. We, however, do not apply the plural either to "God" or to "substance," This word "thing" is one of the transcendentals. Whence, so far as it is referred to relation, it is predicated of God in the plural; whereas, so far as it is referred to the substance, it is predicated in the singular. So Augustine says, in the passage quoted, that "the same Trinity is a thing supreme." The form signified by the word "person" is not essence or nature, but personality. Therefore there is God who begets, and there is God who does not beget; and thus it follows that there are two Gods. it need not always stand for the essence it signifies. the Son is generated. Therefore since the divine essence is in the Son, it seems that the divine essence is generated. it is true to say that "God begets God." Therefore this is also true: "Essence begets essence." a predicate can stand for that of which it is predicated. He is principle only by begetting or spirating. Therefore the Father begets or spirates the Godhead. what belongs to action is more nearly allied to the persons because actions belong to _supposita._ In creatures the one generated has not the same nature numerically as the generator, but another nature, numerically distinct, which commences to exist in it anew by generation, and ceases to exist by corruption, and so it is generated and corrupted accidentally; whereas God begotten has the same nature numerically as the begetter. So the divine nature in the Son is not begotten either directly or accidentally. Although God and the divine essence are really the same, nevertheless, on account of their different mode of signification, we must speak in a different way about each of them. The divine essence is predicated of the Father by mode of identity by reason of the divine simplicity; yet it does not follow that it can stand for the Father, its mode of signification being different. But notional and personal adjectives cannot be predicated of the essence unless we add some substantive. He is the principle of the whole Godhead; not as generating or spirating it, but as communicating it by generation and spiration. the lower is not predicated of the higher except by accidental predication; although to say of any of the _supposita_ of the divine nature, "God is the Trinity," is untrue, nevertheless it is true of the divine essence. the predication is one of identity, and not of the lower in regard to a higher species: the essential attributes should not be appropriated to the persons. what is common is prior to what is proper. in order to make the persons manifest by way of similitude, or dissimilitude, For "eternity" imports duration of existence; species, the principle of existence; no person is Father, Son and Holy Ghost. in one person there are several relations; Person and property are really the same, but differ in concept. The properties are said to be in the essence, only by mode of identity; but in the persons they exist by mode of identity, not merely in reality, but also in the mode of signification; properties are not designated as _supposita,_ but as forms of _supposita._ For simple things are distinct by themselves. But the persons are supremely simple. a form is distinguished only in relation to its genus. what is absolute comes before what is relative. But the distinction of the divine persons is the primary distinction. relation presupposes distinction, The persons are the subsisting relations themselves. Hence it is not against the simplicity of the divine persons for them to be distinguished by the relations. The divine persons are not distinguished as regards being, in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but only as regards something relative. The more prior a distinction is, the nearer it approaches to unity; and so it must be the least possible distinction. So the distinction of the persons must be by that which distinguishes the least possible; and this is by relation. Relation presupposes the distinction of the subjects, when it is an accident; but when the relation is subsistent, it does not presuppose, but brings about distinction. person is "a hypostasis distinguished by a property of dignity." if property be removed from person, the hypostasis remains. It would seem that the notional acts are understood before the properties. in the order of intelligence every relation presupposes that on which it is founded; paternity also presupposes generation. This objection avails of paternity as a relation, but not as constituting a person. action is one of the ten genera. Therefore any action attributed to God belongs to His essence, and not to a notion. the nature of action is of itself to cause passion. Every origin is designated by an act. as movement derived from another into a mobile object, is called "passion," so the origin of movement itself as beginning from another and terminating in what is moved, is called "action." passions are attributed to Him only from a grammatical standpoint, nothing is more voluntary than love. But the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love from the Father and the Son. the Son proceeds from the Father by will, and not by nature. what is not voluntary is necessary. the conception of the divine Word is natural. twofold meaning: the Father does not beget the Son from something, but from nothing. the Son was not begotten from something, but from nothing. the divine essence is unchangeable, and is not susceptive of another form. we can say that the creature is from God Who is essence; but not that it is from the essence of God. wisdom created is a kind of participation of the uncreated Wisdom. the Son proceeds as the word, which is the concept of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, which belongs to the will. Possible, as opposed to what is necessary, is a consequence of a passive power, which does not exist in God. in God the distinction of action and agent is one of reason only, otherwise action would be an accident in God. in God, power does not signify essence but relation. in God, the power to act [posse] and 'to act' are not distinct. there is a distinction of reason. there can be several Sons in God. Divine perfection and the total absence of matter in God require that there cannot be several Sons in God, Nor can there be equality by reason of discrete quantity, because two persons are more than one. essence is signified by way of form. But agreement in form makes things to be alike, not to be equal. the Son is the image of the Father; and so the Father is not equal to the Son. equality is a relation. But no relation is common to the three persons; for the persons are distinct by reason of the relations. Quantity is twofold. we say not only that the Son is like to the Father, in order to exclude the error of Eunomius, but also that He is equal to the Father to exclude the error of Arius. two ways equality and likeness in the divine persons is not a real relation distinct from the personal relations: nothing eternal has a principle. everything which is corrupted ceases to be. there is a moment to be assigned for the begetting of the Son, and before that moment the Son did not exist. Eternity excludes the principle of duration, but not the principle of origin. whatever exists in God is the essence, or a person, or a notion. in the divine persons there exists neither priority nor posteriority, wherever order exists, distinction also exists. But there is no distinction in the divine nature. there is no order of essence in God. Therefore neither is there of nature. The order of nature signifies the notion of origin in general, neither on the part of the nature, nor on the part the relations, can one person be prior to another, Nature in a certain way implies the idea of a principle, but essence does not; He Himself said (John 14:28): "The Father is greater than I"; the Son does not possess all the Father's dignity; in the Father there are three notions, while in the Son there are only two, These words are to be understood of Christ's human nature, the Son possesses whatever dignity the Father has; Wherefore all the relations together are not greater than only one; the Son and the Father are relatively opposed. What is contained in creatures does not sufficiently represent what exists in God; the Father can act of Himself. the Father has greater power than the Son. better still, this may be referred to Christ in His human nature. by the same power the Father begets, and the Son is begotten. this does not apply to a divine person, Who is everywhere. Mission implies inferiority in the one sent, when it means procession from the sender as principle, by command or counsel; forasmuch as the one commanding is the greater, and the counsellor is the wiser. In God, however, it means only procession of origin, which is according to equality, such a mission takes place without a separation, having only distinction of origin. This objection rests on the idea of mission according to local motion, which is not in God. mission implies procession. But the procession of the divine persons is eternal. Gregory speaks of the temporal generation of the Son, not from the Father, but from His mother; the Holy Ghost was given to the apostles for the working of miracles. Although the Son can be known by us according to other effects, yet neither does He dwell in us, nor is He possessed by us according to those effects. The working of miracles manifests sanctifying grace the Father gives Himself by grace the whole Trinity dwells in us He is not described as being sent, for He is not from another. only the Holy Ghost is sent invisibly. the procession of the Son and of the Holy Ghost differ from each other. Therefore they are distinct missions if both are sent; Although all the gifts, considered as such, are attributed to the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as He is by His nature the first Gift, since He is Love, as stated above (Q. 38, A. 1), some gifts nevertheless, by reason of their own particular nature, are appropriated in a certain way to the Son, those, namely, which belong to the intellect, the Son is the Word, not any sort of word, but one Who breathes forth Love. the effects of grace, which consist in the illumination of the intellect and the kindling of the affection. Fathers of the Old Testament had their share of grace. progress in virtue is only by grace. Christ and the blessed have fullness of grace. But mission is not to them, the Sacraments of the New Law contain grace, The invisible mission was directed to the Old Testament Fathers, Such invisible mission, however, chiefly occurs as regards anyone's proficiency in the performance of a new act, or in the acquisition of a new state of grace; To Christ the invisible mission was sent at the first moment of His conception; the mission of the divine person is not sent to the sacraments, but to those who receive grace through the sacraments. the Holy Ghost is never said to be less than the Father. the Holy Ghost is either not sent visibly at all, or His visible mission takes place in all these things. every visible creature is an effect showing forth the whole Trinity. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not sent by reason of those visible creatures more than any other person. if the Holy Ghost is sent visibly, He ought to be sent by reason of rational creatures. the angels are sent, and not the Holy Ghost. the Holy Ghost is said to be sent visibly, inasmuch as He showed Himself in certain creatures as in signs especially made for that purpose. Although the whole Trinity makes those creatures, still they are made in order to show forth in some special way this or that person. It was necessary for the Son to be declared as the author of sanctification, Those visible creatures were formed by the ministry of the angels, not to signify the person of an angel, but to signify the Person of the Holy Ghost. It is not necessary that the invisible mission should always be made manifest by some visible external sign; if a divine person is sent by another, He must be from that other. the divine person sent must proceed from the one sending. the divine person is sent only by the one whence He proceeds. the relation of the thing caused to its cause does not appear to be essential to beings, in mathematics demonstration is not made by the efficient cause, The science of mathematics treats its object as though it were something abstracted mentally, primary matter has no subject. the first passive principle is matter. every agent produces its like, and thus, since every agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it follows that everything made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only in potentiality, here we are speaking of things according to their emanation from the universal principle of being; from which emanation matter itself is not excluded, although it is excluded from the former mode of being made. Passion is an effect of action. The reason adduced does not show that matter is not created, but that it is not created without form; whatever exists in sensible things exists only by participation of some species. sciences and definitions are concerned with species themselves, but not as these are in particular things, because there is no science or definition of particular things. Therefore there are some beings, which are beings or species not existing in singular things, and these are called exemplars. Although creatures do not attain to a natural likeness to God according to similitude of species, as a man begotten is like to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him, forasmuch as they represent the divine idea, this particular man is a man by participation of the species, we abstract universal ideas by force of the active intellect from the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that the universals should exist outside the particulars in order to be their exemplars. to act for an end seems to imply need of the end. But God needs nothing. the end of generation is the form of the thing generated. But God is the first agent producing all things. all things desire their end. But all things do not desire God, for all do not even know Him. the final cause is the first of causes. If, therefore, God is the efficient cause and the final cause, it follows that before and after exist in Him; which is impossible. To act from need belongs only to an imperfect agent, which by its nature is both agent and patient. But this does not belong to God, and therefore He alone is the most perfectly liberal giver, because He does not act for His own profit, but only for His own goodness. The form of the thing generated is not the end of generation, except inasmuch as it is the likeness of the form of the generator, which intends to communicate its own likeness; otherwise the form of the thing generated would be more noble than the generator, since the end is more noble than the means to the end. All things desire God as their end, when they desire some good thing, creation appears to be the most noble action, and first among all actions. "nothing" cannot be the matter of being, nor in any way its cause. Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal sense, generation is simply nobler and more excellent than alteration, because the substantial form is nobler than the accidental form; When anything is said to be made from nothing, this preposition "from" [ex] does not signify the material cause, but only order; "nothing is made from nothing." creation is change. But every change occurs in some subject, when anything is made, its becoming precedes its having been made. But this is impossible, unless there is a subject in which the becoming is sustained. infinite distance cannot be crossed. But infinite distance exists between being and nothing. Ancient philosophers, as is said above (Q. 44, A. 2), considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular causes, Creation is not change, except according to a mode of understanding. In things which are made without movement, to become and to be already made are simultaneous, This objection proceeds from a false imagination, creation taken passively is not anything in the creature. on to infinity. the subject is before the accident, and preserves the accident; in God relation to the creature is not a real relation, Nor is there need of a further creation in its creation; because relations, or their entire nature being referred to something, are not referred by any other relations, but by themselves; "The first of creatures is being." composite things are not from nothing, matter, and not the composite, is, properly speaking, that which is created. the "composite" is created so that it is brought into being at the same time with all its principles. creation is the production of the whole being, and not only matter. an immaterial substance can make a substance like to itself. But a "contrary" resists more than "nothing." Therefore it requires more power to make (something) from its contrary, which nevertheless a creature can do, than to make a thing from nothing. created being is finite, only a finite power is needed to produce a creature by creation. But to have a finite power is not contrary to the nature of a creature. no created being can produce a being absolutely, A thing is made from its contrary indirectly (Phys. i, text 43), but directly from the subject which is in potentiality. And so the contrary resists the agent, inasmuch as it impedes the potentiality from the act which the agent intends to induce, as fire intends to reduce the matter of water to an act like to itself, but is impeded by the form and contrary dispositions, whereby the potentiality (of the water) is restrained from being reduced to act; and the more the potentiality is restrained, the more power is required in the agent to reduce the matter to act. Hence a much greater power is required in the agent when no potentiality pre-exists. Thus therefore it appears that it is an act of much greater power to make a thing from nothing, than from its contrary. although to create a finite effect does not show an infinite power, yet to create it from nothing does show an infinite power: the procession of the divine Person is prior to the procession of the creature: the causation of creatures belongs to the Persons according to processions and relations. The processions of the divine Persons are the cause of creation, As the divine nature, although common to the three Persons, still belongs to them in a kind of order, creation, which is the production of the very substance of a thing, is reduced to "power." the trinity of persons cannot be traced from the creatures, on to infinitude. in the creature is to be found a trace not of the Trinity but of the unity of essence. only to a subsisting being is the trace ascribed in regard to those three things. The processions of the persons are also in some way the cause and type of creation; the substantial form is not produced by the operation of nature; and therefore it must be produced by creation. Forms begin to be actual when the composite things are made, for the generation of perfect animals the universal agent does not suffice, but a proper agent is required, in the shape of a univocal generator. If therefore the world began to exist, it was a possible being before it began to exist. But possible being is matter, which is in potentiality to existence, which results from a form, and to non-existence, which results from privation of form. If therefore the world began to exist, matter must have existed before the world. But matter cannot exist without form: no incorruptible thing begins to exist. But there are many incorruptible things in the world, what is unbegotten has no beginning. But the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten, before the world there was a vacuum; which is impossible. movement always was; time cannot begin or end, and consequently neither can movement, Since therefore God is eternal, the world is also eternal. the action of God is His substance, which is eternal. Therefore the world is eternal. Before the world existed it was possible for the world to be, not, indeed, according to a passive power which is matter, but according to the active power of God; they did not begin by the natural mode whereby things generated and corruptible begin. matter and heaven did not begin by generation, as some said, especially about heaven. But we say that matter and heaven were produced into being by creation, there was no place or space before the world was. The first mover was always in the same state: but the first movable thing was not always so, God is prior to the world by priority of duration. from the eternal action of God an eternal effect did not follow; it can be proved demonstratively that God is the effective cause of the world; The world, therefore, which is His effect, did not always exist. certain countries have begun to be inhabited at some fixed time. nothing can be equal to God. But if the world had always been, it would be equal to God in duration. it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium. in efficient causes there could be an infinite series, which is disproved an infinite number of human souls would actually now exist, which is impossible. creation, by which He produced the world, is not a successive change, it was not made from anything; Such is the human intellect, but not the divine intellect Even supposing that the world always was, it would not be equal to God in eternity, as Boethius says (De Consol. v, 6); because the divine Being is all being simultaneously without succession; Passage is always understood as being from term to term. In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity _per se_--thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are _per se_ required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity _accidentally_ creation was not in the beginning of time. everything which is made, was being made; and so to be made implies a "before" and "after." But in the beginning of time, since it is indivisible, there is no "before" and "after." Therefore, since to be created is a kind of "being made," it appears that things were not created in the beginning of time. together with time heaven and earth were created. in every movement there is "before" and "after," before any one point in a given movement--that is, whilst anything is in the process of being moved and made, there is a "before" and also an "after," because what is in the beginning of movement or in its term is not in "being moved." But creation is neither movement nor the term of movement, nothing exists of time except "now." Hence time cannot be made except according to some "now"; He produces but one effect. God is the exemplar cause of His effect, the end of the creation is one--viz. the divine goodness, The natural agent acts by the form which makes it what it is, and which is only one in one thing; and therefore its effect is one only. But the voluntary agent, such as God is, as was shown above (Q. 19, A. 4), acts by an intellectual form. Since, therefore, it is not against God's unity and simplicity to understand many things, as was shown above (Q. 15, A. 2), it follows that, although He is one, He can make many things. no creature represents the first exemplar perfectly, which is the divine essence; and, therefore, it can be represented by many things. it belongs to God, Who is the Best, to make all things equal. equality is the effect of unity (Metaph. v, text 20). But God is one. this does not mean that He makes every part of the whole the best absolutely, but in proportion to the whole; The first effect of unity is equality; inequality comes from the perfection of the whole. His power is not limited to the creation of one world; but rather it is infinite, it is better for there to be many worlds than one, multiplication in number comes from matter. But the world has a form in matter. This reason proves that the world is one because all things must be arranged in one order, and to one end. No agent intends material plurality as the end The world is composed of the whole of its matter. For every genus is a nature. But evil is a genus; every difference which constitutes a species is a nature. But evil is a difference constituting a species of morality; each extreme of two contraries is a nature. But evil and good are not opposed as privation and habit, but as contraries, evil acts, for it corrupts good. Therefore evil is a being and a nature. evil is not a constitutive difference as such, but by reason of the good that is annexed. the Philosopher speaks there of good and evil in morality. threefold sense. evil neither belongs to the perfection of the universe, nor does it come under the order of the same, "being" and "thing" are convertible. If therefore evil is a being in things, it follows that evil is a thing, in things made by God there is no evil. it is neither a habit nor a pure negation, but a privation. twofold. one contrary is not the subject of another. evil is not in existing things as a part, or as a natural property of any existing thing. privation is negation in a subject, one good can coexist with the privation of another good. one contrary is wholly corrupted by another. But good and evil are contraries. in all creatures there is the defect of not being able to preserve their own existence, which nevertheless is neither a pain nor a fault. in irrational creatures there is neither fault nor pain; but, nevertheless, they have corruption and defect, temptation is an evil, but it is not a fault; for "temptation which involves no consent, is not a sin, but an occasion for the exercise of virtue," a thing is evil "because it hurts." But whatever hurts is penal. Therefore every evil comes under pain. not every defect of good is an evil, Pain and fault do not divide evil absolutely considered, but evil that is found in voluntary things. the very nature of pain includes the idea of injury to the agent fault is to pain what merit is to reward. since the agent is better than the action, it seems that pain is worse than fault. the privation of the end is a pain consisting in forfeiting the vision of God; whereas the evil of fault is privation of the order to the end. Therefore pain is a greater evil than fault. pain is brought about so that the fault may be avoided, Pain and fault are not to be compared as end and order to the end; good tree cannot bring forth evil one contrary cannot be the cause of another. the cause of evil can only be evil. evil has no cause. the movement itself of an evil will is caused by the rational creature, which is good; Good does not cause that evil which is contrary to itself, but some other evil: Evil has no direct cause, but only an accidental cause, the effect of the secondary cause is reduced to the first cause. But good is the cause of evil, as was said above (A. 1). Therefore, since God is the cause of every good, as was shown above (Q. 2, A. 3; Q. 6, AA. 1, 4), it follows that also every evil is from God. These passages refer to the evil of penalty, and not to the evil of fault. God does not fail in doing what is necessary for the safety of all. if one contrary is in nature, so is the other. whatever is accidental is reduced to that which is _per se._ But good is the accidental cause of evil. Therefore, we must suppose some supreme evil which is the _per se_ cause of evils. proceed to infinity Contraries agree in one genus, and they also agree in the nature of being; and therefore, although they have contrary particular causes, nevertheless we must come at last to one first common cause. since evil is privation of good, as appears from what was said above (Q. 48, AA. 1, 2, 3), it is opposed to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the supreme good, who is pure act. privation removes a perfection. No being is called evil by participation, but by privation of participation. Evil can only have an accidental cause, nothing is moved except a body, every creature is corporeal. it is said that angels, compared to God, are material and corporeal, not, however, as if anything corporeal existed in them. an angel is called an ever mobile substance, because he is ever actually intelligent, and not as if he were sometimes actually and sometimes potentially, as we are. everything which is contained under any genus is composed of the genus, and of the difference which added to the genus makes the species. But the genus comes from the matter, and the difference from the form the properties of matter are to receive and to substand; an angel is not pure act, for this belongs to God alone. the form which is not in matter is an infinite form. But the form of an angel is not infinite, for every creature is finite. it would be cogent, supposing that the receptive mode of the intellect and of matter were the same. But this is clearly false. Although there is no composition of matter and form in an angel, yet there is act and potentiality. there is nothing against a creature being considered relatively infinite. number is a species of quantity, and follows the division of a continuous body. But this cannot be in the angels, the more a thing approaches to unity, so much the less is it multiplied, as is evident in numbers. But among other created natures the angelic nature approaches nearest to God. Therefore since God is supremely one, it seems that there is the least possible number in the angelic nature. the proper effect of the separate substances seems to be the movements of the heavenly bodies. But the movements of the heavenly bodies fall within some small determined number, which we can apprehend. In the angels number is not that of discrete quantity, brought about by division of what is continuous, but that which is caused by distinction of forms; This argument comes from the opinion of such as hold that matter is the cause of the distinction of things; but this was refuted more and less do not change a species. But the angels seem to differ only from one another according to more and less--namely, all souls are of the one species. So therefore are the angels. the more perfect a thing is in nature, the more ought it to be multiplied. all the angels differ in species according to the diverse degrees of intellectual nature. More and less change the species, not according as they are caused by the intensity or remissness of one form, but according as they are caused by forms of diverse degrees; the perfection of the angelic nature calls for the multiplying of species, but not for the multiplying of individuals in one species. "all things would tend towards nothing, unless the hand of the Almighty preserved them." Damascene is dealing with perfect immortality, which includes complete immutability; By the expression 'gods' Plato understands the heavenly bodies, when it is said that all things, even the angels, would lapse into nothing, unless preserved by God, it is not to be gathered therefrom that there is any principle of corruption in the angels; "The demons are called animals of the atmosphere because their nature is akin to that of aerial bodies." But the nature of demons and angels is the same. every animal is composed of body and soul. life is more perfect in the angels than in souls. metaphorically, an intellectual substance which is not united to a body is more perfect than one which is united to a body. an angel has no need for a body, since his own power exceeds all bodily power. a body is not united to an angel as to a form, angels do not assume bodies from the earth or water, or they could not suddenly disappear; nor again from fire, otherwise they would burn whatever things they touched; nor again from air, because air is without shape or color. all the apparitions in the Old Testament were ordained to that one whereby the Son of God appeared in the flesh. by Divine power sensible bodies are so fashioned by angels as fittingly to represent the intelligible properties of an angel. angels assume bodies of air, pretence is unbecoming in angels of truth. in the works of the angels there is nothing without a purpose. But eyes, nostrils, and the other instruments of the senses, would be fashioned without a purpose in the body assumed by the angel, if he perceived nothing by their means. to move hither and thither is one of the functions of life, angels spoke when angels appeared in their assumed bodies they ate, angels exercised vital functions it can in no way be said that the angels perceive through the organs of their assumed bodies. angels are moved accidentally, angels do not talk through their assumed bodies; angels cannot be said to eat, the sons of God are to be understood the sons of Seth, things incorporeal are not in a place." to have a position cannot befit an angel, since his substance is devoid of quantity, the proper difference of which is to have a position. an angel can neither be measured nor contained by a place, the soul is in several places at once, for it is entirely in every part of the body, an angel is in the body which he assumes; and, since the body which he assumes is continuous, it would appear that he is in every part thereof. angels do not fill a place, demons, although they do not obsess souls, do obsess bodies occasionally; and thus the soul and the demon are at the one time in the same place; An angel and a body are not in a place in the same way; Not even a demon and a soul are compared to a body according to the same relation of causality; since the soul is its form, while the demon is not. "nothing which is devoid of parts is moved"; movement is "the act of an imperfect being," movement is simply because of want. Aristotle's demonstration deals with what is indivisible according to quantity, to which responds a place necessarily indivisible. And this cannot be said of an angel. the movement which is by application of energy is the act of one in act: because energy implies actuality. The movement of that which is in potentiality is the act of an imperfect infinite points an angel is of simpler substance than the soul. The place of an angel is not taken as equal to him according to magnitude, but according to contact of power: and so the angel's place can be divisible, and is not always a mere point. While an angel is moved locally, his essence is applied to various places: In continuous movement the actual change is not a part of the movement, but its conclusion; hence movement must precede change. If therefore a body is moved in time, an angel is moved in an instant. the angel's movement is simpler than any bodily change. But some bodily change is effected in an instant, such as illumination; he is not moved except in the last instant of time. the swiftness of the angel's movement is not measured by the quantity of his power, but according to the determination of his will. Illumination is the term of a movement; and is an alteration, not a local movement, It would seem that the angel's act of understanding is his substance. For the angel is both higher and simpler than the active intellect of a soul. life is essence. The relation between "life" and "to live" is not the same as that between "essence" and "to be"; The essence of an angel is the reason of his entire existence, but not the reason of his whole act of understanding, since he cannot understand everything by his essence. an angel would not be a simple form, which is contrary to what has been previously said the angel is of a simpler nature than primary matter, as being closer to God. But primary matter is its own power. An angel is called "intellect" and "mind," because all his knowledge is intellectual: whereas the knowledge of a soul is partly intellectual and partly sensitive. a simple form which is not its own existence, but is compared to it as potentiality is to act, can be the subject of accident; The power of matter is a potentiality in regard to substantial being itself, whereas the power of operation regards accidental being. an angel receives enlightenment from a higher angel, and enlightens a lower one. Knowledge, however, is not generated in the angels, but is present naturally. Hence there is no need for admitting an active and a passive intellect in them. if anyone wishes to call these by the names of active and passive intellect, he will then be speaking equivocally; and it is not about names that we need trouble. there is a sensitive faculty in them as well. they have likewise a power of memory. the power of the imagination is in the demons; and for the same reason it is in the angels, since they are of the same nature. "in things which are without matter, the intellect is the same as the object understood." God has a proper knowledge of all things by His own essence: and this the angel has not, but only a common knowledge. the angel's knowledge is not the cause of existing things; that belongs to the Divine knowledge alone. Therefore it is necessary for the species, by which the angelic mind understands, to be derived from things. the angelic light is stronger than the light of the active intellect of the soul. There are images of creatures in the angel's mind, not, indeed derived from creatures, but from God, the nature of a form in the imagination, which form is without matter but not without material conditions, stands midway between the nature of a form which is in matter, and the nature of a form which is in the intellect The angel's knowledge is quite indifferent as to what is near or distant. angels do not understand by species abstracted from things. Therefore it cannot be said that the species of the angelic intellect are more or less universal. to know anything generically is, in a fashion, midway between potentiality and act. If, therefore, the higher angels know by more universal species than the lower, it follows that the higher have a more imperfect knowledge than the lower; which is not befitting. if the higher angel knows various things by one universal form, which the lower angel knows by several special forms, It is accidental to the universal to be abstracted from particulars, two senses. The same applies to the universal form which is in the mind of the angel, so that, on account of its excellence, many things can be known through it with a proper knowledge. since the angel possesses only knowledge which is intellectual, no angel can know himself. understanding is a kind of passion. But nothing is moved by or is passive to itself; We have no knowledge of single corporeal things, not because of their particularity, but on account of the matter, the action of the intellect is not of the same nature as the action found in corporeal things, one angel is not the cause of another. the Trinity alone can penetrate the mind. The spiritual natures of the angels are distinguished from one another in a certain order, The nature of cause and effect does not lead one angel to know another, except on account of likeness, One angel knows another by the species of such angel existing in his intellect, God made every creature proportionate to the universe which He determined to make. God is infinitely above the intellect of an angel. But what is infinitely beyond cannot be reached. Dionysius is speaking of the knowledge of comprehension, Since an angel's intellect and essence are infinitely remote from God, it follows that he cannot comprehend Him; nor can he see God's essence through his own nature. Yet it does not follow on that account that he can have no knowledge of Him at all: material things cannot be the perfections of angels, since they are beneath them. there is neither imaginary nor sensible vision in the angels, but only intellectual. material things are not actually intelligible, The thing understood is the perfection of the one who understands, by reason of the intelligible species which he has in his intellect. Sense does not apprehend the essences of things, but only their outward accidents. In like manner neither does the imagination; he has knowledge of material things by actually intelligible species of things, in the angels there is no power of understanding save the intellectual power, an angel is immaterial, while matter is the principle of singularity. singular things are not known in the universal except potentially. the species in the angel's intellect, which are images drawn from the Divine essence, are the images of things not only as to their form, but also as to their matter. Angels know singulars by universal forms, angels are mightier in knowledge than men. But some men know many future events. to the angel's mind, past and future are not different, universal species refer equally to present, past, and future. Men cannot know future things except in their causes, or by God's revelation. The angels know the future in the same way, but much more distinctly. since there is succession in the angel's intellect, not all things that happen through all time, are present to the angelic mind. Things which are yet to come have not yet a nature whereby they are likened to such species; when an intellectual substance is seen, the intelligible species within it is also seen. the images in our imagination can be known by an angel as corporeal things are known: The first obstacle will be removed at the Resurrection, and does not exist at all in the angels; while the second will remain, and is in the angels now. it does not follow that one knows how far another makes use of them by actual consideration. it does not follow that, if the angel knows what is passing through man's sensitive appetite or imagination, he knows what is in the thought or will: the mystery of the Incarnation is the most excellent of all mysteries. But the angels knew of it from the beginning; the angels behold God's wisdom, the prophets are enlightened by the angels, as is clear from Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv). But the prophets knew mysteries of grace; two ways Although the angels in bliss behold the Divine wisdom, yet they do not comprehend it. movement is the act of what is in potentiality, as stated in _Phys._ iii, 6. But the angels' minds are moved by understanding, whoever desires to know anything is in potentiality thereto. the angel's intelligence has some admixture of potentiality. Movement is taken there not as the act of something imperfect, that is, of something existing in potentiality, but as the act of something perfect, that is, of one actually existing. they are said to desire the vision of God with regard to fresh revelations, which they receive from God to fit them for the tasks which they have to perform. the angel's intellect is never so in potentiality as to be without act. neither can one intellect simultaneously understand various intelligible things. it can behold at the same time many intelligible objects under one species; they know creatures through the Word. the human intellect can syllogize, and know causes in effects; all of which is the discursive method. Therefore the intellect of the angel, which is higher in the order of nature, can with greater reason do this. "demons learn more things by experience." they do not acquire knowledge of an unknown truth in this way, similitude, there is composition and division in the angel's mind. the first of distinctions is that of affirmation and negation. in speaking to men, angels use affirmative and negative expressions, in apprehending a nature, he by one simple perception grasps all that we can learn by composing and dividing. as to the way in which they are known, affirmation and negation have something more in common; The fact that angels use affirmative and negative forms of speech, shows that they know both composition and division: yet not that they know by composing and dividing, there can be nescience in the angels. there is no darkness in the knowledge of an angel; since there is no error nor falsehood. there ought to be admitted a third class of knowledge, Evening and morning knowledge in the angelic knowledge are not taken as compared to an admixture of darkness, but as compared to beginning and end. the morning and evening knowledge of the angels are one and the same. the angels are always using their morning knowledge; because they are always beholding God and things in God, it is compared to it as the less perfect to the perfect. Therefore the evening knowledge cannot exist together with the morning knowledge. the evening knowledge is referred to the morning knowledge in the angels; faith, which is of the things that are not seen, is made void when vision succeeds. there is no reason in the angels, but something higher than reason. Therefore there is no will in the angels, but something higher than the will. the will is comprised under the appetite, as is evident from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42). But the appetite argues something imperfect; the angels are immovable, since they are incorporeal. the intellect knows by simple intuition, while reason knows by a process of discursion from one thing to another. in the angels, who are purely intellectual, there is no appetite higher than the will. to will and to understand are termed movements of a kind; the good and the true differ, not really but only logically the true is a particular good, to wit, of the intellect. the good is apprehended by the intellect as something true; while the true is desired by the will as something good. the angels' knowledge is not the result of inquiring, free-will implies indifference to alternatives. free-will does not admit of degrees. there is choice in the angels, yet not with the inquisitive deliberation of counsel, but by the sudden acceptance of truth. Free-will exists in a nobler manner in the higher angels than it does in the lower, demons are of the same nature as angels; for sin has not altered their nature. charity and temperance appear to be in the concupiscible, while hope and fortitude are in the irascible. Fury and concupiscence are metaphorically said to be in the demons, as anger is sometimes attributed to God;--on Love and joy, in so far as they are passions, are in the concupiscible appetite, but in so far as they express a simple act of the will, they are in the intellective part: in this sense to love is to wish well to anyone; Charity, as a virtue, is not in the concupiscible appetite, but in the will; an angel's love is intellectual. the angels are not acted upon, charity is above nature, while wickedness is against nature. an angel being moved to act in so far as such natural inclination is implanted in him by the Author of his nature. natural love is nothing else than the inclination implanted in nature by its Author. Now rational love is contrasted with intellectual, which is proper to angels, besides their infused love, there is only natural love in the angels. Not all love of choice is rational love, natural love regards the end itself; while love of choice regards the means to the end. As love is an action which remains within the agent, so also is it a movement which abides within the lover, but does not of necessity tend towards something else; yet it can be reflected back upon the lover so that he loves himself; an angel does not know another as he knows himself: because he knows himself by his essence, while he knows another by his similitude, love for another comes of love for self, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore one angel does not love another as himself, but loves himself more. demons, who have no love for the good angels. The expression "as" does not denote equality, but likeness. Nor can such natural love be stripped from the wicked angels, without their still retaining a natural affection towards the good angels, in so far as they share the same nature with them. But they hate them, in so far as they are unlike them according to righteousness and unrighteousness. we behold every agent acting naturally for its own preservation. it is proper to charity to love God more than self. But to love from charity is not natural to the angels; the love of God more than self does not remain in the angel or man who sins; everything in its own way naturally loves God more than itself. everything is inclined to preserve not merely its individuality, but likewise its species. God, in so far as He is the universal good, from Whom every natural good depends, is loved by everything with natural love. So far as He is the good which of its very nature beatifies all with supernatural beatitude, He is love with the love of charity. it is impossible that whoever sees Him in His essence should not love Him. the angels are immaterial forms, as was shown above (Q. 50, A. 2). Therefore they have no cause of their being. the angels have no active cause. the angels were not passed over in that account of the first creation of things, Substances that are subsisting forms have no 'formal' cause of their existence and unity, God is the cause of the angel by His being: for He does not act through something besides His essence. But His being is eternal. the angel is above time, the intellectual nature of the soul and of the angel is not only incorruptible, but likewise eternal. He produced such as He willed, and when He willed. An angel is above that time which is the measure of the movement of the heavens; they did not possess this nature from eternity; the angelic nature was produced ere time was made, and after eternity. the angelic nature is more remote from the corporeal nature than one corporeal nature is from another. But one corporeal nature was made before another; the creation of the angels does not involve creation of the universe. the angels were not created in any corporeal place. the angels were created in the upper atmosphere: the empyrean heaven is said to be the highest heaven. The angels were created in a corporeal place, he is not speaking of all the angels; but only of such as sinned, Isaias is not speaking there of any corporeal heaven, but of the heaven of the Blessed Trinity; angels were created in beatitude. the angelic nature is nobler than the corporeal creature. But the corporeal creature straightway from its creation was made perfect and complete; straightway from their creation they knew the Word, and things in the Word. But the bliss of the angels comes of seeing the Word. The corporeal creature instantly in the beginning of its creation could not have the perfection to which it is brought by its operation; twofold the angel naturally turns to God: it was not a difficult task for the angel to turn to God; we do not stand in need of grace in order to prepare ourselves for grace: The angel loves God naturally, so far as God is the author of his natural being. But here we are speaking of turning to God, so far as God bestows beatitude by the vision of His essence. two ways. threefold If, therefore, the angel had been created in grace, no angel would ever have turned away from God. first created in nature only, and then received grace, and that last of all they were beatified. he who has grace can fail to make use of it, and can sin. glory is the end of the operation of nature helped by grace. the angel experienced no difficulty in acting rightly. it was quite natural for the angel to turn to God. the distinct degrees of grace would not be permanent; which is not admissible. good work is beyond his natural capacity. An angel did not merit beatitude by natural movement towards God; but by the movement of charity, which comes of grace. man is not rewarded at once after one act of merit. angels were in beatitude in the first instant. the angel would have to pass through many stages of merit in order to reach beatitude. Man was not intended to secure his ultimate perfection at once, like the angel. the various instants regarding the angels are not to be taken except as reckoning the succession of their acts. the degree of grace depends on God's will, grace does not come "of works," man does not receive more grace according to the degree of his natural gifts. grace is bestowed according to degree of nature than according to works. Diversity of natural gifts is in one way in the angels, who are themselves different specifically; and in quite another way in men, who differ only numerically. natural love and knowledge are imperfect in comparison with beatified knowledge and love. the knowledge and love of glory suffice for the beatified angels. happiness consists not in habit, but in act. The advent of a perfection removes the opposite imperfection. no beatitude is self-subsisting, except the uncreated beatitude. natural knowledge and love are ordained to the knowledge and love of glory. beatitude does not do away with nature. the will of the angel in beatitude does not cease to be rational. Therefore it is inclined towards good and evil. freedom of will is not lessened in the beatified angels. Created good, considered in itself, can fail. But from its perfect union with the uncreated good, such as is the union of beatitude, it is rendered unable to sin, they have no tendency to opposites with regard to God Himself, as merit increases, the reward of beatitude increases. if unable to ascend higher, it would appear that there is imperfection and defect in them; which is not admissible. to merit belongs to the imperfect charity of this life; two ways. Such joy belongs to their accidental reward, which can be increased unto judgment day. the subject of privation is a being in potentiality. But the angels have not being in potentiality, since they are subsisting forms. the angels are higher than the heavenly bodies. But philosophers say that there cannot be evil in the heavenly bodies. it is natural for the angels to be moved by the movement of love towards God. Therefore such love cannot be withdrawn from them. for the angels there can be no apparent good which is not a true good; there is potentiality in their intellective part, besides their natural action there is the action of free-will in the angels, by reason of which evil may be in them. for him to turn to God as the object of supernatural beatitude, comes of infused love, from which he could be turned away by sinning. two ways demons delight even in the obscenities of carnal sins; not only can there be pride and envy in the angels; but likewise sloth and avarice. many vices spring from pride; and in like manner from envy. it is wholly through envy that they take pleasure in all sorts of human sins, so far as these are hindrances to a man's good. pride and envy are the only spiritual sins which can be found in demons; Under envy and pride, as found in the demons, are comprised all other sins derived from them. an angel could not desire to be as God. If, therefore, the angel desired to be as God, not by equality, but by likeness, it would seem that he did not thereby sin. the angel was created with greater fulness of wisdom than man. But no man, save a fool, ever makes choice of being the equal of an angel, still less of God; because choice regards only things which are possible, regarding which one takes deliberation. Therefore much less did the angel sin by desiring to be as God. some men are naturally wicked, the fox is naturally sly, Augustine rebukes Porphyry for saying that the demons are naturally deceitful; himself maintaining that they are not naturally so, but of their own will. "He was a murderer from the beginning." in the first instant of their creation some of the angels were made blessed, and some sinned. some intellectual nature can merit in the first instant of its creation; he never went back from his sin. The same reason does not hold good of sin; some of them at once placed an impediment to their beatitude, thereby destroying their preceding merit; since walking is continuous movement, it requires an interval. "the serpent of old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly"; there was some delay between man's formation and his sin. there is a middle time between every two instants. time is taken to mean the succession of their mental acts, the order of the Cherubim is under the order of the Seraphim, If therefore the highest of the angels sinned, it follows that the Divine ordinance was frustrated the higher an angel is, so much the more is he inclined towards God. Cherubim is derived from knowledge; which is compatible with mortal sin; there was no necessity imposed upon him: they all sinned at one time. an angel's first sin can only be pride, as was shown above (A. 2). But pride seeks excellence. Now it is more contrary to excellence for anyone to be subject to an inferior than to a superior; and so it does not appear that the angels sinned by desiring to be subject to a higher angel rather than to God. the lower angels would have sinned more deeply than the highest one; in the order of nature they were even then subject to the highest angel. since the highest angel had greater natural energy than the lower angels, he fell into sin with intenser energy, and therefore he became the greater in malice. "The number of fools is infinite." According to those who maintain that the chief devil was of the highest order, it is probable that some fell of every order; they are not clean of heart, whereby alone can God be seen. the demons have no morning knowledge, because they do not see things in the Word; nor have they the evening knowledge, the angels at their creation knew the mystery of the kingdom of God, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19; De Civ. Dei xi). But the demons are deprived of such knowledge: Nor can they learn by long experience: because experience comes of the senses. neither does the angel's happiness consist in knowing separated substances. on account of the perfection of his intellect he can of his nature have a higher knowledge of God than man can have. Such knowledge of God remains also in the demons. if it be not referred to God, as is the case with the demons, it is not called evening, but "nocturnal" knowledge. the demons much less fully understood the mystery of the Incarnation, three ways: the demons' will is not so obstinate in evil as not to be able to return to what is good. since God's mercy is infinite, it is greater than the demons' malice, which is finite. that sin, namely, pride, is in them no longer; because the motive for the sin no longer endures, namely, excellence. the lower demons fell through the highest one. Therefore their fall can be repaired by another. he confesses the truth, God's mercy delivers from sin those who repent. But such as are not capable of repenting, cling immovably to sin, and are not delivered by the Divine mercy. The devil's first sin still remains in him according to desire; when he believes and confesses, yet not willingly, but compelled by the evidence of things. there is joy in the demons: sorrow is the cause of fear, for those things cause fear while they are future, which cause sorrow when they are present. But there is no fear in the demons, it is a good thing to be sorry for evil. But the demons can do no good action. Joy and sorrow about the same thing are opposites, but not about different things. "the devils believe and tremble" he is not sorry for the evil of sin. a spiritual nature is not affected by place. man's place of punishment is hell. Much more, therefore, is it the demons' place of punishment; there is no fire in the darksome atmosphere. Some have maintained that the pain of sense for demons and souls is postponed until the judgment day: and that the beatitude of the saints is likewise postponed until the judgment day. But this is erroneous, visible bodies do not continue for ever, corporeal creatures are evil, corporeal creatures withdraw us from God. All the creatures of God in some respects continue for ever, at least as to matter, since what is created will never be annihilated, Corporeal creatures according to their nature are good, Creatures of themselves do not withdraw us from God, but lead us to Him; all things were created for their own being's sake, Corporeal creatures, therefore, are created for the sake of spiritual creatures, the former were made on account of movements of free-will, In the very fact of any creature possessing being, it represents the Divine being and Its goodness. in the production of things it was ordained that the corporeal should be produced by the spiritual, If then all creatures, both spiritual and corporeal, were produced immediately by God, there would be no diversity in creatures, infinite power is not required to produce a finite effect. not such that one creature is created by another, for that is impossible; the production of finite things, where nothing is presupposed as existing, is the work of infinite power, the heavenly bodies give form to things here below, for which reason they are said to cause generation and corruption. if by immaterial forms he understands the angels, we say that from them come material forms, not by emanation, but by motion. types in the Divine intellect, by which the seeds of forms are implanted in created things, that they may be able to be brought by movement into act. The heavenly bodies inform earthly ones by movement, not by emanation. nature in its working imitates the working of God, matter is higher than accident, for matter is part of substance. Nature produces effect in act from being in potentiality; God produces being in act out of nothing, Accident, inasmuch as it is a form, is a kind of act; whereas matter, as such, is essentially being in potentiality. different acts befit different potentialities, distinction is due to form. Augustine follows in this the opinion of Plato, who does not admit a fifth essence. the matter of the celestial bodies is different from that of the elemental, because the matter of the celestial is not in potentiality to an elemental form. the empyrean heaven is not movable. If, therefore, the empyrean heaven is the highest of bodies, it must necessarily exercise some influence on bodies below it. But this does not seem to be the case, Corporeal place, therefore, cannot be the seat of contemplation. among the heavenly bodies exists a body, partly transparent and partly luminous, which we call the sidereal heaven. There exists also a heaven wholly transparent, called by some the aqueous or crystalline heaven. If, then, there exists a still higher heaven, it must be wholly luminous. But this cannot be, when glory is finally consummated, the movement of bodies will cease. the empyrean has light, not condensed so as to emit rays, as the sun does, but of a more subtle nature. time is the measure of the firmament's movement; and the firmament is said to have been made on the second day. movement precedes time, Place, then, as truly as time, must be reckoned among the things first created. time was in a manner formless before it was fully formed and distinguished into day and night. time is nothing else than "the measure of priority and succession in movement." movement, which is related only to the movable subject. Place is implied as existing in the empyrean heaven, this being the boundary of the universe. the powers of movement, intersection, reflection, belong properly to bodies; Therefore light is a body. Augustine takes light to be a luminous body in act--in other words, to be fire, metaphorically, light does not remain in the air when the source of light is withdrawn. every sensible quality has its opposite, as cold is opposed to heat, blackness to whiteness. But this is not the case with light since darkness is merely a privation of light. Light, then, is not a sensible quality, but rather a substantial or spiritual form. light is not produced by the transmutation of matter, It is accidental to light not to have a contrary, so does light act instrumentally, by virtue of the heavenly bodies, towards producing substantial forms; qualities are accidents, and as such should have, not the first, but a subordinate place. the sun, which is recorded as having been made on the fourth day. the firmament was made on the second day. in the beginning spiritual darkness was not, the light was the sun's light, twofold. heaven existed before days, the firmament naturally precedes the earth and the waters, all that was made in the six days was formed out of matter created before days began. But the firmament cannot have been formed out of pre-existing matter, for if so it would be liable to generation and corruption. the heaven made on the first day is the empyrean, and the firmament made on the second day, the starry heaven. water is heavy by nature, fluids cannot rest on a sphere, water would be useless there. the waters surrounding the earth are of a dense consistency, and those around the firmament of a rarer consistency, the waters above the firmament are not fluid, but exist outside it in a solid state, as a mass of ice, and that this is the crystalline heaven of some writers. these waters are set there to temper the heat of the celestial bodies, Water therefore cannot be distinct from water by place. the waters below do not reach up to the firmament. the higher being the place of their begetting, the lower, the place of their repose. On account of the air and other similar bodies being invisible, Moses includes all such bodies under the name of water, there is only one earth. Therefore there is only one heaven. that which consists of the entire sum of its own matter, must be one; there may be many heavens. All the heavens have in common sublimity and some degree of luminosity, the earth hitherto had been completely covered by the waters, wherefore it was described as "invisible" [* See Q. 66, A. 1, Obj. 1]. There was then no place on the earth to which the waters could be gathered together. not all the waters are in continuous contact, a Divine precept of this kind was unnecessary. the waters are heaped up to a greater height at the place where they were gathered together, All the waters have the sea as their goal, by the production of certain plants the earth was accursed. Life in plants is hidden, Even before the earth was accursed, thorns and thistles had been produced, their matter was produced in the work of creation, before there was any day, The luminaries, therefore, should have been made on the first day, The lights, therefore, should have been produced at the same time as the firmament, that is to say, on the second day. plants are an effect of the sun, moon, and other heavenly bodies. Now, cause precedes effect in the order of nature. The lights, therefore, ought not to have been produced on the fourth day, but on the third day. the lights are proved not to be gods, by the fact that they were not from the beginning. on the fourth day the lights received a definite power to produce determinate effects. According to Ptolemy the heavenly luminaries are not fixed in the spheres, but have their own movement distinct from the movement of the spheres. as far as the senses are concerned, its apparent size is greater. the heavenly lights were not made to be signs. the lights are the cause of what takes place upon the earth. the distinction of seasons and days began from the first day. the lights are nobler than the earth. The lights in the heaven are set for signs of changes effected in corporeal creatures, he says "signs," rather than "causes," to guard against idolatry. The general division of time into day and night took place on the first day, as regards the diurnal movement, which is common to the whole heaven Light was given to the earth for the service of man, who, by reason of his soul, is nobler than the heavenly bodies. the lights of heaven, as pertaining to its adornment, should be living beings also. animals generated from putrefaction, which receive life from the power of the sun and stars. only beings that are living move themselves, The movements of the heavenly bodies are natural, not on account of their active principle, but on account of their passive principle; fishes and birds are not produced from water only, but earth seems to predominate over water in their composition, birds ought to be produced from the air, not all fishes creep through the waters, for some, as seals, have feet land animals are more perfect than birds and fishes which appears from the fact that they have more distinct limbs, and generation of a higher order. For they bring forth living beings, It was laid down by Avicenna that animals of all kinds can be generated by various minglings of the elements, and naturally, without any kind of seed. two points of view. Nature passes from one extreme to another through the medium; in generation also the more perfect is reached through the less perfect. land animals are more like man, whom God is recorded to have blessed, than are birds and fishes. But as birds and fishes are said to be blessed, this should have been said, with much more reason, of the other animals as well. certain animals are generated from putrefaction, which is a kind of corruption. But corruption is repugnant to the first founding of the world. certain animals are poisonous, and injurious to man. But there ought to have been nothing injurious to man before man sinned. Therefore such animals ought not to have been made by God at all, since He is the Author of good; or at least not until man had sinned. The life of plants, for instance, is very imperfect and difficult to discern, and hence, in speaking of their production, nothing is said of their life, but only their generation is mentioned, since only in generation is a vital act observed in them. In other animals, and in plants, mention is made of genus and species, to denote the generation of like from like. The blessing, however, is repeated in the case of man, since in him generation of children has a special relation to the number of the elect [*Cf. Augustine, Gen. ad lit. iii, 12], and to prevent anyone from saying that there was any sin whatever in the act of begetting children. the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, man before he sinned would have used the things of this world conformably to the order designed, poisonous animals would not have injured him. It would seem that the completion of the Divine works ought not to be ascribed to the seventh day. For all things that are done in this world belong to the Divine works. But the consummation of the world will be at the end of the world God creates daily new souls. the perfection of beatitude will be at the end of the world. He ceased making them on the seventh day, animals of new kinds arise occasionally from the connection of individuals belonging to different species, as the mule is the offspring of an ass and a mare; but even these existed previously in their causes, "My Father worketh until now, as God produced His work without movement and without labor, He cannot be said to have rested God indeed "worketh until now" by preserving and providing for the creatures He has made, but not by the making of new ones. Rest is here not opposed to labor or to movement, but to the production of new creatures, no special blessing or sanctifying are due to the seventh day. The days, therefore, in which God produced creatures deserved a blessing it was not necessary that after all had been produced, the seventh day should be blessed. something is added to creatures by their multiplying, In the first six days creatures were produced in their first causes, the blessing attached to the seventh day, to its propagation. separate days should be assigned to creation. other days ought to be devoted to the distinction of fire and air. Another day, then, ought to be assigned to the production of birds and another to that of man. The light and the luminaries, therefore, ought not to have been produced on different days. as on the seventh day nothing was instituted, that day ought not to be enumerated with the others. the work of creation lies only in the Divine act producing the substance of beings instantaneously. The production of animals is recorded with reference to their adorning the various parts of the world, The nature of light, as existing in a subject, was made on the first day; and the making of the luminaries on the fourth day does not mean that their substance was produced anew, but that they then received a form that they had not before, the world entered on the seventh day upon a new state, in that nothing new was to be added to it, It would seem that all these days are one day. created all things together." the entire work ascribed to one day God perfected in an instant, On the day on which God created the heaven and the earth, He created also every plant of the field, not, indeed, actually, but "before it sprung up in the earth," that is, potentially. On the seventh day God ceased from making new things, but not from providing for their increase, each succeeding work added to the world a fresh state of perfection. the order of days refers to the natural order of the works attributed to the days. mention should have been made of the Word of God. the water was created by God, yet its creation is not mentioned. it does not befit God to move and to occupy place. the day has many parts. under the word, "earth," Scripture is accustomed to include all the four elements the second number is an imperfect number, as receding from the perfection of unity. the Spirit moved over the element of water, "fostering and quickening its nature and impressing vital power, But as it was necessary, for the sake of those especially who have asserted that all visible things were made by the angels, to mention how things were made, it is added, in order to remove that error, that God Himself made them. every mover moved is a body. If, therefore, the soul were not a body, it could not have knowledge of corporeal things. contact is only between bodies. because the philosophers of old believed that nothing existed but bodies, they maintained that every mover is moved; ancient philosophers omitted to distinguish between actuality and potentiality; and so they held that the soul must be a body in order to have knowledge of a body; There are two kinds of contact; of "quantity," and of "power." By the former a body can be touched only by a body; by the latter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves that body. "this particular thing" is said not of the soul, but of that which is composed of soul and body. everything subsistent operates. But the soul does not operate; it has no operation apart from the body, two senses. man understands through the soul. The body is necessary for the action of the intellect, man is of the same genus as other animals; the soul of brute animals has an operation apart from the body. Although man is of the same genus as other animals, he is of a different species. Specific difference is derived from the difference of form; two kinds. it is a "hypostasis" or a person; Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a person, but that which has the complete nature of its species. the first potentiality is primary matter. the properties of matter are found in the soul--namely, to be a subject, and to be changed, what has no matter, and is a form only, is a pure act, and is infinite. But this belongs to God alone. For primary matter receives individual forms; whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms. To be a subject and to be changed belong to matter by reason of its being in potentiality. The form causes matter to be, and so does the agent; But in intellectual substances there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of matter and form, but of form and participated existence. the souls of brute animals are corruptible. whatever is out of nothing can return to nothingness; the soul understands nothing without a phantasm; the souls of brutes are produced by some power of the body; whereas the human soul is produced by God. a thing is said to be corruptible because there is in it a potentiality to non-existence. After separation from the body it will have another mode of understanding, the end of the soul is the same as that of an angel--namely, eternal happiness. the soul and the angel agree in the ultimate specific difference: the soul does not differ from an angel except in its union with the body. Eternal happiness is the ultimate and supernatural end. the intellectual faculty is not the noblest, because it is indeterminate and common to many degrees of intellectuality; the soul in a certain way requires the body for its operation, proves that the soul is endowed with a grade of intellectuality inferior to that of an angel, the intellect is "separate," and that it is not the act of any body. if the intellect were united to the body as its form, since every body has a determinate nature, it would follow that the intellect has a determinate nature; and thus, it would not be capable of knowing all things, the form of the thing understood is not received into the intellect materially and individually, but rather immaterially and universally: the intellectual principle has _per se_ existence and is subsistent, the intellectual principle, since it is incorruptible, as was shown above (Q. 75, A. 6), remains separate from the body, after the dissolution of the body. understanding is an act which cannot be performed by a corporeal organ, The human soul, by reason of its perfection, is not a form merged in matter, or entirely embraced by matter. there is one intellect in all men. individuals are things which differ in number but agree in one species. for then the intellect would seem not to be distinct from the imagination. according to the division of matter, there are many souls of one species; after the dissolution of the bodies, the souls retain their multiplied being. Individuality of the intelligent being, or of the species whereby it understands, does not exclude the understanding of universals; Whether the intellect be one or many, what is understood is one; One knowledge exists in the disciple and another in the master. It would seem that besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another, such as the sensitive soul and the nutritive soul. Not forms, but composites, are classified either generically or specifically. The embryo has first of all a soul which is merely sensitive, and when this is removed, it is supplanted by a more perfect soul, which is both sensitive and intellectual: We must not consider the diversity of natural things as proceeding from the various logical notions or intentions, which flow from our manner of understanding, the body has a substantial form by which it is a body. in man and in every animal there must be another substantial form, by which the body is constituted. the forms of the elements must remain in a mixed body; the soul by its motive power is the part which moves; We observe in matter various degrees of perfection, as existence, living, sensing, and understanding. the forms of the elements remain in the mixed body, not actually but virtually. it is not properly united to a corruptible body. the soul should be united to a most subtle body, to fire, for instance, two conditions The parts of an animal, for instance, the eye, hand, flesh, and bones, and so forth, do not make the species; man has by nature his reason and his hands, we must presuppose accidents to be in matter before the substantial form; we must suppose dimensions in matter before the substantial forms, what is spiritual is connected with what is corporeal by virtual contact. But the virtue of the soul is its power. Therefore it seems that the soul is united to the body by means of a power, which is an accident. the more perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs to the inferior forms; Dimensions of quantity are accidents consequent to the corporeity which belongs to the whole matter. the intellectual soul is united by its very being to the body as a form; the breath, which is a subtle body, is the means of union between soul and body. it seems to be united to the body by means of an incorruptible body, and such would be some heavenly light, the soul is the form of the body, each part of the human body is not an organic body. the sight will be in the ear, and hearing in the eye, and this is absurd. nor would one part be nobler than another; which is clearly untrue. The Philosopher is speaking there of the motive power of the soul. it does not follow that a part of an animal is an animal. these powers need not be wherever the soul is, One part of the body is said to be nobler than another, on account of the various powers, the soul is nobler than primary matter. But primary matter is its own potentiality. Much more therefore is the soul its own power. the substantial form is simpler than the accidental form; a sign of which is that the substantial form is not intensified or relaxed, but is indivisible. But the accidental form is its own power. Much more therefore is that substantial form which is the soul. the soul is its own power. if the power of the soul is something else besides the essence thereof, it is an accident, which is contrary to Augustine, "a simple form cannot be a subject." the potentiality of matter is nothing else but its essence. Action belongs to the composite, as does existence; for to act belongs to what exists. the substantial form is the first principle of action; but not the proximate principle. Although the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet it has an admixture of potentiality, as we have said above (Q. 75, A. 5, ad 4); and for this reason it can be the subject of an accident. the intellectual soul excels all other forms in power. The intellectual soul approaches to the Divine likeness, more than inferior creatures, in being able to acquire perfect goodness; there is one essence of the soul, with several powers. the act is subsequent to the power; and the object is extrinsic to it. if the powers are distinguished by their objects, it follows that the same power could not have contrary objects. if the difference of powers came from the difference of objects, the same object would not come under different powers. Act, though subsequent in existence to power, is, nevertheless, prior to it in intention and logically; the power of the soul does not regard the nature of the contrary as such, but rather the common aspect of both contraries; all are naturally simultaneous. sight can act independently of hearing, they may be said to be simultaneous, according as they receive the predication of the common genus. the soul senses certain things, not through the body, in fact, without the body, as fear and such like; All the powers are said to belong to the soul, not as their subject, but as their principle; two ways. the essence of the soul cannot be said to be the cause of the powers; Neither is the soul moved, from the one essence of the soul many and various powers proceed; The emanation of proper accidents from their subject is not by way of transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance; all the powers of the soul are created at the same time nothing is the accident of an accident. one accident is received prior to another into substance, as quantity prior to quality. imperfect things naturally proceed from perfect things. "the soul withdraws from the body, taking with itself sense and imagination, reason and intelligence, concupiscibility and irascibility." properties are always in that to which they belong; the powers even of the sensitive soul are not weakened when the body becomes weak; memory remains in the separated soul; separate souls grieve or rejoice at the pains or rewards which they receive. These powers, which we say do not actually remain in the separate soul, are not the properties of the soul alone, but of the composite. the soul remains unchangeable, In the separate soul, sorrow and joy are not in the sensitive, but in the intellectual appetite, as in the angels. only three parts of the soul are commonly assigned--namely, the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul, and the rational soul. there are only four genera of powers of the soul, as the appetitive is excluded. desire is common to each power of the soul. Therefore the appetitive power should not be made a special genus of the powers of the soul. the motive power should not be added to the above as a special genus of soul. the "animal appetite" results from the form apprehended; this sort of appetite requires a special power of the soul--mere apprehension does not suffice. sense and appetite, as such, are not sufficient to cause movement, the powers of the soul are above the natural forces. generation is common to all things that can be generated and corrupted, whether living or not living. the augmentative power of the soul is not distinct from the generative power. we should not distinguish the nutritive power from the generative. the operation of the vegetative principle is performed by means of heat, the nutritive power is required, whereby the food is changed into the substance of the body. sense can know accidents. But there are many kinds of accidents. there is much more need for another sensitive power than can grasp magnitude or shape than for that which grasps color or sound. the sense of touch grasps several contraries; such as hot or cold, damp or dry, and suchlike. Therefore it is not a single sense but several. taste is a kind of touch. Therefore it should not be classed as a distinct sense of touch. Not every accident has in itself a power of immutation Shape is a quality about quantity, the common sense should not be numbered among the interior sensitive powers, there is no need to assign an interior power, called the common sense. memory and imagination should not be assigned as powers distinct from the senses. much less should we assign to the sensitive part a power, which they call the "estimative" power, for the perception of intentions which the sense does not perceive. the estimative and memorative powers should not be made distinct from the imagination. there is no interior power between the sense and intellect, besides the imagination. The interior sense is called "common" not by predication, as if it were a genus; but as the common root and principle of the exterior senses. Although the operation of the intellect has its origin in the senses: yet, in the thing apprehended through the senses, the intellect knows many things which the senses cannot perceive. The cogitative and memorative powers in man owe their excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part; but to a certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason, which, so to speak, overflows into them. the intellect is the essence of the soul. angels are called "minds" and "intellects." the soul is immaterial through its essence. Augustine puts the will in the mind; and the Philosopher, in the reason In the angels there is no other power besides the intellect, and the will, it follows not that the intellect is the substance of the soul, but that it is its virtue and power. the intellect is not a passive power. "if the intellect is passive, it is corruptible" all the intellectual powers, which are the highest, are active. Aristotle calls the "possible" intellect (De Anima iii, 4) is not passive except in the third sense: for it is not an act of a corporeal organ. Hence it is incorruptible. The agent is nobler than the patient, if the action and the passion are referred to the same thing: but not always, if they refer to different things. since our intellect is in potentiality to things intelligible, it seems that we cannot say that the intellect is active, but only that it is passive. in the operation of the intellect there is no appointed medium that has to be brought into act. a form is intelligible in act from the very fact that it is immaterial. in the intellectual part, there is something active and something passive. light is required for sight, in order to make colors actually visible. the intelligible in act is not something existing in nature; this is done by something higher than the soul: our soul does not always understand: a man would always be able to understand when he wished, If, therefore, the passive intellect, which is in potentiality to all things intelligible, is something in the soul, it seems impossible for the active intellect to be also something in our soul. it would not be in the soul by way of participation from some higher intellect: That true light enlightens as a universal cause, from which the human soul derives a particular power, it is not owing to the active intellect that sometimes we do, and sometimes we do not understand, but to the intellect which is in potentiality. the active intellect is not an object, The intellectual soul is indeed actually immaterial, but it is in potentiality to determinate species. On the contrary, phantasms are actual images of certain species, but are immaterial in potentiality. Wherefore nothing prevents one and the same soul, inasmuch as it is actually immaterial, having one power by which it makes things actually immaterial, by abstraction from the conditions of individual matter: which power is called the "active intellect"; and another power, receptive of such species, which is called the "passive intellect" by reason of its being in potentiality to such species. it is not multiplied in the many human bodies, the active intellect is the cause of the universal, which is one in many. all men agree in the first intellectual concepts. the active intellect is also called "separate"; but not as a separate substance. The active intellect is the cause of the universal, by abstracting it from matter. All things which are of one species enjoy in common the action which accompanies the nature of the species, and consequently the power which is the principle of such action; memory is common to man and beast, this is not the province of the intellect, but of the sense. in the memory are preserved the species of those things of which we are not actually thinking. as concerns the intellectual part, the past is accidental, and is not in itself a part of the object of the intellect. sometimes the intelligible species is in a middle state, between potentiality and act: memory is a distinct power from the will. memory in the sensitive part is distinct from sense, memory, understanding, and will are equal to one another, and one flows from the other. by memory he understands the soul's habit of retention; Past and present may differentiate the sensitive powers, but not the intellectual powers, Intelligence arises from memory, as act from habit; the reason is distinct from the intellect, as imagination is from sense. intellect is compared to reason, as eternity to time. that book is not of great authority. eternity is compared to time as immovable to movable. Other animals are so much lower than man that they cannot attain to the knowledge of truth, which reason seeks. the image of the Trinity is in the higher part of the reason, and not in the lower. the lower reason flows from the higher, necessary is the same as eternal, and temporal the same as contingent, (mind) is derived from _metiendo_ (measuring). so far as reason is divided according to its various acts, the higher and lower reason are called parts; but not because they are different powers. necessary truths are found even among temporal things, Boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act of the intellect which transcends the act of the reason. Wherefore he also says that reason alone belongs to the human race, as intelligence alone belongs to God, for it belongs to God to understand all things without any investigation. the speculative intellect is merely an apprehensive power; while the practical intellect is a motive power. the object of the speculative intellect is _truth,_ and of the practical is _good;_ which differ in nature. the speculative intellect differs from the practical. The practical intellect is a motive power, not as executing movement, but as directing towards it; Truth and good include one another; Many differences differentiate the sensitive powers, which do not differentiate the intellectual powers, "synderesis" is a power. "synderesis" always incites to good; while sensuality always incites to evil: there are certain "rules and seeds of virtue, both true and unchangeable." And this is what we call synderesis. various acts can belong to one power. to "synderesis" as to a habit. conscience is a power; nothing is a subject of sin, except a power of the soul. conscience must of necessity be either an act, a habit, or a power. But it is not an act; for thus it would not always exist in man. Nor is it a habit; conscience is a certain pronouncement of the mind. appetite is common to animate and inanimate things: what we desire is the same as what we know. Appetite is found in things which have knowledge, above the common manner in which it is found in all things, it is diversity of aspect in the objects, and not material diversity, which demands a diversity of powers. it is accidental to the appetible object whether it be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. the appetite is a movement of the soul to individual things, the motive power which in man follows the intellect is not distinct from the motive power which in animals follows sense. The intellectual appetite, though it tends to individual things which exist outside the soul, yet tends to them as standing under the universal; the serpent presented himself as one giving information and proposing sin, the bodily senses appertain to sensuality as a preamble. for the apprehensive power, to which belong the higher and lower reason, is a motive power; as is appetite, the concupiscible power regards what is suitable, while the irascible is concerned with what is harmful, the sensitive appetite regards only what is suitable according to the senses. hatred is contrary to love, and is in the concupiscible part. the object of the irascible power is to resist the onslaught of the unsuitable. by reason of the strife which arises from hatred, it may belong to the irascible appetite. sensuality does not obey reason, the irascible and concupiscible appetites resist reason: the sensitive part of the soul does not obey reason: reason is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic power: the interior powers, both appetitive and apprehensive, do not require exterior things. whatever the will desires is voluntary. the will extends to opposite things, we are not masters of that which is of necessity. natural necessity "does not take away the liberty of the will," The will, so far as it desires a thing naturally, corresponds rather to the intellect the will's object moves it of necessity. the thing apprehended by the intellect is the object of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. because good is of many kinds, for this reason the will is not of necessity determined to one. as the capacity of the will regards the universal and perfect good, its capacity is not subjected to any individual good. The sensitive power does not compare different things with each other, as reason does: the object of the will is good and the end. the act of the will, in the natural order, follows the act of the intellect. the habit which perfects the will--namely, charity--is more noble than the habits which perfect the intellect: what precedes absolutely and in the order of nature is more perfect: for thus act precedes potentiality. charity is the virtue by which we love God. the intellect excels and precedes the will, the intellect moves the will, because the good apprehended by the intellect moves without being moved; so on indefinitely, two ways: the principle of counselling and understanding is an intellectual principle higher than our intellect--namely, God--as the concupiscible power is so called from "concupiscere" (to desire), and the irascible part from "irasci" (to be angry). their objects are not sensible, but intellectual. two ways. The will itself may be said to [be] irascible, as far as it wills to repel evil, in the same way the will may be said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good. man does not what he wills; God moves the will, man is not master of his own actions: it is natural to us to follow some particular end, the sensitive appetite, though it obeys the reason, yet in a given case can resist by desiring what the reason forbids. it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, free-will is nothing but a free judgment. But judgment denominates an act, not a power. free-will is a habit. free-will is forfeited through sin; if free-will denominated an act, it would not always remain in man. Man is said to have lost free-will by falling into sin, not as to natural liberty, which is freedom from coercion, but as regards freedom from fault and unhappiness. to judge is an act of a cognitive power. choice seems to belong to knowledge, because it implies a certain comparison of one thing to another, which belongs to the cognitive power. "having formed a judgment by counsel, we desire in accordance with that counsel." And in this sense choice itself is a judgment from which free-will takes its name. it has some likeness of comparison by choosing one in preference to another. choice, which is the act of free-will, is distinct from the act of willing, on the part of the intellectual appetite, there must be another power besides the will. _Boulesis_ is distinct from _thelesis_ on account of a distinction, not of powers, but of acts. Choice and will--that is, the act of willing--are different acts: yet they belong to the same power, The intellect is compared to the will as moving the will. And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an active and a passive will. "bodies cannot be understood by the intellect; nor indeed anything corporeal unless it can be perceived by the senses." the soul can by no means, through the senses, understand spiritual things, which are intelligible. the intellect is concerned with things that are necessary and unchangeable. the intellect knows bodies by understanding them, not indeed through bodies, nor through material and corporeal species; but through immaterial and intelligible species, it is not correct to say that as the sense knows only bodies so the intellect knows only spiritual things; for it follows that God and the angels would not know corporeal things. all corporeal creatures exist in a more excellent way in the soul than in themselves. the soul is all things, "after a fashion," forasmuch as it is in potentiality to all--through it has not a complete likeness thereof, angels understand all things through innate species: we have some knowledge of things even before we acquire knowledge; which would not be the case unless we had innate species. the angelic intellect is perfected by intelligible species, in accordance with its nature; whereas the human intellect is in potentiality to such species. the intellect does not receive substantial being through the intelligible species; If questions be put in an orderly fashion they proceed from universal self-evident principles to what is particular. the intellect in act is the thing understood in act. the intelligible species, by which our intellect understands, are caused by some things actually intelligible, existing outside the soul. whatever is in potentiality is reduced to act by something actual. The intelligible species which are participated by our intellect are reduced, as to their first cause, to a first principle which is by its essence intelligible--namely, God. Material things, as to the being which they have outside the soul, may be actually sensible, not by a separate intelligence, as proximate cause, although perchance as remote cause. It would seem that the intellectual soul does not know material things in the eternal types. "ideas are permanent types existing in the Divine mind." "we cannot expect to learn the fulness of truth from the senses of the body." "the body does not cause its image in the spirit, but the spirit causes it in itself." we understand some things which cannot be perceived by the senses. the intelligible species suffices for the intellect to understand actually, without turning to the phantasms. the imagination can actually imagine in the absence of the sensible. There are no phantasms of incorporeal things: for the imagination does not transcend time and space. The species preserved in the passive intellect exist there habitually when it does not understand them actually, the imagination does not need any further likeness of the individual, whereas the intellect does. God, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), we know as cause, it sometimes happens to us to syllogize while asleep. Although the intellect is superior to the senses, nevertheless in a manner it receives from the senses, The senses are suspended in the sleeper through certain evaporations the intellect is false if it understands an object otherwise than as it really is. seeing is not caused by abstraction of species from color, but by color impressing itself on the sight. Therefore neither does the act of understanding take place by abstraction of something from the phantasm, but by the phantasm impressing itself on the intellect. two ways: Because Plato failed to consider the twofold kind of abstraction, as above explained (ad 1), he held that all those things which we have stated to be abstracted by the intellect, are abstract in reality. It is thus that the intelligible species is said to be abstracted from the phantasm; not that the identical form which previously was in the phantasm is subsequently in the passive intellect, it does not follow that the intelligible species abstracted is what is actually understood; but rather that it is the likeness thereof. two things, two operations universals come first as regards their nature, the composition precedes the simple in relation to us. But universals are the more simple. Therefore they are known secondarily by us. we know causes and principles by their effects. But universals are principles. Therefore universals are secondarily known by us. two ways. two ways. what is a principle of knowledge is not of necessity a principle of existence, intellect is above time, intelligible species are not opposed to each other. the intellect understands a whole at the same time, such as a man or a house. But a whole contains many parts. we cannot know the difference between two things unless we know both at the same time the multitude itself of intelligible species causes a certain vicissitude of intelligible operations, according as one operation succeeds another. And this vicissitude is called time by Augustine, Not only is it impossible for opposite forms to exist at the same time in the same subject, but neither can any forms belonging to the same genus, two ways. If the intellect sees the difference or comparison between one thing and another, it knows both in relation to their difference or comparison; the intellect cannot understand many things at the same time. the intellect abstracts from time, composition and division are not in things, the intellect knows many things by composition and division, forasmuch as it turns to the phantasms, composition and division of the intellect involve time. Nevertheless composition of the intellect differs from composition of things; for in the latter the things are diverse, whereas composition of the intellect is a sign of the identity of the components. "truth and falsehood are in the mind." opinion and reasoning belong to the intellect. But falsehood exists in both. sin involves falsehood: falsehood is in the intellect in regard to composition and division. truth, being a certain equality between thought and thing, is not subject to more or less; if one man understands better than another, it would seem that they do not belong to the same species. The difference of form which is due only to the different disposition of matter, causes not a specific but only a numerical difference: "we understand and know from the knowledge of principles and elements." the indivisible is part of the definition of the divisible; the indivisible is more like to the intellect than is the divisible; sometimes from sensible effects we arrive at the knowledge of principles a thing is known first, not on account of its natural likeness to the cognitive power, but on account of the power's aptitude for the object: our intellect knows this singular, Socrates. action has relation to singular things. in itself it is a singular, sense knows the singular. Much more, therefore, can the intellect know it. the universal principle of the practical intellect does not move save through the medium of the particular apprehension of the sensitive part, Intelligibility is incompatible with the singular not as such, but as material, for nothing can be understood otherwise than immaterially. The higher power can do what the lower power can, but in a more eminent way. God excels all infinite things. But our intellect can know God, our intellect can naturally know genera and species. But there is an infinity of species in some genera, our intellect can have an habitual knowledge of an infinite number of things. it appears to be an infinite power. we cannot know God in our present life except through material effects. it cannot know actually or habitually species of numbers there must be a definite and not an infinite number of species in our intellect. it can know the present. Therefore it can know the future. the intellect is freer and more vigorous when removed from sense. some animals know the future; from universal causal principles; from these the future may be known, their imagination follows entirely the influence of the heavenly bodies. an angel understands itself by its own essence. the human mind is void of matter, two ways, an angel apprehends his own essence through itself: not so the human mind, which is either altogether in potentiality to intelligible things--as is the passive intellect--or is the act of intelligible things abstracted from the phantasms--as is the active intellect. the habits of the soul are not known by their acts, but by themselves. no one knows that he has faith unless he knows that he believes. habit as such does not belong to the order of objects of knowledge; proceed indefinitely, The object of the intellect is something universal, namely, _being_ and _the true,_ in the act of the will is not in the intellect; the object of the will is not the same as the object of the intellect. what is in the will is, in a certain way, also in the intellect. the soul's affections are in the memory by certain notions. not that the knowledge of itself gives it a perfect and absolute knowledge of them. The likeness of nature is not a sufficient cause of knowledge; that sensible objects of great power are not grasped by the senses, is due not merely to the fact that they corrupt the organ, but also to their being improportionate to the sensitive power. if separate substances are not understood by us, it does not follow that they are not understood by any intellect; for they are understood by themselves, and by one another. there are no phantasms of what is immaterial. there are sciences and definitions of immaterial substances; other material substances can be understood by us, through their material effects. the only cause which cannot be comprehended through its effects is that which is infinitely distant from them, and this belongs to God alone. there is no proper and adequate proportion between material and immaterial things, Science treats of higher things principally by way of negation. through the likeness derived from material things we can know something positive concerning the angels, according to some common notion, though not according to the specific nature; whereas we cannot acquire any such knowledge at all about God. God is the cause of all our knowledge; He is the first cause of our faculty of knowledge. the image in our mind is imperfect; by death all human interior principles are corrupted. death destroys the senses and imagination, if the separated soul can understand, this must be by means of some species. But it does not understand by means of innate species, because it has none such; the soul in that state understands by means of participated species arising from the influence of the Divine light, the soul is more perfect when joined to the body God alone can enter into the soul; nor by means of species abstracted by the soul from an angel, for an angel is more simple than a soul. If, therefore, the separated soul can understand separate substances, its happiness would be secured by its separation alone; The separated soul is, indeed, less perfect considering its nature in which it communicates with the nature of the body: but it has a greater freedom of intelligence, The separated soul understands the angels by means of divinely impressed ideas; Man's ultimate happiness consists not in the knowledge of any separate substances; but in the knowledge of God, the types of all natural things exist in separate substances. much more can it understand all natural things which are in a lower degree of intelligibility. Even an angel does not understand all natural things through his substance, it knows them confusedly, the intellect cannot know singulars, if it knew the singulars, yet not by sense, for the same reason it would know all singulars. But it does not know all singulars. Therefore it knows none. The intellect does not know the singular by way of abstraction; The knowledge of the separated soul is confined to those species or individuals to which the soul has some kind of determinate relation, The separated soul has not the same relation to all singulars, "Knowledge shall be destroyed" some who are less good would, even in the future life, excel some who are better; two forms of the same species would co-exist in the same subject The Apostle is not speaking of knowledge as a habit, These two kinds of knowledge are not of the same species, This objection considers the corruption of knowledge on the part of the sensitive powers. "the soul neither remembers nor loves." it cannot understand at all by intelligible species acquired in this life. the habit of knowledge is acquired here by acts of the intellect turning to phantasms: therefore it cannot produce any other acts. These acts, however, are not adapted to the separated soul. The different mode of intelligence is produced by the different state of the intelligent soul; The acts which produce a habit are like the acts caused by that habit, in species, but not in mode. "the souls of the dead are where they cannot know what is done here." their knowledge was impeded by local distance; distance of time impedes knowledge in the separated soul, for the soul is ignorant of the future. Augustine speaks there in accordance with the opinion that demons have bodies naturally united to them, and so have sensitive powers, which require local distance. In the same book he expressly sets down this opinion, though apparently rather by way of narration than of assertion, The future, which is distant in time, does not actually exist, the dead often appear to the living, asleep or awake, and tell them of what takes place there; The souls of the departed may care for the living, even if ignorant of their state; it may be said of Samuel that he appeared through Divine revelation; he who breathes sends forth something of himself. the soul is a pure act; which applies to God alone. God and the mind exist, and in no way differ, it is not a pure act like God. things which differ must in some way be compound; the soul is in part material, since it is not a pure act. Therefore the soul was made of matter; and hence it was not created. the soul is educed from the potentiality of matter. if the soul is created, all other forms also are created. Thus no forms would come into existence by generation; since the rational soul does not depend in its existence on corporeal matter, and is subsistent, and exceeds the capacity of corporeal matter, as we have seen (Q. 75, A. 2), it is not educed from the potentiality of matter. there is no comparison between the rational soul and other forms. inferior spirits, who are the rational souls, are produced by means of the superior spirits, the angels. "perfect is that which can produce its like," the soul was made by creation; whereas the body was made at the end of the work of adornment. the rational soul has more in common with the angels than with the brute animals. But angels were created before bodies, the soul outlasts the body. the soul is naturally the form of the body, as the form of the body, it belongs to the animal genus, as a formal principle. That the soul remains after the body, is due to a defect of the body, namely, death. it should not have been made of the slime of the earth, but out of nothing. it should not be made of an earthly body, but of a heavenly body. it should rather have been made of fire and air the human body is composed of the four elements. it was fitting that the human body should be made of the four elements, for the acts of the rational soul the heavenly body is less adapted. If fire and air, whose action is of greater power, predominated also in quantity in the human body, they would entirely draw the rest into themselves, in the account of the Creation no mention is made of fire and air, which are not perceived by senses of uncultured men such as those to whom the Scripture was immediately addressed. it was produced by the instrumentality of the angels, the human body can be produced by the created power of a heavenly body; the angels could act as ministers in the formation of the body of the first man, in the same way as they will do at the last resurrection by collecting the dust. Perfect animals, produced from seed, cannot be made by the sole power of a heavenly body, The movement of the heavens causes natural changes; but not changes that surpass the order of nature, two ways. some animals have sharper senses and quicker movement than man; man is lacking. man should not be of erect stature. The sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses, is more perfect in man than in any other animal; Horns and claws, which are the weapons of some animals, and toughness of hide and quantity of hair or feathers, which are the clothing of animals, are signs of an abundance of the earthly element; which does not agree with the equability and softness of the human temperament. four reasons. the human body was made by God immediately, the form of the human body is the soul itself Scripture uses a special way of speaking, to show that other things were made for man's sake. by these words is signified the plurality of the Divine Person, vital operations are more clearly seen in man's face, "the female is a misbegotten male." woman is naturally of less strength and dignity than man; occasions of sin should be cut off. But God foresaw that the woman would be an occasion of sin to man. Therefore He should not have made woman. the production of woman comes from defect in the active force in man the discretion of reason predominates. If God had deprived the world of all those things which proved an occasion of sin, the universe would have been imperfect. in the other animals the female was not made from the male. as man was made of the slime of the earth, so woman should have been made of the same, and not from man. close relationship makes a person unfit for that office; hence near relations are debarred from intermarriage, Divine Power, being infinite, can produce things of the same species out of any matter, Woman, however, was not produced from man by natural generation, the rib was much smaller than the woman's body. if a rib was removed, his body remained imperfect; there was no pain before sin. an addition was made to the already existing matter The rib belonged to the integral perfection of Adam, not as an individual, but as the principle of the human race; it was made through the ministry of the angels, as the body of man was not formed by the angels from the slime of the earth, so neither was the body of the woman formed by them from the man's rib. there is no species common to both God and man; analogy God is the cause not only of rational, but also of irrational creatures. the whole universe is to the image of God, even what falls short of the nature of an image, so far as it possesses any sort of likeness to God, participates in some degree Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine goodness, as regards its causality; God granted to no other creature besides man to be to His image. "man is so much to God's image that God did not make any creature to be between Him and man: the intellectual nature does not admit of intensity Augustine excludes the inferior creatures bereft of reason from the image of God; but not the angels. this does not mean that the angels are not more to God's image. "man is the image of God, but woman is the image [Vulg. glory] of man" all men are not predestined. by sin man becomes unlike God. the image of God in man is of the Divine Essence, and not of the Trinity of Persons. by his natural knowledge man could know the Trinity of the Divine Persons; if in man there were an image of God as regards the Person, this would not be an image of the Trinity, but only of the Son. This argument would avail if the image of God in man represented God in a perfect manner. man is not only mind. the distinction of male and female is in the body. shape belongs to the body. the image of God is impressed on his mind; the image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction. this is not to be understood as though the image of God were in man's body; to exist does not signify an act. mind does not signify an act, but rather the power or the essence of the intellectual soul. an act does not always remain. it is clear that memory, understanding, and will are not three powers the soul always understands and loves itself, not actually but habitually; the image of the Divine Trinity is in our mind as regards any object. this image is not in man by nature but by grace, the image of God exists in us even according to temporal things. what is Word of God proceeds from knowledge of God. in the future life faith will no longer exist, but only the remembrance of faith. It would seem that "likeness" is not properly distinguished from "image." it is not true to say that the "likeness is in the essence because it is immortal and indivisible; whereas the image is in other things" it is incorrectly said (Sent. ii, D, xvi) "that the image is taken from the memory, the understanding and the will, while the likeness is from innocence and righteousness." it is incorrect to say (Sent. ii, D, xvi) that "the image consists in the knowledge of truth, and the likeness in the love of virtue." The soul's essence belongs to the "image," Nor it is unfitting to us the term "image" from one point of view and from another the term "likeness." Love of the word, which is knowledge loved, belongs to the nature of "image"; but love of virtue belongs to "likeness," as virtue itself belongs to likeness. It would seem that the first man saw God through His Essence. obscurity resulted from sin. twofold; "In paradise man was accustomed to enjoy the words of God; and by purity of heart and loftiness of vision to have the company of the good angels." the body of the first man was not a load upon his soul; That the soul of the first man fell short of the knowledge regarding separate substances, was not owing to the fact that the body was a load upon it; but to the fact that its connatural object fell short of the excellence of separate substances. The soul of the first man was not able to arrive at knowledge of separate substances by means of its self-knowledge, our soul, as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4), is "like a clean tablet on which nothing is written." other men have not, from the beginning, knowledge of all things, the present state of life is given to man in order that his soul may advance in knowledge and merit; The first man had knowledge of all things by divinely infused species. To Adam, as being the first man, was due a degree of perfection which was not due to other men, Adam would have advanced in natural knowledge, not in the number of things known, but in the manner of knowing; "the woman being seduced was in the transgression." "the woman was not frightened at the serpent speaking, because she thought that he had received the faculty of speech from God." But this was untrue. Therefore before sin the woman was deceived. Wherefore man would have been deceived in the size of what he saw, just as he is deceived now. in the state of innocence man would have eaten and consequently have slept and dreamed. the first man would have been ignorant of other men's thoughts, it was not till she had already sinned by interior pride. We need not, however, follow the Master of the Sentences in this point. A man is not accountable for what occurs during sleep; as he has not then the use of his reason, wherein consists man's proper action. he would have been divinely guided from above, Christ alone was made in grace. "Adam did not possess the Holy Ghost." God thus first created men and angels in the state of natural free-will only; whoever has grace can advance by merit. nature is more distant from grace than grace is from glory, which is but grace consummated. "he did not possess the Holy Ghost, as the faithful possess Him now," The Master here speaks according to the opinion of those who held that man was not created in grace, but only in a state of nature. we do not merit grace by an act of nature; by the passions of the soul "the flesh lusteth against the spirit" in Adam the moral virtues were perfect. The flesh lusts against the spirit by the rebellion of the passions against reason; which could not occur in the state of innocence. Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away the passions, but regulates them; in the state of innocence no immoderation existed in the passions. in the state of innocence neither sin nor unhappiness existed. perseverance is a virtue. But Adam possessed it not; as proved by his subsequent sin. faith is a virtue. But it did not exist in the state of innocence; Virtues, however, relating to passions which regard evil in the same subject, if relating to such passions only, could not exist in the primitive state in act, but only in habit, two ways: we are more in need of grace than was man in the state of innocence. Therefore grace is more copiously poured out upon us; and since grace is the source of merit, our actions are more meritorious. struggle and difficulty are required for merit; for it is written (2 Tim. 2:5): "He . . . is not crowned except he strive lawfully" and the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3): "The object of virtue is the difficult and the good." But there is more strife and difficulty now. man even before sin required grace to obtain eternal life, which is the chief reason for the need of grace. Difficulty and struggle belong to the degree of merit according to the proportionate degree of the work done, man was more able then than now to resist temptation even without grace. the angels need not have intervened thus, if man himself were master over the animals. many animals are hostile to one another, after sin animals would become useful to man." a command is not given rightly save to a rational being. certain things in regard to animals could be done by angels, which could not be done by man; for instance, the rapid gathering together of all the animals. man needed animals in order to have experimental knowledge of their natures. This is signified by the fact that God led the animals to man, that he might give them names expressive of their respective natures. all animals would have obeyed man of their own accord, as in the present state some domestic animals obey him. man would not have had mastership over all other creatures. For an angel naturally has a greater power than man. man had no dominion over plants. man had no dominion over them. "Where there is no sin, there is no inequality." likeness and equality are the basis of mutual love, the cause of present inequality among men seems to arise, on the part of God, between those who are unequal there can be a greater love than between equals; although there be not an equal response: for a father naturally loves his son more than a brother loves his brother; the term "mortal" belongs to the definition of man. there can be no passing from one genus to another. nature does not change within the same species, immortality is promised to man as a reward, This power of preserving the body was not natural to the soul, but was the gift of grace. The promised reward of the immortality of glory differs from the immortality which was bestowed on man in the state of innocence. in the state of innocence man would have been sensitive. man slept in the state of innocence, he was passible even to the degree of the cutting out of part of his body. man's body was soft. But a soft body is naturally passible as regards a hard body; therefore if a hard body had come in contact with the soft body of the first man, the latter would have suffered from the impact. Therefore the first man was passible. Hence as man does not suffer any natural deterioration by seminal issue; so neither did he through the separation of the rib. partly also by Divine Providence, so preserving him, that nothing of a harmful nature could come upon him unawares. Adam's body suffered no loss, as being incorruptible. nourishment involves passibility. we need food for the preservation of life. the consumption of food involves voiding of the surplus, which seems unsuitable to the state of innocence. man was obliged to take food. the food taken was passible; If man had not taken food he would have sinned; there was need for voiding the surplus, yet so disposed by God as to be decorous and suitable to the state. the tree of life was corruptible, otherwise it could not be taken as food; If therefore the tree of life caused immortality, this would have been natural immortality. this would seem to be reduced to the ancient fable, that the gods, by eating a certain food, became immortal; "corruption is contrary to generation." But contraries affect the same subject: in the state of innocence there would have been no generation. This is against the natural law, according to which all things are in common, In the state of innocence the human body was in itself corruptible, Although generation in the state of innocence might not have been required for the preservation of the species, yet it would have been required for the multiplication of the individual. In the state of innocence, however, the will of men would have been so ordered that without any danger of strife they would have used in common, Therefore, if generation by coition had existed before sin, they would have had intercourse while still in paradise: which was not the case according to Scripture in carnal intercourse, more than at any other time, man becomes like the beasts, virginal integrity is corrupted by intercourse. After the resurrection man will be like an angel, spiritualized in soul and body. our first parents did not come together in paradise, because on account of sin they were ejected from paradise shortly after the creation of the woman; In that state fecundity would have been without lust. But in the state of innocence there would have been no weakness of mind. Therefore neither would there have been weakness of body in infants. it appears to be a punishment of sin that he has not that strength. in the state of innocence there would have been no weakness of old age. The fact that some animals have the use of their limbs immediately after birth, is due, not to their superiority, they would have desired nothing except with an ordinate will; in the state of innocence man's active force was not subject to defect, in the state of innocence, there was no need for women to be born. Woman is said to be a "misbegotten male," as being a product outside the purpose of nature considered in the individual case: but not against the purpose of universal nature, by the mere will of the parent the sex of the offspring might be diversified. it was fitting that all should generate, "Before sin the first man would have begotten children sinless; but not heirs to their father's righteousness." grace is not transfused from one to another, the soul is not transmitted from the parent. These words of Hugh are to be understood as referring, not to the habit of righteousness, but to the execution of the act thereof. "If no sinful corruption had infected our first parent, he would not have begotten 'children of hell'; no children would have been born of him but such as were destined to be saved by the Redeemer." good is stronger than evil. the angels who remained faithful to God, while the others sinned, were at once confirmed in grace, If, however, they did not become "children of hell" by falling into sin, this would not have been owing to their being confirmed in righteousness, but to Divine Providence preserving them free from sin. Anselm does not say this by way of assertion, but only as an opinion, For the necessity of sin incurred by the descendants would not have been such that they could not return to righteousness, which is the case only with the damned. the angel's is not changeable, Adam was gifted with perfect knowledge ignorance is a result of sin, children would have been gifted with righteousness from birth. The perfection of knowledge was an individual accident of our first parent, Ignorance is privation of knowledge due at some particular time; Children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct them to deeds of righteousness, children have not perfect use of reason in our present state, is due to the soul being weighed down by the body; some animals at birth have the use of their natural powers, The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, because it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to man at all ages. Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use of their natural powers as they have later on. "paradise reaches to the lunar circle." the rivers there mentioned have visible sources elsewhere, none have made mention of the place of paradise. the tree of life is a spiritual thing, the planting of the trees of paradise is recorded after the work of the six days. Bede's assertion is untrue, "It is probable that man has no idea where paradise was, paradise is shut off In like manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a material tree, so called in view of future events; because, after eating of it, man was to learn, by experience of the consequent punishment, the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of rebellion. the angels from the very beginning of their existence were made to dwell in the abode of the blessed--that is, the empyrean heaven. Therefore the place of man's habitation should have been there also. it seems that God made paradise to no purpose. paradise was not of an even temperature; for it is said to have been on the equator--a situation of extreme heat, it is a fitting abode for man in regard only to his beatitude. "No irrational animal inhabited paradise"; Enoch and Elias still dwell in that paradise. whatever be the truth of the matter, we must hold that paradise was situated in a most temperate situation, whether on the equator or elsewhere. the cultivation of the soil was a punishment of sin in paradise there was no fear of trespass with violence. if man was placed in paradise to dress and keep it, man would apparently have been made for the sake of paradise, It would seem that man was created in paradise. For the angel was created in his dwelling-place--namely, the empyrean heaven. But before sin paradise was a fitting abode for man. Therefore it seems that man was created in paradise. woman was made in paradise. natural things which make up the greater part of the world do not move, or work for an end; the world does not appear to be so directed, but has stability in itself. the world does not require to be governed. two ways. even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing, would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand, the natural necessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence. the end of the government of the world is the peaceful order in things themselves. many ways: The Philosopher is speaking of the ends of various arts; this, however, is not its ultimate end, created things agree not together, and act against each other; as is evident in the case of contraries. the world is not governed by one, but by many. dissimilarity of movements is caused by diversity of things moved, which diversity is essential to the perfection of the universe (Q. 47, AA. 1,2; Q. 48, A. 2), and not by a diversity of governors. Although contraries do not agree with each other in their proximate ends, nevertheless they agree in the ultimate end, If we consider individual goods, then two are better than one. the good which consists in order; the world is governed by one these are too numerous to be counted. time and chance in all." "God hath no care for oxen." the rational creature can govern itself; These things are said to be under the sun which are generated and corrupted according to the sun's movement. In all such things we find chance: irrational creatures which do not act but are acted upon, are not thus governed by God. The rational creature governs itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the Divine intellect and will. For Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves the opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts. God can by Himself govern all things without any intermediary cause. it seems to be imperfect in a ruler to govern by means of others; If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the perfection of causality. That an earthly king should have ministers to execute his laws is a sign not only of his being imperfect, but also of his dignity; if nothing occurs outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that there is nothing fortuitous and casual. if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that all things happen by necessity, and nothing is contingent; which is false. There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is ever founded on good, as shown above (Q. 48, A. 3). Therefore something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of some particular good. If it wholly escaped from the order of the Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist. as to the order of Divine providence, "nothing in the world happens by chance," The very fact that something occurs outside the order of some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to the Divine government. if no one rebelled against God's commands, no one would be justly punished by God. some things oppose others. even the sinner intends the attainment of a certain good: but because they resist some particular good, which belongs to their nature or state. Therefore they are justly punished by God. some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause; some creatures are subsistent forms, as we have said of the angels (Q. 50, AA. 2, 5): and thus to be is in them of themselves. Much more, therefore, can God cause His creature to be kept in being, after He has ceased to create it. the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures and heavenly bodies is rather something in God, Who can withdraw His influence, than in the form or matter of those creatures. there is no comparison with an agent that is not the cause of _being_ but only of _becoming._ The preservation of things by God is a continuation of that action whereby He gives existence, which action is without either motion or time; God created all things immediately. it cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less therefore can it be given to a creature to preserve another. in the creation itself He established an order among things, no effect can be endowed with the power of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving another. "Because God is good, we exist." But God cannot cease to be good. a creature has this tendency of itself, since it is produced from nothing. God's goodness is the cause of things, not as though by natural necessity, because the Divine goodness does not depend on creatures; but by His free-will. If God were to annihilate anything, this would not imply an action on God's part; but a mere cessation of His action. all things must tend to this end, that there shall be nothing but God. a creature cannot last for an infinite duration; forms and accidents have no matter as part of themselves. But at some time they cease to exist. things which have no contrary, although they have a finite power, continue to exist for ever. they remain in the potentiality of the matter, or of the subject. the forms of things are produced by God, only by means of particular causes. two ways. He acts by His will and intellect, He can also produce certain effects by Himself without any other cause. the mover and the moved must exist simultaneously, God cannot move a body immediately. an infinite power moves instantaneously. according to virtual contact He touches creatures by moving them; but He is not touched, since a finite power moves in a determinate time, it follows that an infinite power does not move in any time; to understand or to feel is a kind of movement, God is not intelligible to us, and exceeds the capacity of our intellect. He moves the created intellect, and yet He cannot be intelligible to it, the will cannot be forced. to be voluntarily moved means to be moved from within, if God moves the will, it follows that voluntary actions are not imputed to man for reward or blame. In like manner God, while moving the will, does not force it, because He gives the will its own natural inclination. this interior principle may be caused by an exterior principle; its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself, the same work cannot proceed at the same time from two sources; God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents is superfluous. One action does not proceed from two agents of the same order. it would seem that He is changeable; which cannot be said. the creation of the world, and of souls, and the justification of the unrighteous, are done by God outside the natural order; as not being accomplished by the action of any natural cause. Yet these things are not called miracles. no more reason exists to wonder at one effect thereof than at one man will not then enlighten another, light in the angels is threefold; of nature, of grace, and of glory. But an angel is enlightened in the light of nature by the Creator; in the light of grace by the Justifier; in the light of glory by the Beatifier; all of which comes from God. light is a form in the mind. All the angels, both inferior and superior, see the Essence of God immediately, a superior angel knows more about the types of the Divine works than an inferior angel, An angel does not enlighten another by giving him the light of nature, grace, or glory; but by strengthening his natural light, "The names of the angels designate their properties." God enlightens by changing the intellect and will, He cleanses by removing defects of intellect and will, and perfects unto the end of the intellect and will. One angel can induce another to love God by persuasion as explained above. this does not apply to the angels. in the Church even superiors are enlightened and taught by their inferiors, the inferiors enlightened by God can enlighten superiors. in the heavenly hierarchy the perfection of the order is in proportion to its nearness to God; the superior angels had long known the Mystery of the Incarnation, if the superior angels enlighten the inferior about all they know, nothing that the superior angels know would be unknown to the inferior angels. Therefore the superior angels could communicate nothing more to the inferior; Till the Judgment Day some new things are always being revealed by God to the highest angels, concerning the course of the world, and especially the salvation of the elect. Hence there is always something for the superior angels to make known to the inferior. speech manifests to another what lies hidden in the mind. exterior speech takes place by some sensible sign, as by voice, or gesture, or some bodily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and this cannot apply to the angels. it does not appear that one angel incites another to listen; the tongue of an angel is called metaphorically the angel's power, whereby he manifests his mental concept. There is no need to draw the attention of the good angels, inasmuch as they always see each other in the Word; speech of the angels is an enlightenment an angel cannot make known anything to God, an angel sometimes speaks to another angel. Speech is not always for the purpose of making something known to another; but is sometimes finally ordered to the purpose of manifesting something to the speaker himself; The angels are ever speaking to God in the sense of praising and admiring Him and His works; an angel's speech is limited by the bounds of that place. The angelic speech, as above explained (A. 1, ad 2), is interior; perceived, nevertheless, by another; local distance has no effect, all the angels have the intellectual power in common. the enlightenment of one angel by another extends to all the angels, it is not necessary that these speeches should be common to all. the angels are supreme among creatures, all men are of one hierarchy. All men are of one species, and have one connatural mode of understanding; which is not the case in the angels: if there are many orders, there is not one hierarchy only, but many. among the angels all the spiritual gifts are common to all, for "nothing is possessed individually" each of the angels cleanses, enlightens, and perfects. twofold. the more perfectly anyone can communicate a gift, the higher grade he occupies, The inferior angel is superior to the highest man of our hierarchy, equals belong to one order. several angels in one order would be superfluous. absolutely speaking they are not equal. That special distinction of orders and offices wherein each angel has his own office and order, is hidden from us. the distinction of hierarchies and orders in the angels is by grace, and not by nature. common names should not be appropriated to individuals. archangels are as it were angel princes. the name "Seraphim" is derived from ardor, which pertains to charity; and the name "Cherubim" from knowledge. But charity and knowledge are gifts common to all the angels. there ought not to be any order of "Thrones" besides the "Cherubim" and "Seraphim." two ways. "some companies of the angels, because others are subject to obedience to them, are called dominations." The "Archangels," according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ix), are between the "Principalities" and the "Angels." The name "Seraphim" does not come from charity only, but from the excess of charity, expressed by the word ardor or fire. In the same way the name "Cherubim" comes from a certain excess of knowledge; the order of the "Thrones" is distinguished from the orders of the "Cherubim" and the "Seraphim." the order of prelates is the highest. the order of "Thrones" is the nearest to God; the order of "Cherubim" seems to be higher than the "Seraphim." Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Evang.) places the "Principalities" above the "Powers." These therefore are not placed immediately above the Archangels, as Dionysius says the orders which derive their name from presiding are not the first and highest; but rather the orders deriving their name from their nearness and relation to God. The nearness to God designated by the name of the "Thrones," belongs also to the "Cherubim" and "Seraphim," and in a more excellent way, to know lower things is better than to love them; and to love the higher things, God above all, is better than to know them. Christ will "bring to naught all principality and power, after the Day of Judgment one angel will not cleanse, enlighten, or perfect another, because they will not advance any more in knowledge. the angelic offices are ordered for the purpose of leading men to salvation. those who are already saved will be enlightened through the angelic ministry. the angels of the lowest hierarchy are never transferred into the middle, or the first. Therefore neither are men transferred to the angelic orders. certain offices belong to the orders of the angels, as to guard, to work miracles, to coerce the demons, and the like; which do not appear to belong to the souls of the saints. it is erroneous to say that the souls of bad men are changed into demons; men can ascend to the grade of grace, but not of nature. by a certain special dispensation it is sometimes granted to some of the saints to exercise these offices; order belongs to good, the demons are not in a hierarchy, evil cannot exist without good the demons are wholly fallen from justice. these cannot be without concord; which is not to be found among the demons, the superior demons who have sinned the most grievously, would be subject to the inferior. The authority of the demons is not founded on their justice, but on the justice of God ordering all things. it belongs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those whom they see to be stronger, in order to carry out their own wickedness. to preside in evil is to be more unhappy. one demon can manifest truth to another, the superior demons abound in the participation of natural light. Not every kind of manifestation of the truth is enlightenment, there is no necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels, or in the demons, the bad angels, being darkness, are not enlightened by the good angels. superiors are responsible as regards negligence for the evil deeds of their subjects. But the demons do much evil. Therefore if they are subject to the good angels, it seems that negligence is to be charged to the good angels; which cannot be admitted. if the demons fell from every order, as is commonly said, many of the demons are superior to many good angels in the natural order. the good angels do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm. the power of Divine justice to which the good angels cleave, is stronger than the natural power of the angels. corporeal things have their actions determined by the nature divinely bestowed upon them. some corporeal things are inferior, and others are superior. there would be as many angelic offices as there are species of things. a corporeal creature must be moved by a spiritual creature. we must assert that the angels possess an immediate presidency not only over the heavenly bodies, but also over the inferior bodies. Nor does it follow that there are more than nine orders of angels, For the power of an angel excels the power of the soul. But corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul; Our soul is united to the body as the form; Whatever an inferior power can do, that a superior power can do, not in the same way, but in a more excellent way; the angels do not cause the forms of natural bodies, In natural bodies, however, there is no vital principle. the ebb and flow of the sea does not follow from the substantial form of the water, but from the influence of the moon; and much more can local movements result from the power of spiritual substances. The angels, by causing local motion, as the first motion, can thereby cause other movements; that is, by employing corporeal agents to produce these effects, an angel's power is not limited to any body; hence it can move locally bodies not joined to it. demons can work miracles. in collecting the dust in the general resurrection, Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever happens in this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local movement. Although the angels can do something which is outside the order of corporeal nature, yet they cannot do anything outside the whole created order, which is essential to a miracle, man is enlightened by faith; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii) attributes enlightenment to baptism, as "the sacrament of faith." But faith is immediately from God, God enlightens man immediately. man is not conscious of being enlightened by angels. "No one believes except willingly." Natural reason, which is immediately from God, can be strengthened by an angel, two ways. burning away our vices." "every malicious act and unclean passion is contrived by the demons and put into men" as the angel enlightens the mind, so can he change the will. Those who act as God's ministers, either men or angels, are said to burn away vices, and to incite to virtue by way of persuasion. the devil is called the kindler of thoughts, The human intellect in its present state can understand only by turning to the phantasms; but the human will can will something following the judgment of reason rather than the passion of the sensitive appetite. since the forms in the imagination are spiritual, they are nobler than the forms existing in sensible matter. But an angel cannot impress forms upon sensible matter an angel can be mingled with the human imagination, a good angel cannot be the cause of deception, Sometimes, however, the imagination is informed in such a way that the act of the imaginative movement arises from the impressions preserved within. he cannot make a man born blind imagine color), The commingling of the angelic spirit with the human imagination is not a mingling of essences, but by reason of an effect which he produces in the imagination An angel causing an imaginative vision, sometimes enlightens the intellect at the same time, so that it knows what these images signify; and then there is no deception. such an operation does not come from an extrinsic principle. the angel cannot change the nutritive power, an angel cannot change the order of nature this interior principle can be moved in many ways by the exterior principle, An angel can do nothing outside the entire order of creatures; but he can outside some particular order of nature, the empyrean heaven is the place that beseems the angelic dignity. if they were sent, their beatitude would be lessened; to minister is the part of an inferior; two ways. an angel does not derive his dignity from the empyrean heaven; In their external actions the angels chiefly minister to God, and secondarily to us; among the orders, the highest is that of the Seraphim, as stated above (Q. 108, A. 6). But a Seraph was sent to purify the lips of the prophet the Divine Persons are sent. only the last angel would be sent in ministry; which contradicts the words, According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), the angel who was sent to purify the prophet's lips was one of the inferior order; but was called a "Seraph," that is, "kindling " in an equivocal sense, because he came to "kindle" the lips of the prophet. The Divine Persons are not sent in ministry, the superior are sent to the higher ministries, and the lower to the inferior ministries. every holy angel is nearer to God than Satan is. Yet Satan assisted God, according to Job 1:6: "When the sons of God came to stand before the Lord, Satan also was present among them." Therefore much more do the angels, who are sent to minister, assist. only the highest angel would assist; Satan is not described as having assisted, but as present among the assistants; all the angels either assist, or minister, according to Dan. 7:10. But the angels of the second hierarchy do not assist; "there are more who minister than who assist." The Dominations are reckoned among the ministering angels, not as exercising but as disposing and commanding what is to be done by others; thus an architect does not put his hands to the production of his art, but only disposes and orders what others are to do. This opinion is verified as regards the number of orders, as six administer and three assist. man is able to guard himself by his free-will; men are guarded by God, The angels would therefore be negligent if men are given to their guardianship. But that is clearly false. Therefore the angels are not the guardians of men. By free-will man can avoid evil to a certain degree, but not in any sufficient degree; God guards man as his universal instructor, Whose precepts reach man by the medium of the angels, that men perish is not to be imputed to the negligence of the angels but to the malice of men. Therefore much more can one angel guard many men. it is a greater office to guard one man than another. the superior angels guard men. all the angels of the five orders are deputed to the guardianship of men. for the guardianship of men it seems especially necessary to coerce the demons, which belongs most of all to the Powers, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.); and to work miracles, which belongs to the Virtues. Therefore these orders are also deputed to the work of guardianship, and not only the lowest order. Chrysostom can be taken to mean the highest in the lowest order of angels; Not all the angels who are sent have guardianship of individual men; but some orders have a universal guardianship, greater or less, Even inferior angels exercise the office of the superior, this is unseemly, for Christ is greater than all the angels. Adam was the first of all men. But it was not fitting that he should have an angel guardian, at least in the state of innocence: men who are foreknown to damnation, never attain to eternal life. Christ as man was guided immediately by the Word of God: although the help which they receive therefrom does not result in their deserving eternal life by good works, it does nevertheless conduce to their being protected from certain evils which would hurt both themselves and others. an angel is appointed to guard a man from the time of his baptism, children are not capable of instruction as soon as they are born, it does not appear that an angel is appointed to guard a child before its birth, it has many other effects consistent with childhood; for instance to ward off the demons, the angel who guards the mother guards the child while in the womb. God forsakes man at times, sometimes they are in heaven. "The angels of peace shall weep bitterly." the loss of the man whom he has guarded is against the guardian angel's will. they grieve for the just man who falls into sin. "The angels are brought to judgment as to whether men have fallen through their negligence or through their own fault." metaphorical, Both in man's repentance and in man's sin there is one reason for the angel's joy, namely the fulfilment of the ordering of the Divine Providence. The angels are brought into judgment for the sins of men, not as guilty, but as witnesses to convict man of weakness. among the high angels there is no strife. where there is perfect charity and just authority there can be no strife. But all this exists among the angels. Therefore there is no strife among the angels. if we say that angels strive for those whom they guard, one angel must needs take one side, and another angel the opposite side. But if one side is in the right the other side is in the wrong. It will follow therefore, that a good angel is a compounder of wrong; which is unseemly. demons are not deputed to assail man. it is not a fair fight, the assaults of the flesh and the world are enough for man's exercise. sometimes their assault is a punishment to man: In order that the conditions of the fight be not unequal, there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be gained principally through the grace of God, secondarily through the guardianship of the angels. The assault of the flesh and the world would suffice for the exercise of human weakness: but it does not suffice for the demon's malice, which makes use of both the above in assailing men. "God tempted Abraham." to tempt is a sign of ignorance. sin dwells in the will. Since therefore the demons cannot change man's will, as appears from what has been said above (Q. 111, A. 2), it seems that it is not in their province to tempt. the inward disposition of man God alone knows, though the will cannot be forced, it can nevertheless be inclined. "the multitude of demons is the cause of all evils, of every sinner can be said what the Lord said of the Jews (John 8:44): "You are of your father the devil." But this was in as far as they sinned through the devil's instigation. every good thing we do is due to the suggestion of the good angels: When man commits sin without being thereto instigated by the devil, he nevertheless becomes a child of the devil thereby, in so far as he imitates him who was the first to sin. Man can of his own accord fall into sin: the activity of the demons will show itself especially in the works of Antichrist. demons are unable to change the nature of a body; they can employ certain seeds that exist in the elements of the world, Christ overcame the tempter most effectively. Yet afterwards the demon assailed Him by instigating the Jews to kill Him. there is not substance below the corporeal substance which can be susceptible of the latter's action; quantity hinders substance from movement and action, bodies, being most composite, are most remote from the first active cause, if a body is an agent, the term of its action is either a substantial, or an accidental form. But it is not a substantial form; for it is not possible to find in a body any principle of action, save an active quality, which is an accident; and an accident cannot be the cause of a substantial form, since the cause is always more excellent than the effect. Likewise, neither is it an accidental form, for "an accident does not extend beyond its subject," as Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4). Therefore no bodies are active. this latter is primary matter, which is a pure potentiality, just as God is pure act. because action is not effected by local movement, as Democritus held: but by something being reduced from potentiality to act. which is most distant from God is primary matter; which is in no way active, since it is a pure potentiality. Democritus explained action by an issue of atoms. in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually, seeds are active principles. But there are no active principles in corporeal matter; since, as we have said above, matter is not competent to act miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal virtues. These active and passive virtues are in certain parts of corporeal things: and when they are employed with local movement for the production of certain results, we speak of the demons as employing seeds. that can be called seed also which the female contributes as the passive principle. From the words of Augustine when speaking of these seminal virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal virtues, just as seed is a kind of cause: for the production of anything, an agent and matter suffice. the agent produces its like. Now it is to be observed that everything which is produced here below is produced through the action of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and other such qualities, which do not exist in heavenly bodies. sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies: For the separate species, since they are supposed to be immovable, would always have the same mode of being: the effects of the stars are varied even in corporeal things, it seems that they can cause impressions on our souls, astrologers often foretell the truth they cannot compel the will, "the wise man is stronger than the stars" For the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, can harass men, who on that account are called lunatics, as appears from Matt. 4:24 and 17:14. But this would not be if they were not subject to the heavenly bodies. necromancers observe certain constellations in order to invoke the demons. the demons are confined to certain inferior bodies, namely, "herbs, stones, animals, and to certain sounds and words, forms and figures," Now it is manifest that "the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body," as Aristotle says [*De Part. Animal. ii, 7: De Sens. et Sensato ii: De Somn. et Vigil. iii]: wherefore it is the most subject to the action of the moon, the property of which is to move what is moist. heavenly bodies are a sufficient cause of their effects. the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject to the power of heavenly bodies, The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that take place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes, which can fail in their effects in the minority of cases. The power of a heavenly body is not infinite. Wherefore it requires a determinate disposition in matter, both as to local distance and as to other conditions, in order to produce its effect. the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the causality of a heavenly body, If therefore things happen by fate, there will be neither luck nor chance in the world. Nothing hinders certain things happening by luck or by chance, if compared to their proximate causes: but not if compared to Divine Providence, whereby "nothing happens at random in the world," fate is in God, and not in creatures. fate seems to be one thing only, essentially fate is the very disposition or "series," i.e. order, of second causes. Fate has the nature of a cause, Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies order, which is not a substance, but a relation. if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to fate happens unchangeably and of necessity. But things ascribed to fate seem principally to be contingencies. Therefore there would be no contingencies in the world, but all things would happen of necessity. All the things mentioned in this passage are done by God by means of second causes; Although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet some of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. And these, therefore, are not subject to fate, man cannot teach, and this is proper to God. knowledge is an active quality just as heat is. a man cannot by teaching cause knowledge in another man. the teacher only brings exterior help knowledge need not be an active quality: but is the principle by which one is directed in teaching, the Apostle says (Eph. 3:10): "That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the Church." But the Church is the union of all the faithful. Therefore some things are made known to angels through men. some men are higher than some angels; Certain men in this state of life are greater than certain angels, not actually, but virtually; in the working of miracles a change is wrought in corporeal matter. bewitched this change sometimes goes so far as to bring on sickness and death. The saints are said to work miracles by the power of grace, not of nature. when the soul is of strong imagination, it can change corporeal matter. This he says is the cause of the "evil eye." the apprehension of the human soul does not suffice to work a change in exterior bodies, except by means of a change in the body united to it, a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance as to local motion, Simon Magus, by sorcery retained power over the soul of a child that he had slain, and that through this soul he worked magical wonders. if the motive power of a separate substance is naturally determinate to move a certain body, that substance will not be able to move a body of higher degree, Simon Magus was deceived by some demon who pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magician had slain. it begins to exist not by generation but by creation. the sensitive soul cannot be caused by the animal's generating power. neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in the semen, The sensitive soul is not a perfect self-subsistent substance. This active force which is in the semen, and which is derived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a certain movement of this soul itself: As to the active power which was in the semen, it ceases to exist, when the semen is dissolved the rational soul is from the begetter. if the rational soul be created by God, sometimes God concurs in the sin of adultery, the soul is in the embryo; the nutritive soul from the beginning, then the sensitive, lastly the intellectual soul. the seminal power disposes the matter, but the power of the soul gives the form. the matter is disposed for the reception of a certain species of form. In the action of the adulterer, what is of nature is good; in this God concurs. But what there is of inordinate lust is evil; in this God does not concur. This would not be true if He created new souls every day. If therefore souls were created with the bodies, every day innumerable spiritual substances would be added to the perfection of the universe: the souls which are created now, existed already, as to the likeness of the species, Something can be added every day to the perfection of the universe, as to the number of individuals, That the soul remains without the body is due to the corruption of the body, the "radical humor" seems to belong to the reality of human nature; and if it be lost, it cannot be recovered, according to physicians. But it could be recovered if the food were changed into the humor. man would be able by taking food to insure himself against death in perpetuity. If therefore a man lived long enough, it would follow that in the end nothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at the beginning. the transforming virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth. Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this; and then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether, the animal dies. It is the same with living bodies, in which by means of nourishment that is renewed which was consumed by natural heat. if the semen from which something is generated, is produced from the surplus food, a man would receive nothing from his grandfather and his ancestors in whom the food never existed. If therefore, the semen were produced from surplus food, the man begotten of such semen would be more akin to the cow and the pig, than to his father or other relations. kinship is not in relation to matter, but rather to the derivation of the forms. both were in Adam as in principle. an end is not a cause. But that for which a man acts, is the cause of his action; in some cases the last end is an action, man does not do everything for an end. Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent's intention. And it is this way that it is a cause. two ways: they have indeed an imaginary end, they do not apprehend the idea of an end as such, to act for an end is to order one's action to an end. the good and the end is the object of the will. But "the will is in the reason" when he is moved under another's compulsion, it is not necessary that he should know the end. all things that lack reason are, of necessity, moved to their particular ends by some rational will which extends to the universal good, namely by the Divine will. the end is an extrinsic cause. But everything is specified by an intrinsic principle. that which gives a thing its species should exist before it. But the end comes into existence afterwards. one thing cannot be in more than one species. But one and the same act may happen to be ordained to various ends. The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, The end, in so far as it pre-exists in the intention, pertains to the will, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1). And it is thus that it gives the species to the human or moral act. good has the nature of an end. Therefore there is an indefinite series of ends. things pertaining to the reason can be multiplied to infinity: thus mathematical quantities have no limit. and so on indefinitely. the first good is the last end, In things which are of themselves, reason begins from principles that are known naturally, and advances to some term. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Poster. i, 3) that there is no infinite process in demonstrations, because there we find a process of things having an essential, not an accidental, connection with one another. But in those things which are accidentally connected, nothing hinders the reason from proceeding indefinitely. Now it is accidental to a stated quantity or number, as such, that quantity or unity be added to it. Wherefore in such like things nothing hinders the reason from an indefinite process. This multiplication of acts of the will reacting on itself, is accidental to the order of ends. The power of the will does not extend to making opposites exist at the same time. Which would be the case were it to tend to several diverse objects as last ends, what man does in jest, he ordains not to the last end. Actions done jestingly are not directed to any external end; One need not always be thinking of the last end, whenever one desires or does something: some turn away from the unchangeable good, by sinning. If, therefore, all men had the same last end, they would not have various pursuits in life. Those who sin turn from that in which their last end really consists: but they do not turn away from the intention of the last end, which intention they mistakenly seek in other things. "All things obey money." money seems to be the means of possessing all things: All material things obey money, All things salable can be had for money: not so spiritual things, which cannot be sold. the desire for artificial wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence, honor more than anything else seems to be that by which virtue is rewarded, man suffers loss in all other things, lest he should suffer loss of honor. virtue's true reward is happiness itself, Honor is due to God and to persons of great excellence as a sign of attestation of excellence already existing: not that honor makes them excellent. man seeks to be honored especially by the wise, glory consists "in being well known and praised." happiness is the most enduring good. Now this seems to be fame or glory; because by this men attain to eternity after a fashion. The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which is with men, but of the glory which is from God, with His Angels. Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by false report. all things desire to become like to God, the highest perfection for man is to be able to rule others; more than aught else, men shun servitude, which is contrary to power. God's power is His goodness: Just as it is a very good thing for a man to make good use of power in ruling many, so is it a very bad thing if he makes a bad use of it. And so it is that power is towards good and evil. Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of power: it consists in the health of the body. "to be" is better than "to live," being itself is that which is most desired by all. the good of the body is preferred to external goods, Being taken simply, as including all perfection of being, surpasses life it is absurd to ask anyone what is his motive in wishing to be pleased" "the first cause goes more deeply into the effect than the second cause" all desire delight; operations of the senses, through being the principles of our knowledge, are more perceptible. they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely, we love that for which we desire good, more than the good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom we desire money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man desires, he desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself more than all other goods. As to whether man loves anything more than himself with the love of friendship there will be occasion to inquire when we treat of Charity. that which constitutes happiness, viz. which makes man happy, is something outside his soul, man's highest good is happiness. Since then the angel is above man in the order of nature, as stated in the First Part (Q. 111, A. 1), it seems that man's happiness consists in man somehow reaching the angel. man's happiness consists in the whole universe of creatures. man is made happy by that which lulls his natural desire. The summit of man does indeed touch the base of the angelic nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest there as in his last end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself of good, which is the common object of happiness of all the blessed, as being the infinite and perfect good. the last end of man is not the good of the universe, but God himself. it seems that happiness is the same as God. men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), by participation; operation does not remain, but passes. operations are many. human operation is often interrupted; two senses. Boethius, in defining happiness, considered happiness in general: But Aristotle expressed the very essence of happiness, such an operation is an action and a perfection, not of the agent, but rather of the patient, in men, according to their present state of life, the final perfection is in respect of an operation whereby man is united to God: but this operation neither can be continual, nor, consequently, is it one only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued. And for this reason in the present state of life, perfect happiness cannot be attained by man. the operation of the senses is required antecedently for imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life. in this imperfect happiness, we need the aggregate of those goods that suffice for the most perfect operation of this life. we advance from the perfection of the lower part to the perfection of the higher part. happiness is the supreme good. But good is the object of the will. Therefore happiness consists in an operation of the will. the first mover in regard to operations is the will: the love of God, which is an act of the will, is a more excellent operation than knowledge, Peace pertains to man's last end, not as though it were the very essence of happiness; but because it is antecedent and consequent thereto: motion towards the end begins in the will. Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but knowledge precedes love in attaining: man is like God, by his practical intellect, which is the cause of things understood, the practical intellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative intellect, which is ordained to the true. the speculative intellect is more concerned with things outside man; the speculative intellect has good within it, But since man's last end is something outside of him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by an operation of the speculative intellect; therefore, man's happiness consists in an operation of the speculative intellect rather than of the practical intellect. everything is perfected, according as it is reduced from potentiality to act. But the human intellect is reduced to act by the consideration of speculative sciences. In his book on Ethics the Philosopher treats of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, Not only is perfect happiness naturally desired, but also any likeness or participation thereof. Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fashion, by the consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its final and perfect act. it seems that man's final happiness consists in contemplating the angels. the beginning of human knowledge is from the angels, by whom men are enlightened, We shall take part in the feasts of the angels, by contemplating not only the angels, but, together with them, also God Himself. the angel enlightens as a minister, two ways. the final perfection of the human intellect does not reach to this, but consists in something less. Dionysius speaks of the knowledge of wayfarers journeying towards happiness. twofold nothing besides vision is required for happiness. The very sight of God causes delight. Delight that is attendant upon the operation of the intellect does not hinder it, delight ranks before the operation of the intellect, i.e. vision. delight or enjoyment corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith, we should form our estimate of things not simply according to the order of the sensitive appetite, but rather according to the order of the intellectual appetite. delight does not answer to charity as its end, but vision does, happiness is without comprehension. Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third. happiness consists in an operation. But operations are determined by their objects: twofold. Wherefore even vision itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as it is present, is the object of comprehension. many who are not clean of heart, know many truths." the operation of the intellect precedes the operation of the will. Happiness once obtained, rectitude of the will is no longer necessary. Hence the instruments of movement are no longer necessary when the end has been gained: but the due order to the end is necessary. Now the soul, without the body, has not the perfection of nature; the soul has not perfect being, while it is separated from the body, this cannot be said of the separated soul; for it yet desires to be united to the body, the soul without the body is not equal to the angels, the human soul retains the being of the composite after the destruction of the body: since the intellect remains, it can have Happiness. two ways. after the body has been resumed, Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent. "the souls of the departed see not God as the angels do," Happiness does not consist in bodily goods. man's Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 8). But the body has no part in this operation, the soul should be abstracted from the body in every way. bodily good can add a certain charm and perfection to Happiness. perfection of the body is necessary, lest it hinder the mind from being lifted up. The perfect operation of the intellect requires indeed that the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body which weighs upon the soul; at least external place is necessary for Happiness. metaphorically, These goods that serve for the animal life, are incompatible with that spiritual life wherein perfect Happiness consists. the empyrean heaven, will be appointed to the Blessed, not as a need of Happiness, but by reason of a certain fitness and adornment. glory consists in man's good being brought to the notice of many. charity includes the love of God and of our neighbor. That glory which is essential to Happiness, is that which man has, not with man but with God. friendship is, as it were, concomitant with perfect Happiness. man considers truth in material things: Since, therefore, the angelic nature through which man cannot mount is midway between God and human nature; it seems that he cannot attain Happiness. Because the angels attained it forthwith after the beginning of their creation: whereas man attains if after a time. after this state of life, he has another natural way, he can surmount them by an operation of the intellect, nothing can surpass the supreme. either man is not happy; or, if he be happy, no other Happiness can be greater. the many mansions signify the manifold Happiness in the divers degrees of enjoyment. one is said to be happier than another, by reason of diverse participation of the same good. imperfect participation in the Sovereign Good does not destroy the nature of Happiness, Some are said to be happy in this life, either on account of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the life to come, two causes. Men esteem that there is some kind of happiness to be had in this life, on account of a certain likeness to true Happiness. Since then man is, by his nature, changeable, it seems that Happiness is participated by man in a changeable manner. And consequently it seems that man can lose Happiness. it seems that it can desist from the operation whereby man is made happy: the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's Happiness has a beginning, since man was not always happy. Therefore it seems that it has an end. whoever has happiness has it altogether unchangeably: man is unable not to wish to be happy. the beginning of happiness is from one cause, its endlessness is from another. nature does not fail in necessary things. irrational creatures can attain their end by their natural powers. it did give him free-will, with which he can turn to God, that He may make him happy. the rational creature, which can attain the perfect good of happiness, but needs the Divine assistance for the purpose, is more perfect than the irrational creature, which is not capable of attaining this good, but attains some imperfect good by its natural powers. man is made happy, through a higher creature, viz. an angel, acting on him. man is potentially happy. Therefore he can be made actually happy by an angel who is actually happy. an angel can enlighten man's intellect man is indeed helped by the angels no creature can communicate its Happiness to another. A happy angel enlightens the intellect of a man or of a lower angel, as to certain notions of the Divine works: but not as to the vision of the Divine Essence, God who does not require dispositions before acting, bestows Happiness without any previous works. The Apostle is speaking of the Happiness of Hope, many know not what Happiness is. some consider it impossible for man to see the Divine Essence; the principle of human acts is not in man himself, but outside him: all human acts are new, since none is eternal. Consequently, the principle of all human acts is from without: Not every principle is a first principle. such movements caused by an extrinsic principle are of another genus of movement. it is not contrary to the essence of a voluntary act, that it proceed from God, since the will is in the reason (De Anima iii, 9), it cannot be in irrational animals. neither praise nor blame is due to the acts of irrational minds. likeness deliberating reason is indifferently disposed to opposite things, knowledge is essential to the voluntary, as stated above (AA. 1, 2). But knowledge involves an act. Therefore voluntariness cannot be without some act. two senses. God, that is more powerful than the human will. Therefore it can be compelled, at least by Him. the will is a passive force: for it is a "mover moved" (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore, since it is sometimes moved by its active principle, it seems that sometimes it is compelled. the movement of the will is sometimes contrary to nature; as is clear of the will's movement to sin, which is contrary to nature, when the will is moved, according to its own inclination, by the appetible object, this movement is not violent but voluntary. That to which the will tends by sinning, although in reality it is evil and contrary to the rational nature, nevertheless is apprehended as something good and suitable to nature, in so far as it is suitable to man by reason of some pleasurable sensation or some vicious habit. violence cannot be done to the will, sometimes a man suffers compulsion without being grieved some violent actions proceed from the will: two ways. fear regards a future evil which is repugnant to the will. the will of him that is in fear, does concur somewhat in that which he does through fear. Now a thing is said to be voluntary, not only for its own sake, as it were absolutely; but also for the sake of something else, as it were relatively. just as fear is a passion, so is concupiscence. fear has a greater tendency than concupiscence to cause involuntariness. the man who yields to concupiscence acts counter to that which he purposed at first, but not counter to that which he desires now; If concupiscence were to destroy knowledge altogether, as happens with those whom concupiscence has rendered mad, it would follow that concupiscence would take away voluntariness. a circumstance is that from "which an orator adds authority and strength to his argument." that which surrounds (_circumstat_) is rather out than in. human acts themselves are accidents. The orator gives strength to his argument, in the first place, from the substance of the act; and secondly, from the circumstances of the act. two ways. two ways. circumstances cannot give quality to human acts; circumstances are the accidents of acts. But one thing may be subject to an infinity of accidents; hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 2) that "no art or science considers accidental being, except only the art of sophistry." oratory is not a part of theology. nothing hinders their being called good or bad according to their proportion to extrinsic things that are adjacent to them. But such like accidents are not what we call circumstances; because circumstances although, as stated above (A. 1), they are extrinsic to the act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by being related to it. To the theologian this consideration belongs, in all the aforesaid ways: since to him all the other arts are subservient: there are only two circumstances, to wit, "when" and "where." all the circumstances are included under one, which is the "mode of acting." Accordingly, neither "who," nor "why," nor "about what," are circumstances: since "who" refers to the efficient cause, "why" to the final cause, and "about what" to the material cause. Time and place surround (_circumstant_) the act by way of measure; This mode "well" or "ill" is not a circumstance, but results from all the circumstances. For those in which the act is seem to be place and time: and these do not seem to be the most important of the circumstances, since, of them all, they are the most extrinsic to the act. the end of a thing is extrinsic to it. But the cause of an act is the person that does it; while the form of an act is the manner in which it is done. Wherefore Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi], as though he were explaining the dictum of the Philosopher, instead of the latter's term--"in which the act is"--said, "what is done." Although the end is not part of the substance of the act, yet it is the most important cause of the act, the same power regards opposites; volition is directed not only to beings, but also to non-beings. the object of the will is good. That which is not a being in nature, is considered as a being in the reason, wherefore negations and privations are said to be "beings of reason." if volition is of the end, it is not of the means. The Philosopher is speaking of the will in reference to the simple act of the will; not in reference to the power of the will. every practical art considers both the end and the means. it is the same movement of the will whereby it is directed to the end and to the means. whenever a man wills the means, by the same act he wills the end; but not the conversely. the will sometimes wills the end, and yet does not proceed to will the means. Therefore the intellect does not move the will. sometimes our imagination affects us no more than what is set before us in a picture, the same is not mover and moved in respect of the same thing. The passage quoted proves, not that the intellect does not move, but that it does not move of necessity. it is not the speculative intellect that moves, but the practical intellect It is therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved in the same respect. the sensitive appetite is less excellent than the will the sensitive appetite is a particular power, the mover is not moved by that which it moves, in such a way that there be reciprocal motion. in respect of the man in whom a passion is predominant, in so far as he is subject to that passion, the sensitive appetite is more excellent. both irascible and concupiscible can move counter to the will: nothing moves itself. If, therefore, it moved itself, it would always be moving itself, If, therefore, the will move itself, it would follow that the same thing is at once moved immediately by two movers; forasmuch as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act, The power of the will is always actually present to itself; but the act of the will, whereby it wills an end, is not always in the will. By the intellect it is moved on the part of the object: it is essential to the voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle, the will cannot suffer violence, the will moves itself sufficiently. its first principle is from without. then the will would will and not will the same thing. it needs to be moved by another as first mover. all various and multiform movements are reduced, as to their cause, to a uniform movement which is that of the heavens, astrologers The movements of the human body are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of a heavenly body, in so far as the disposition suitable to a particular movement, is somewhat due to the influence of heavenly bodies; "We must confess that when the truth is foretold by astrologers, this is due to some most hidden inspiration, to which the human mind is subject without knowing it. And since this is done in order to deceive man, it must be the work of the lying spirits." man's will can be moved by an angel also, man's intellect is reduced to act, not by God alone, but also by the angel who enlightens it, If, therefore man's will were moved by God alone, it would never be moved to evil: An angel is not above man in such a way as to be the cause of his will, God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover, to the universal object of the will, which is good. no movement is always in the will. nature is determinate to one thing: whereas the will is referred to opposites. in every thing, being itself, which is from nature, precedes volition, which is from the will. it is not necessary that the will (which is reduced from potentiality to act, when it wills something), should always be in the act of volition; a mover, if it be sufficient, moves the movable of necessity. the intellect is moved, of necessity, by its object: therefore the will also, by its object. The intellect is moved, of necessity, by an object which is such as to be always and necessarily true: but not by that which may be either true or false--viz. by that which is contingent: as we have said of the good. The last end moves the will necessarily, it is not in man's power to cast aside a passion at once. if the sensitive appetite happen to be disposed to something, by reason of a passion, the will cannot be moved in a contrary sense. it is in the power of the will not to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence. But sometimes, although reason is clouded by passion, yet something of this reason remains free. we will and do many things without passion, and through choice alone; God cannot be resisted, because His power is infinite; it would be more repugnant to the Divine motion, for the will to be moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature; than for it to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature. to enjoy is not an act of the appetitive power, but of the intellect. to enjoy belongs to each power, enjoyment belongs to the apprehensive, and not to the appetitive power. the intellect attains this end, as the executive power, but the will as the motive power, the appetitive power moves the other powers to their ends; two things: irrational animals cannot obtain the last end. the sensitive appetite cannot enjoy: Augustine is speaking there of perfect enjoyment. Enjoyment need not be of the last end simply; but of that which each one chooses for his last end. The sensitive appetite follows some knowledge; Augustine is speaking there of imperfect enjoyment. the appetite has no rest save in the possession of the end. Augustine speaks there of perfect enjoyment. two ways to ordain is an act of reason. figuratively, Intention is called a light because it is manifest to him who intends. The will does not ordain, threefold intention regards the end as the terminus, as stated above (A. 1, ad 4). But a terminus is something last. enjoyment is always of the last end. when we pray, we direct our intention to God, A terminus is something last, not always in respect of the whole, but sometimes in respect of a part. intention implies movement towards an end, not rest. there cannot be several termini in the same direction of one movement. one man cannot have several last ends. There can be several termini ordained to one another, it is possible to understand several things at the same time, in so far as, in some way, they are one. intention of the end and the willing of the means are distinct movements of the will. the willing of the means is called choice. But choice and intention are not the same. we can have intention of the end without having determined the means which are the object of choice. nature intends the end even in things void of reason, enjoyment is in irrational animals, irrational animals act for an end; Enjoyment does not imply the ordaining of one thing to another, as intention does, but absolute repose in the end. Irrational animals are moved to an end, not as though they thought that they can gain the end by this movement; this belongs to one that intends; but through desiring the end by natural instinct, choice implies comparison, whereby one is given preference to another. But to compare is an act of reason. choice is a kind of conclusion in practical matters, there is an "ignorance of choice," Choice implies a previous comparison; not that it consists in the comparison itself. In speaking "of ignorance of choice," we do not mean that choice is a sort of knowledge, but that there is ignorance of what ought to be chosen. irrational animals desire something on account of an end: since they act for an end, and from desire. Therefore choice is in irrational animals. irrational animals take something in preference to others: a hound in following a stag, on coming to a crossroad, tries by scent whether the stag has passed by the first or the second road: and if he find that the stag has not passed there, being thus assured, takes to the third road without trying the scent; as though he were reasoning by way of exclusion, there must be a certain discrimination of one thing from another. Wherefore as soon as an animal, whether by its sense or by its imagination, is offered something to which its appetite is naturally inclined, it is moved to that alone, without making any choice. This is clear from the fact that all that share in one nature, invariably act in the same way. But just as there can be preference of means, so can there be preference of ends. there is but one last end. It is exterior action that is put in contradistinction to contemplation. it often happens that we are unable to accomplish what we choose: if the superior command what is impossible, it should be attempted. the subject should not rely on his own judgment to decide whether a certain thing is possible; conclusions follow of necessity from their principles. reason judges of necessity about some things: every act of choosing is in regard to something that seems in some way better. conditionally; If two things be proposed as equal under one aspect, nothing hinders us from considering in one of them some particular point of superiority, counsel is ascribed to God: counsel is of what man wills to do)--and those only take counsel who lack knowledge." the matter of counsel is human actions. But some human actions are ends, if any human act be an end, it will not, as such, be the matter of counsel. it is possible for many to confer about things that are not subject to movement, and are not the result of our actions, such as the nature of various things. men sometimes seek counsel about things that are laid down by law; some are said to take consultation about future events; if counsel were only of things that we do, no one would take counsel about what another does. But this is clearly untrue. Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do. Counsel implies conference, not of any kind, but about what is to be done, Counsel is not only about what is done, but also about whatever has relation to what is done. We seek counsel about the actions of others, in so far as they are, in some way, one with us; choice is about all things that we do. whenever we do not act through the impulse of passion, we act in virtue of the reason's inquiry. when the judgment or decision is evident without inquiry, there is no need for the inquiry of counsel. In matters that are evident, the reason makes no inquiry, but judges at once. when not only the means, but also the way of using the means, is fixed, then there is no need of counsel. the process of counsel is not one of analysis. Since then, the past precedes the present, and the present precedes the future, it seems that in taking counsel one should proceed from the past and present to the future: which is not an analytical process. the inquiry of counsel should begin from things present. the order of reasoning about actions is contrary to the order of actions. Reason begins with that which is first according to reason; but not always with that which is first in point of time. we must first inquire whether it be conducive to the end, before considering whether it be possible. singulars are infinite. the inquiry about removing obstacles can go on indefinitely. certainty is not to be had in contingent singulars, Singulars are infinite; not actually, but only potentially. Although human action can be hindered, the hindrance is not always at hand. In contingent singulars, something may be taken for certain, not simply, indeed, but for the time being, and as far as it concerns the work to be done. sense is an apprehensive power. assent belongs to the intellect, when Augustine ascribes consent to the reason, he takes reason as including the will. Sense, properly speaking, belongs to the apprehensive faculty; but by way of similitude, in so far as it implies seeking acquaintance, it belongs to the appetitive power, Hence the will, to which it belongs to tend to the thing itself, is more properly said to consent: whereas the intellect, whose act does not consist in a movement towards the thing, but rather the reverse, as we have stated in the First Part (Q. 16, A. 1; Q. 27, A. 4; Q. 59, A. 2), is more properly said to assent: the appetite of irrational animals is determinate to one thing. If therefore there were no consent in irrational animals, there would be no act accomplished; irrational animals act through passion. consent implies a determination of the appetite, which is active rather than merely passive. the accomplishment of an act follows not only from consent, but also from the impulse of the appetite, The man who acts through passion is able not to follow the passion: whereas irrational animals have not that power. we consent to the end. the intemperate man consents to his own act. If therefore consent were only directed to the means it would nowise differ from choice. so do we consent to the means on account of the end, in respect of which our act is not consent but something greater, namely, volition. Delight in his act, rather than the act itself, is the end of the intemperate man, after consent there still remains a choice. consent to the act does not belong only to the higher reason. the higher reason is not alone in consenting to the act. man often consents to an act not for eternal, but for temporal reasons, it does not follow that consent is an act of each power, but of the will which is in the reason, use is an act of the reason and not of the will. execution comes last. judgment of things created by God belongs to the speculative reason; which seems to be altogether distinct from the will, Damascene is speaking of use in so far as it belongs to the executive powers. the speculative reason is said to use, in so far as it is moved by the will, in the same way as the other powers. animals apply their members to action; instinct; the last end, more than anything else, is the object of the will's application. use in general, nothing follows after choice, except execution. since use belongs to that very motion of the will, it stands between choice and execution. the more a cause precedes, the more numerous the effects to which it has relation. Choice precedes use, if they be referred to the same object. command is a kind of motion; it belongs to the will to move all the other powers of the soul, to command belongs to that which is most free. But the root of liberty is especially in the will. the act of the reason is not followed at once by act: To command is to move, not anyhow, but by intimating and declaring to another; and this is an act of the reason. the will can tend freely towards various objects, precisely because the reason can have various perceptions of good. command is an act of reason not absolutely, but with a kind of motion its soul is not competent to command, because it is not competent to direct. the acts of different powers are themselves distinct. sometimes the commanded act is separate from the command: command naturally precedes the commanded act. The fact that command and the commanded act can be separated from one another shows that they are different parts. Because the parts of a man can be separated from one another, and yet they form one whole. nothing hinders one part from preceding another. will cannot understand the command; proceed to infinity; it commands imperfectly. the intellect understands, not for itself alone, but for all the powers; the first act of the will is not due to the direction of the reason but to the instigation of nature, or of a higher cause, it seems impossible for a thing to command itself. Reason commands itself, nothing prevents the reason from participating in itself: it is not always in our power to apprehend something by sense or imagination. the sensitive appetite is hindered from perfect compliance with the command of reason. twofold the powers of the sensitive soul are subject to the command of reason. in the acts of the nutritive and generative power, there is room for praise and blame, virtue and vice: the very fact that the acts of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, shows that they rank lowest. it does not hold in every respect: for the soul did not create the body out of nothing, as God created the world; for which reason the world is wholly subject to His command. the members of the body are more distant from the reason, than the powers of the vegetal soul. But the powers of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, the movement of the heart is not subject to the command of reason: nothing acts except in so far as it is in act. Now a thing is evil, not according as it is in act, but according as its potentiality is void of act; whereas in so far as its potentiality is perfected by act, it is good, Evil acts in virtue of deficient goodness. An evil action can have a proper effect, "evil is not in things, but in the sinner's use of them," "good and evil are in things themselves," "no art takes notice of what is accidental" an action can be good or evil in its genus Circumstances are outside an action, inasmuch as they are not part of its essence; but they are in an action as accidents thereof. Every accident is not accidentally in its subject; for some are proper accidents; and of these every art takes notice. Since good and being are convertible; according as being is predicated of substance and of accident, so is good predicated of a thing both in respect of its essential being, and in respect of its accidental being; and this, both in natural things and in moral actions. the end is an extrinsic cause. a good action may happen to be ordained to an evil end, as when a man gives an alms from vainglory; and conversely, an evil action may happen to be ordained to a good end, as a theft committed in order to give something to the poor. Therefore an action is not good or evil from its end. The good in view of which one acts is not always a true good; but sometimes it is a true good, sometimes an apparent good. And in the latter event, an evil action results from the end in view. it may happen that an action which is good in its species or in its circumstances is ordained to an evil end, or vice versa. However, an action is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways: since "evil results from any single defect, but good from the complete cause," good and evil do not make a specific difference in things; non-being cannot be a difference, the same specific effect results from a good and from an evil action: since a circumstance is an accident, it does not give an action its species. good, inasmuch as it is in accord with reason, and evil, inasmuch as it is against reason, inasmuch as it is against reason, diversify the moral species. Evil implies privation, not absolute, but affecting some potentiality. The conjugal act and adultery, as compared to reason, differ specifically and have effects specifically different; because the other deserves praise and reward, the other, blame and punishment. But as compared to the generative power, they do not differ in species; and thus they have one specific effect. A circumstance is sometimes taken as the essential difference of the object, as compared to reason; actions derive their species from the object. The end also has the character of an object, it is not accidental to the interior act of the will, unity of species on the part of the internal action. the last difference always constitutes the most specific species. the more formal a difference is, the more specific it is: The end is last in execution; but first in the intention of the reason, in regard to which moral actions receive their species. every end and every object is either good or bad. every action must needs be either good or bad in its species, and none is indifferent. there can be something between good and evil. Every object or end has some goodness or malice, at least natural to it: but this does not imply moral goodness or malice, which is considered in relation to the reason, Not everything belonging to an action belongs also to its species. an action can be indifferent in its species, those who are of an even temper and prodigal disposition are not evil; and yet it is evident that they are not good, since they depart from virtue; several ways. the prodigal is not evil, because he hurts none save himself. Whenever an end is intended by deliberate reason, it belongs either to the good of some virtue, or to the evil of some vice. the species of an action is taken from its object. an accident does not constitute the species. one thing is not in several species. But one action has several circumstances. not every circumstance implies accord or disaccord with reason. it does not always change the species of good or evil. The will is not always directed to what is truly good, but sometimes to the apparent good; two ways. Ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the will, in so far as the circumstance affects the thing willed: the good belongs to the will before it belongs to reason, the will moves the reason the will cannot desire a good that is not previously apprehended by reason. the very desire of the due end presupposes on the part of reason a right apprehension of the end. the goodness of the will does not depend on the eternal law. the eternal law is unknown to us. there can be several measures if one is subordinate to the other. Although the eternal law is unknown to us according as it is in the Divine Mind: nevertheless, it becomes known to us somewhat, either by natural reason which is derived therefrom as its proper image; or by some sort of additional revelation. erring reason is not derived from the eternal law. the will that is at variance with erring reason is not reducible to some species of malice. the erring reason puts forward its judgment as being true, the eternal law and God's commandment are proposed to us by the apprehension of the reason, even when it errs. it seems that the will is always evil when in conjunction with erring reason: so that in such a case a man would be in a dilemma, and, of necessity, would sin: which is unreasonable. his ignorance is vincible and voluntary. the goodness of the will depends on the object alone. this can be referred to an evil end, for instance, to vainglory or covetousness, by willing to obey God for the sake of temporal gain. The act of the will cannot be said to be good, if an evil intention is the cause of willing. if you add to the cause, you add to the effect. in good actions, the will is good in proportion to the good intended. The goodness of the intention is not the whole cause of a good will. The mere malice of the intention suffices to make the will evil: and therefore too, the will is as evil as the intention is evil. it is impossible for man's will to be conformed to the Divine will; our knowledge does not require to be conformed to God's knowledge; our action cannot be conformed to God's. Therefore neither can our will be conformed to His. The human will cannot be conformed to the will of God so as to equal it, but only so as to imitate it. we cannot will what we know not: since the apprehended good is the object of the will. But in many things we know not what God wills. it would follow that a man is bound to will his own damnation. Which is inadmissible. We can know in a general way what God wills. He wills such things under the aspect of justice. good and evil are in the external action, good is in the act of some other power prior to being in the act of the will. that which is formal is subsequent; since form is something added to matter. A man sins by his will, not only when he wills an evil end; but also when he wills an evil act. the difference of good and evil is applicable to both the interior and external act. the same accident cannot be in different subjects. nothing is its own cause. the internal and external actions are different in the physical order: yet distinct as they are in that respect, they combine to form one thing in the moral order, It is in this way that the goodness of the external action is derived from the goodness of the will, and vice versa; viz. according to the order of one to the other. good or evil is to be estimated according to God's judgment rather than according to the judgment of man. Therefore the external action adds no goodness or malice to that of the interior act. the goodness which the external action takes from its matter and circumstances, is distinct from that which it derives from the end; the good actions of his hearers are consequences resulting from the words of a preacher. But such goods as these redound to the merit of the preacher, the punishment is increased on account of the consequences; The virtue of a cause is measured by the effect that flows from the nature of the cause, not by that which results by accident. one continuous movement can be both good and bad: it may happen that the servant's action result from his master's good will, and is therefore good: and from the evil will of the servant, and is therefore evil. This continual movement which proceeds from various intentions, although it is one in the natural order, is not one in the point of moral unity. in so far as they are voluntary in respect of wills that differ, they are two distinct things, and good can be in one of them while evil is in the other. The action of the servant, in so far as it proceeds from the will of the servant, is not the master's action: but only in so far as it proceeds from the master's command. the goodness or malice of a human action depends, before all, on the intention of the end, and on its achievement. punishment is not a sin, although it is an evil. twofold; natural things are not deserving of praise or blame the artist is not blamed for making something bad: weakness or inability either takes away or diminishes guilt. Natural actions are not in the power of the natural agent: since the action of nature is determinate. Reason stands in different relations to the productions of art, and to moral actions. Weakness that occurs in voluntary evils, is subject to man's power: good or evil actions are not all related to another person, A man's good or evil actions, although not ordained to the good or evil of another individual, are nevertheless ordained to the good or evil of another, i.e. the community. he is bound to serve the community. This very good or evil, which a man does to himself by his action, redounds to the community, a man's action, good or evil, does no good or harm to God; not all human actions are ordained to God. God in Himself neither gains nor loses anything by the action of man: but man, for his part, takes something from God, or offers something to Him, when he observes or does not observe the order instituted by God. free-will, all that man is, and can, and has, must be referred to God: passivity belongs to matter. passion is movement, as is stated in _Phys._ iii, 3. But the soul is not moved, passion is the road to corruption; since "every passion, when increased, alters the substance," as is stated in _Topic._ vi, 6. But the soul is incorruptible. passivity, as implying mere reception, need not be in matter, but can be in anything that is in potentiality. Although it does not belong to the soul in itself to be passive and to be moved, yet it belongs accidentally the appetitive part is not affected unless there be a previous passion in the apprehensive part. the appetitive part is more active than the apprehensive part. passion in the soul occurs, properly speaking, in respect of a bodily transmutation. Wherefore in those things that approach to the Supreme Perfection, i.e. to God, there is but little potentiality and passion: two ways. the object of the intellectual appetite, which is the universal good, is a more powerful active force than the object of the sensitive appetite, which is a particular good. joy and love are said to be passions. things that are disposed to passion, suffer much even from petty agents. all the passions are in the concupiscible part, the objects of the irascible and concupiscible passions are the same, all the irascible passions terminate in the concupiscible passions: Jerome ascribes hatred of vice to the irascible faculty, not by reason of hatred, which is properly a concupiscible passion; but on account of the struggle, which belongs to the irascible power. Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, moves the concupiscible power. the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on no other contrariety than that of good and evil. there is no other contrariety of passions, save that of the objects. every approach has a corresponding contrary withdrawal, difference of species implies a difference of form. But every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety, These passions, considered in themselves, are common to man and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason, they are proper to man. The Philosopher says that we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions considered absolutely; but he does not exclude their becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. "movement in accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to nature is passion." But in movements of the soul, what is against nature is sinful and morally evil: these passions lead to sin: The passions of the soul, in so far as they are contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin: but in so far as they are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue. every passion hinders the judgment of reason: the more a man's action is like to God, the better it is: he sins less, who sins from passion, twofold In God and the angels there is no sensitive appetite, nor again bodily members: and so in them good does not depend on the right ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as it does in us. the passions are in the sensitive appetite; so that accordance with reason is accidental to them. joy and sadness are concupiscible passions. But joy and sadness succeed to the irascible passions: the irascible passions precede those concupiscible passions that connote rest. desire takes precedence of love. desire is a movement towards union pleasure is sometimes the cause of love: twofold. Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes love in the order of intention. anger precedes and surpasses hope. anger seems to be a stronger passion than daring, and daring, than hope. the movement of withdrawal precedes the movement of approach. anger arises from the other passions, hope, which regards good more directly, takes precedence: the movement of the appetitive part is in proportion, not to natural movement, but to the intention of nature, twofold hope and despair should be reckoned as principal passions, since they cause others: fear and hope are not the last passions simply, yet they are the last of those passions that tend towards something as future. that which is accidental cannot be said to be principal. the concupiscible power, being a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot tend to wisdom, fear, which is mentioned in this passage, is in the irascible power. The words quoted refer to intellectual or rational love. Love is spoken of as being fear, joy, desire and sadness, not essentially but causally. Natural love is not only in the powers of the vegetal soul, but in all the soul's powers, no power is a passion. But every love is a power, a union or bond is not a passion, but rather a relation. love is not the very relation of union, but that union is a result of love. the objects of dilection and love are the same. The object of love is more general than the object of dilection: the fact that love, which is concupiscible passion, inclines many to evil, is the reason why some assigned the difference spoken of. dilection presupposes the judgment of reason. "love is a passion, while friendship is a habit," friendship of the useful or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses the character to true friendship. evil also is loved, Evil is never loved except under the aspect of good, it is a good thing to acknowledge one's faults, The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in aspect only. some things are sought without being known, for instance, the sciences; in all things there is love, He who seeks science, is not entirely without knowledge thereof: a thing is loved more than it is known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly known. Even natural love, which is in all things, is caused by a kind of knowledge, not indeed existing in natural things themselves, but in Him Who created their nature, likeness is the cause of hatred; unlikeness is a cause of love. He that loves what he needs, bears a likeness to what he loves, as potentiality bears a likeness to its act, pleasure is a passion. Therefore another passion is a cause of love. desire is a passion. But we love some because we desire to receive something from them: as happens in every friendship based on usefulness. Therefore another passion is a cause of love. hope too is a cause of love. none takes pleasure save in that which is loved in some way. hope itself is of a good that is loved. love is compatible with absence; love does not cause union of essence; union is the effect of knowledge rather than of love. love remains whether the beloved be absent or present. threefold the union caused by love is closer than that which is caused by knowledge. the same cannot be container and contents. it is the function of the reason, not of the appetite where love resides, to divide things that are really united. nothing hinders a thing from being both container and contents in different ways: The apprehension of the reason precedes the movement of love. This argument is true of the third kind of mutual indwelling, which is not to be found in every kind of love. ecstasy seems to imply loss of reason. But love does not always result in loss of reason: This argument applies to love of concupiscence, which, as stated above, does not cause ecstasy simply. He who loves, goes out from himself, in so far as he wills the good of his friend and works for it. Yet he does not will the good of his friend more than his own good: contention is incompatible with love. zeal is opposed to communication; there is no zeal without hatred, as neither is there without love: zeal arises from love of good. love causes languor: love is a dissolvent: love causes fervor: man does not do everything from passion: the other passions of the appetitive faculty are superfluous. some things are done from hatred. all the other passions of the soul, result from love. Hatred also is a result of love, everything that exists, as such, is good. If, therefore, nothing but evil be the object of hatred, it would follow that all hatred is commendable: hatred is not only of evil, but also of good. Being, as such, has not the aspect of repugnance but only of fittingness; it happens sometimes that neither hatred of evil nor love of good is good. of two contraries, one is not the cause of the other. hatred precedes love, love and hatred are naturally simultaneous, logically but not really. they are not themselves contrary, but consequent to one another: love precedes hatred: because each is an appetitive movement. flight from pain pertains to hatred; while desire for pleasure belongs to love. love is turned into hatred. the love of pleasure is less than the love of self-preservation, we feel hatred more keenly. sometimes a man wishes and works evil to himself, e.g. a man who kills himself. Therefore some men hate themselves. everyone hates a miser. But some men are misers. Therefore they hate themselves. they who kill themselves, apprehend death itself as a good, it is caused by inordinate self-love, a man cannot hate good. truth is naturally desired and loved. accidentally, the knowledge of truth may become hateful, The reason why we love those who are straightforward is that they make known the truth, and the knowledge of the truth, considered in itself, is a desirable thing. the senses cannot apprehend the universal. hatred is caused by disagreement; and where there is disagreement, there is nothing in common. But the notion of universality implies something in common. "evil is in things, and not in the mind" (Metaph. vi, 4). Since therefore the universal is in the mind only, The senses do not apprehend the universal, as such: but they apprehend something to which the character of universality is given by abstraction. nothing hinders a thing from being common to many, and at variance with others, there is a concupiscence of wisdom, according to Wis. 6:21: "The concupiscence [Douay: 'desire'] of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom." But the sensitive appetite can have no tendency to wisdom. the desire for the commandments of God is not in the sensitive appetite: concupiscence is in each power of the soul, likeness; it does not imply fellowship in craving, as concupiscence does; but simply movement towards the thing desired. for covetousness is not essentially love, but an effect of love. The passion which is directly contrary to concupiscence has no name, and stands in relation to evil, as concupiscence in regard to good. But since, like fear, it regards the absent evil; sometimes it goes by the name of fear, the natural appetite is contrasted with the animal appetite. if some concupiscences are natural, and some not, they differ only in respect of their objects; which amounts to a material difference, which is one of number only. since concupiscence is a passion, it belongs to the sensitive appetite, The same thing that is the object of the natural appetite, may be the object of the animal appetite, once it is apprehended. The difference between those concupiscences that are natural and those that are not, is not merely a material difference; it is also, in a way, formal, even rational concupiscence may pertain to the sensitive appetite. the object of concupiscence is good, which has the aspect of an end. the infinite is without proportion, and therefore unfitting. if concupiscence were infinite, no delight would ever ensue. the universal which the reason apprehends, is infinite in a sense, inasmuch as it contains potentially an infinite number of singulars. he delights in the realization of each object of his concupiscence. it arises from good already gained. delight is a kind of a perfection when we say that delight is an operation, we designate, not its essence, but its cause. delight is a kind of movement. some passions have a tendency to something good, as stated above (Q. 23, AA. 1, 4): and in this sense delight is called a passion. For "delight is a kind of movement," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But all movement is in time. a thing is said to last long and to be morose in respect of time. But some pleasures are called morose. some passions of the soul are in time. Therefore delight is too. This movement is not successive, nor is it of itself in time. Delight is said to be long lasting or morose, according as it is accidentally in time. Other passions have not for their object a good obtained, as delight has. delight and joy have the same object, one and the same movement, that of desire, ends in joy and delight. if joy differs from delight, it seems that there is equal reason for distinguishing gladness, exultation, and cheerfulness from delight, so that they would all be various passions of the soul. But this seems to be untrue. delights of the soul, which are also called joys, are distinct from bodily delights, there is a difference of repose corresponding to the difference of movement. These other names pertaining to delight are derived from the effects of delight; "delight is a sensible movement." delight is a passion. But every passion is in the sensitive appetite. delight is common to us and to the irrational animals. In us there is delight, not only in common with dumb animals, but also in common with angels. more seek sensible pleasures, than intelligible spiritual pleasures. bodily pleasures have greater effects; bodily pleasures need to be tempered and checked, by reason of their vehemence: whereas there is no need to check spiritual pleasures. the majority cannot attain spiritual pleasures, which are proper to the virtuous, spiritual pleasures are in the mind, which is itself the rule: wherefore they are in themselves both sober and moderate. the pleasure afforded by the sight is the greatest of sensible pleasures. the beginning of friendship which is for the sake of the pleasant is principally sight. The sight is loved most, pleasure is to the emotions of the soul what repose is to bodies. what is against nature is violent. But "whatever is violent causes grief" the object of pleasure is the good. Since therefore good is not contrary to good, to one thing there is one contrary, as is proved in _Metaph._ x, 4. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. this difference is material: whereas contrariety is a difference of form, no virtue can be contrary to another virtue. But in other things nothing prevents one good from being contrary to another, pleasure is contrary to both to another pleasure and to sadness. the end is not always an operation, but is sometimes the effect of the operation. leisure and rest consist in cessation from work: and they are objects of pleasure leisure and play and other things pertaining to repose, are pleasant, inasmuch as they banish sadness which results from labor. pleasure is not compared with generation, movement is the chief cause of toil and fatigue Movement causes toil and fatigue, when it exceeds our natural aptitude. custom is like a second nature. pleasure is caused by present good, hope causes affliction, Nothing prevents the same thing, in different ways, being the cause of contraries. desire is chiefly a craving for pleasure. nothing causes its own contrary. sad things, when remembered, cause sorrow Sometimes accidentally a thing is the cause of its contrary: Sad things, called to mind, cause pleasure, not in so far as they are sad and contrary to pleasant things; but in so far as man is delivered from them. the cause of pleasure is our own good when conjoined to us. the actions of others are not pleasing to us, but to the agents themselves. Another's action may be conjoined to me, either by its effect, as in the first way, or by knowledge, as in the second way; or by affection, as in the third way. doing good pertains not to the obtaining but to the spending of one's proper good. Therefore it seems to be the cause of sadness rather than of pleasure. "illiberality is more connatural to man than prodigality." Prodigality is an excessive spending, doing evil to another is not pleasant, except in so far as it seems to affect one's own good. ruling and presiding seem to imply a certain unlikeness. But "it is natural to take pleasure in ruling and presiding," those who are burdened by sorrow are most inclined to seek pleasures, those who are satiated with certain delights, derive not pleasure but disgust from them; as when one is satiated with food. Since ruler and subject are in communion with one another, there is a certain likeness between them: Bodily goods are conditioned by a certain fixed measure: wonder is the act of one who is ignorant of the nature of something, as Damascene says. But knowledge, rather than ignorance, is a cause of pleasure. wonder is the beginning of wisdom, being as it were, the road to the search of truth, as stated in the beginning of _Metaph._ i, 2. But "it is more pleasant to think of what we know, Wonder gives pleasure, not because it implies ignorance, but in so far as it includes the desire of learning the cause, research is sometimes more pleasing accidentally, "the mind is more inclined by desire to act intensely in things that are new," expansion seems to pertain more to love, expansion seems to belong to desire contraction seems to belong to pleasure, metaphorical this expansion increases at the presence of the pleasurable object: the movement of desire ceases when pleasure is reached. pleasure is, in a way, contrary to desire, distaste is incompatible with desire. But pleasure often causes distaste. when it is imperfect, then the desire, tending to what was not possessed, does not cease altogether. pleasure is a kind of repose. pleasure is in the appetitive faculty, while the use of reason is in the apprehensive power. Bodily pleasure implies indeed repose of the appetite in the object of pleasure; which repose is sometimes contrary to reason; but on the part of the body it always implies alteration. And in respect of both points, it hinders the use of reason. when the soul is very intent on the action of one part, it is hindered from attending to a contrary act of the other part. alteration in the body hinders the use of reason, because it hinders the act of the imagination and of the other sensitive powers. pleasure does not perfect, but weakens human operation. "pleasure does not perfect operation, as a habit does." It is not every pleasure that hinders the act of reason, but only bodily pleasure; operation is the efficient cause of pleasure, while pleasure perfects operation by way of final cause, that which destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason, seems to be evil in itself: children and dumb animals, in whom there is no virtue, seek pleasure: whereas the man who is master of himself does not. no art is ordained to pleasure. it is not the pleasures which result from an act of reason, that hinder the reason or destroy prudence, but extraneous pleasures, such as the pleasures of the body. The temperate man does not shun all pleasures, but those that are immoderate, and contrary to reason. Art is not concerned with all kinds of good, but with the making of external things, pleasure is not sought for the sake of something else; the pleasant depends on agreement with the appetite, which tends sometimes to that which is discordant from reason. Consequently not every object of pleasure is good in the moral order which depends on the order of reason. The reason why pleasure is not sought for the sake of something else is because it is repose in the end. Now the end may be either good or evil; pleasure is the repose of the appetite in good. nothing generated is the greatest good: pleasure is made better by addition; Not every pleasure arises from a "becoming"; "that which is first in a genus is the measure of all the rest" a measure or rule should be uniform; judgment of the effect from its cause is more certain than judgment of cause from effect. Love and desire precede pleasure in the order of generation. But pleasure precedes them in the order of the end, All pleasures are uniform in the point of their being the repose of the appetite in something good: pain can be in the body, pain does not belong to the appetitive, but rather to the apprehensive part: pain does not belong to the animal appetite, but rather to the natural appetite; the cause of pain is in the body: as when we suffer something hurtful to the body. But the movement of pain is always in the soul; the senses are required for bodily pain, "pain is used to express bodily suffering." But sorrow is used more in reference to the soul. pain is only in respect of present evil. But sorrow can refer to both past and future evil: thus repentance is sorrow for the past, and anxiety for the future. sorrow can arise from all the senses. if pain be taken in a wide sense, then it is the genus of sorrow, sorrow can be the cause of pleasure; to some, pain or sorrow gives pleasure: sorrow can be the matter of pleasure; Nothing hinders one contrary causing the other accidentally: and thus sorrow can be the cause of pleasure. Pain itself can be pleasurable accidentally in so far as it is accompanied by wonder, sorrow can be the matter of pleasure, or vice versa, not essentially but accidentally: every pleasure is a remedy for all manner of sorrow, every sorrow hinders any kind of pleasure: Whiteness and blackness do not take their species from their relationship to something extrinsic, as pleasure and sorrow do: contemplation can be an evil: contemplation can be hindered in many ways, "much study is an affliction of the flesh." The "sorrow which is according to God," is not caused by the very act of intellectual contemplation, but by something which the mind contemplates: viz. by sin, things that are contrary in reality are not contrary in the order of thought; Contemplation, in itself, is never evil, since it is nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the good of the intellect: it can, however, be evil accidentally, Affliction of the flesh affects contemplation accidentally the brave man who resists the movement of shunning sorrow, is more virtuous than the temperate man, The saying of Augustine that "sorrow is shunned more than pleasure is sought" is true accidentally but not simply. It is not the same with movement from within and movement from without. life is loved more than food and sexual pleasure. interior sorrow is caused by some evil in the imagination. man dies sooner of outward pain than of interior sorrow. there are not several species of pleasure. these are not included in the above species. Pleasure is caused by good, which has only one meaning: Jealousy and indignation are included in envy, The loss itself of good is apprehended as an evil, desire is pleasant in itself, the hindrance is reckoned as present, and so gives rise to sorrow. when hope is removed through the presence of an obstacle, desire causes sorrow. every separation is opposed to unity. If therefore sorrow were caused by a craving for unity, no separation would be pleasant: and this is clearly untrue as regards the separation of whatever is superfluous. sorrow is caused by the craving, not for any kind of unity, but for that unity in which the perfection of nature consists. hurt can be inflicted even by a lesser power. a greater power is something external. External agents can be the causes of appetitive movements, pain or sorrow, far from destroying, increases the power of learning. sorrow hinders all pleasure, man can learn while sorrowful. Moderate sorrow, that does not cause the mind to wander, can conduce to the acquisition of learning External pain arises from hurt done to the body, so that it involves bodily transmutation more than inward sorrow does: carefulness and indignation imply that the soul is uplifted, That uplifting of the soul ensues from the sorrow which is according to God, because it brings with it the hope of the forgiveness of sin. As far as the movement of the appetite is concerned, contraction and depression amount to the same: Sorrow is said to consume man, when the force of the afflicting evil is such as to shut out all hope of evasion: and thus also it both depresses and consumes at the same time. sorrow is not a hindrance to work, but helps one to work well. sorrow causes desire in many cases, as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 14. But desire causes intensity of action. as some actions are proper to the joyful, so are others proper to the sorrowful; for instance, to mourn. Now a thing is improved by that which is suitable to it. Therefore certain actions are not hindered but improved by reason of sorrow. those things which have only a spiritual existence do not cause a transmutation in the body: sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul. despair seems to be more harmful than sorrow; the spiritual movement of the soul is naturally the cause of bodily transmutation. sorrow implies a transmutation that is repugnant A lesser cause suffices to hinder the use of reason, than to destroy life: not every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow; some pleasures cause sorrow; these very pleasures become burdensome to us when we mourn. tears or groans are an effect of sorrow. laughter does not lessen joy. when we weep, the evil that saddens us is present to the imagination. the effect of sorrow is not related to him that sorrows in the same way as the cause of sorrow is. when many are sorrowful, it seems that their sorrow is greater. the pain of a sympathizing friend becomes, to the friend in sorrow, a further cause of sorrow: so that, his pain being doubled his sorrow seems to increase. The friend's sorrow itself would be a cause of sorrow: but consideration of its cause, viz. his love, gives rise rather to pleasure. the contemplation of truth belongs to the speculative intellect. But "the speculative intellect is not a principle of movement"; contemplation of truth is in the intellect. Therefore it does not assuage bodily pain, which is in the senses. on the part of the things known, knowledge causes sorrow: but on the part of the contemplation of truth, it causes pleasure. The speculative intellect does not move the mind on the part of the thing contemplated: but on the part of contemplation itself, which is man's good and naturally pleasant to him. sorrow is in the soul: whereas sleep and baths regard the body. such remedies as these seem to pertain to the outward senses and limbs, rather than to the interior disposition of the heart. The normal disposition of the body, so far as it is felt, is itself a cause of pleasure, and consequently assuages sorrow. every pleasure assuages sorrow. Every good disposition of the body reacts somewhat on the heart, all avoid sorrow, every spiritual sorrow is an evil of the soul. the perception and rejection of bodily evil is the proof of the goodness of nature. sorrow lessens praise or merit: it seems that sorrow is incompatible with rectitude of the will, excessive sorrow, of which Augustine is speaking, oversteps this rule, and therefore it fails to be a virtuous good. such sorrow is an obstacle to the praise and merit of the virtuous good; for instance, when a man gives an alms sorrowfully. Some things do actually happen, not because God wills, but because He permits them to happen--such as sins. "sorrow hinders operation," This passage is to be taken as referring to excessive sorrow, that which ought to be shunned is still more to be shunned by reason of sorrow: sorrow cannot be man's greatest evil. sorrow or pain cannot be the greatest evil; because it has an admixture of good. that which is an evil to the soul is a greater evil than that which is an evil to the body. the object of hope is the same as the object of cupidity or desire, viz. the future good. possibility of acquisition is accidental to a future good, hope differs from despair according to the difference of possible and impossible. hope, seemingly, is a kind of awaiting; hope is the same as confidence; certainty is ascribed to hope. the movement of hope is sometimes called expectation, knowledge of the future is not in the competency of dumb animals, there is no hope in dumb animals, since they have no mind. hope is of things unseen: an animal is moved by its natural instinct to something future, The object of hope is the possible as compared to a power. through seeing something present, an animal's appetite is moved to seek or avoid something future. fear is contrary to hope. hope and despair do not bear on the same thing: despair seems to imply immobility rather than movement. despair is contrary to hope, only by contrariety of approach and withdrawal. Despair does not regard evil as such; experience belongs to the cognitive power; experience causes want of hope. inexperience, rather than experience, seems to be a cause of hope. The old are wanting in hope because of their experience, in so far as experience makes them think something impossible. young men and drunkards are wanting in steadiness; youth and drunkenness are united to weakness. youth lacks experience. they are steady in their own estimation, in their own estimation, they are capable, love precedes hope, hope implies security. But security begets negligence sorrow hinders action, as stated above (Q. 37, A. 3). But hope sometimes causes sorrow: Hope of itself causes pleasure; it is by accident that it causes sorrow, they who despair of flight, strive less to fly, but hope to avenge their death: the Philosopher denies that passion is a virtue by way of habit. The senses do not apprehend the future: but from apprehending the present, an animal is moved by natural instinct fear is not a special but a general passion. fear is nothing but a kind of avoidance of evil. Therefore it is not a special passion. fear is not a special passion, since it belongs to different powers. when fear is put aside, the other passions of the soul are dispersed; Not every avoidance in the appetite is fear, Fear is nowise in the concupiscible: fear regards an evil that surpasses our power, "shame regards a disgraceful deed already done," amazement and stupor regard great and unwonted things, fear leads to flight rather than to search. it is possible to take into consideration something connected with the deed, and surpassing the faculty of the doer, The past deed may be the occasion of fear of future reproach or disgrace: fear regards good as its proper object. we are commanded to fear God, natural defects such as death and the like are always threatening man. If therefore such like evils were an object of fear, man would needs be always in fear. with this hope one may take counsel about avoiding it. Although evil of nature ever threatens, yet it does not always threaten from near at hand: and consequently it is not always feared. Separation from God is a punishment resulting from sin: and every punishment is, in some way, due to an extrinsic cause. two points. shame is not fear of the very act of sin, but of the disgrace or ignominy which arises therefrom, nothing flies from itself. Not every fear is identically the same; a man's present fear may have a future fear for its object. it is clear that those who are quick-tempered are more subject to sudden emotions. Therefore sudden things are less to be feared. we think less about things that happen suddenly. But the more we think about a thing, the more we fear it; Those who are quick-tempered do not hide their anger; wherefore the harm they do others is not so sudden, an evil that cannot be remedied leaves no hope of escape. Therefore such things are not feared at all. there is no remedy for the evil of death: twofold. Although death be an evil without remedy, yet, since it threatens not from near, it is not feared, fear is the cause of love, fear is caused by hate sometimes, accidentally, fear gives rise to love; love causes fear by way of material disposition, those who are in power are very much feared. But defect is contrary to power. This argument is true of the cause of fear, on the part of the efficient cause. accumulation of heat and vital spirits in the interior parts of the body, dilates the heart unto endeavors of daring, those who fear utter nothing: shame is a kind of fear, as stated above (Q. 41, A. 4). But "those who are ashamed blush," as Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8), and the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9) observe. But blushing is an indication, not of contraction, but of the reverse. in those who are afraid, on account of the condensation caused by cold, the vital spirits have a downward movement; in such like fear, there is contraction not only in the appetite, but also in the corporeal nature: every passion disturbs repose, fear does not conduce to counsel, but hinders it. fear is not more conducive to counsel, than hope is. If, however, the fear be slight, so as to make a man wish to take counsel, without gravely disturbing the reason; it may even make it easier for him to take good counsel, it is in matters of difficulty, especially when we distrust ourselves, that we take counsel, fear does not seem to make one cold, these evacuations are often caused by fear. Therefore fear apparently causes heat; and consequently does not cause trembling. When the heat withdraws from the outer to the inner parts, the inward heat increases, especially in the inferior or nutritive parts. Consequently the humid element being spent, thirst ensues; sometimes indeed the result is a loosening of the bowels, and urinary or even seminal evacuation. fear disturbs reason, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore fear hinders action. those who fear while doing anything, are more apt to fail: laziness or sloth is a kind of fear. laziness is a fear of work hope is contrary to fear. safety is contrary to fear. two ways. Safety does not denote something contrary to fear, but merely the exclusion of fear: hope regards good things, despair excludes fear, daring is intent on something good, viz. victory. But it belongs to hope to tend to that which is good and difficult. Therefore daring is the same as hope; daring which pursues evil, comes after hope which pursues good. fear precedes despair. daring is not a part of hope, but its effect: daring is caused by a defect. want of experience is a defect. the suffering of wrongs pertains to defect. Drunkenness causes daring, not through being a defect, but through dilating the heart: Those who have no experience of dangers are more daring, not on account of a defect, but accidentally, the daring sometimes tremble at first, danger is more arduous and difficult when present. It is then therefore that daring is greatest. anger is provoked by the infliction of wounds. But anger causes daring; in men of daring the heat withdraws to the heart; Hurt does not give rise to anger unless there be some kind of hope, there are several passions in this power, not only one. no passion is contrary to anger, anger includes several passions: The irascible power takes its name from "ira" (anger), not because every movement of that power is one of anger; but because all its movements terminate in anger; and because, of all these movements, anger is the most patent. From the very fact that anger is caused by contrary passions, i.e. by hope, which is of good, and by sorrow, which is of evil, it includes in itself contrariety: and consequently it has no contrary outside itself. anger and hatred agree in their effect, since each seeks to inflict harm on another. But hatred regards evil as its object, the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 6) that "anger acts with sorrow." But evil is the object of sorrow. anger is a kind of "desire." "anger grows into hatred": and Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "hatred is inveterate anger." But hatred, like love, is a concupiscible passion. In this sense, however, desire is common to the irascible and concupiscible faculties. anger when it lasts a long time engenders hatred. the concupiscible passions are the causes of the irascible passions. the sensitive appetite follows an apprehension, not of reason, but of the sensitive faculty. dumb animals are devoid of reason: and yet they are seen to be angry. drunkenness fetters the reason; whereas it is conducive to anger. two ways. instinct the Philosopher says (De Problem. iii, 2, 27) that whose who are very drunk, so as to be incapable of the use of reason, do not get angry: it is proper to man to be by nature a gentle animal. reason is contrasted with nature: since those things that act according to reason, are not said to act according to nature. Now "anger requires an act of reason, these things are more natural to man than vengeance. Reason itself belongs to the nature of man: hatred sometimes has mercy. the angry man is not satisfied unless the object of his anger know it and be aggrieved thereby, anger is more settled and more grievous than hatred. As to the intensity of the desire, anger excludes mercy more than hatred does; hatred ensues from a more lasting cause than anger does. one is angry with irrational beings; sometimes a man is angry with himself; anger is not towards a class but only towards an individual, two ways. "metaphorically all actions are the deeds of individuals: All those things which give anger some kind of perfection are not altogether accidental to anger; Irascibility, which Cicero mentions, seems to pertain to the first species of anger, which consists in a certain quickness of temper, rather than to rancor man, by sinning, can do nothing against God; since it is written (Job 35:6): "If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him?" And yet God is spoken of as being angry with man on account of sin, one may desire vengeance for things done against others. as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) man is angry especially with those "who despise what he takes a great interest in; We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion of the soul but as of judgment of justice, If we are angry with those who harm others, and seek to be avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong in some way to us: either by some kinship or friendship, or at least because of the nature we have in common. When we take a very great interest in a thing, we look upon it as our own good; Silence provokes the insulter to anger when he thinks it is due to contempt, one may suffer an injury without being despised or slighted. dumb animals do not desire honor. Therefore they are not grieved by being slighted. contempt or slight alone adds to the motive of anger, Although a dumb animal does not seek honor as such, yet it naturally seeks a certain superiority, defect rather than excellence makes one prone to anger. excellence is not a cause of anger. dogs bite not those who sit down." anger ceases at the sight of death. we are more angry with friends, this hurt surpasses the measure of just retaliation. To be despised by one's friends seems also a greater indignity. sorrow excludes pleasure. But anger is never without sorrow, the angry man derives pleasure from vengeance, pleasure hinders anger pleasure is the effect or terminus of anger. This argument holds in regard to pleasure caused by the real presence of vengeance, which banishes anger altogether. pleasure felt in taking vengeance follows from anger. fervor, as stated above (Q. 28, A. 5; Q. 37, A. 2), belongs to love. in course of time anger grows weaker; "the addition of a greater anger banishes already existing anger," "anger listens to reason," the passion of anger forestalls the perfect judgment of reason, through failing to obey reason, man sometimes breaks out into unbecoming words: sometimes it goes yet farther, so as to paralyze the tongue habit is reckoned as one of the predicaments; "every habit is a disposition," three ways, habit is "a quality difficult to change," the word "habit" implies a certain lastingness: while the word "disposition" does not. habit does not imply the relation of a principle to an act. If therefore, habit also is a principle of act, it follows that it is posterior to power. And so habit and disposition will not be the first species of quality. health is sometimes a habit, and so are leanness and beauty. But these do not indicate relation to an act. It is, however, in a state of potentiality in respect to operation. It is not the essence of habit to be related to power, but to be related to nature. in so far as nature is a principle of act, it consequently implies a relation to act. a thing is well or ill disposed by its form: power implies sufficiently a principle of act: Given, therefore, the powers, habits become superfluous. if the form be such that it can operate in diverse ways, as the soul; it needs to be disposed to its operations by means of habits. the natural forces do not perform their operations by means of habits: because they are of themselves determined to one mode of operation. habits are necessary that the powers be determined to good. bodily actions are not subject to the will, habit is a quality, difficult to change. This objection runs in the sense of habit as a disposition to operation, and of those actions of the body which are from nature: but not in the sense of those actions which proceed from the soul, and the principle of which is the will. it is in respect of its essence that the soul is the nature of such a body and the form thereof. habit is an accident. since habit belongs to the first species of quality, it is prior to power, one accident is the subject of another; there can be no habits in the powers of the nutritive part. there are not any habits in brutes: in the sensitive powers there are no sciences: the sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason; as the members of the body, for there are no habits in them, but rather in the powers which command their movements. the intellect is not an act of the body habit, which has potentiality at the same time as act, being a sort of medium between the two, cannot be in the intellect; but only in the _conjunction,_ which is composed of soul and body. the habits of knowledge are not in the intellect, which is separate, but in some power which is the act of some part of the body. the "possible" intellect is the subject of intellectual habits. potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the "possible" intellect. the will does not act by means of species. the will is above all an active power, because it moves all the powers to their acts, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1). Therefore there is no habit in the will. in the will and in the other appetitive powers, there be certain qualities to incline them, and these are called habits. the will, and every appetitive power, is both mover and moved the will needs to be inclined, by means of a habit, to some fixed good of the reason, every habit is an accident. Therefore there are no habits in the angels. the angelic essences are perfected of themselves unto conformity with God, and therefore not by means of habits. Since, therefore, angels are simple substances, it seems that there are no dispositions and habits in them. so far as they need to partake of something from without, so far do they need to have habits. In angels there are no essential parts: but there are potential parts, habit "is that which we use when we will," If therefore the habits of the powers were from nature, habit and power would be one. reason itself and will belong to the nature of man. it does not follow that because some habits are natural, therefore all are natural. the agent, inasmuch as it acts, does not receive but rather gives: If therefore habits were caused in anything by its own act, it would follow that the same would be mover and moved, nothing prevents a thing from being moved by itself as to different respects, science, which is the habit of one conclusion, is caused by one demonstration. if an act be very intense, it can be the generating cause of a habit. health and sickness are habits. But it happens that a man is healed or becomes ill, by one act. God treats all equally. If therefore He infuses habits into some, He would infuse them into all: God does not cause habits to be in man except by acts. two forms of the same species cannot be in the same subject. in respect of the order of His Wisdom, for some fixed motive, gives certain things to some, He does nothing contrary to that which is suitable to nature. Acts produced by an infused habit, do not cause a habit, but strengthen the already existing habit; increase concerns quantity (Phys. v, text. 18). But habits are not in the genus [of] quantity, but in that of quality. habit is a perfection (Phys. vii, text. 17, 18). But since perfection conveys a notion of end and term, it seems that it cannot be more or less. in habits there is no alteration, Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a perfection which is the term of its subject; in corporeal quantities there is no increase without addition: twofold. it causes the subject to partake more perfectly of a pre-existing form, or it makes the form to extend further. it is in potentiality to a perfect mode of participation; when the cause is increased the effect is increased. Now acts are causes of habits, as stated above (Q. 51, A. 2). Therefore a habit increases when its acts are multiplied. if some acts increase a habit, every act should increase it. any act is like the habit whence it proceeds. Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long as its subject remains. "the intellect," which is its subject, "is a substance that is incorruptible" habits are not lost either through old age or through death. a habit is like a second nature, and yet it falls short of it. Although there is no contrary to intelligible species, yet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process of reason, the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, although a habit can be lost it cannot diminish. Hence it follows that a habit is a separable form; which is impossible. the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, a certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not in the habit, but in its subject. to be more or less white is not ascribed to whiteness but to a white thing. neither are habits diminished or corrupted through cessation from act. nothing is changed without a moving cause. Since therefore cessation from act does not imply a moving cause, it does not appear how a habit can be diminished or corrupted through cessation from act. those things that are above time are neither destroyed nor diminished by length of time. Cessation from act is a moving cause, time makes us forget. Therefore neither can a power be informed at the same time by many habits. generic diversity of objects entails a difference of powers Although a power is simple as to its essence, it is multiple virtually, a habit is not the terminal boundary of a power, the same object can also belong to different habits. the end is, in practical matters, what the principle is in speculative matters. good is convertible with being; so that, since it is common to all, it cannot be accounted a specific difference, as the Philosopher declares (Topic. iv). Again, evil, since it is a privation and a non-being, cannot differentiate any being. Never, however, does it happen that contrary habits are in one species: the evil that constitutes a difference of habits is not a pure privation, a habit is engendered, not at once, but little by little out of several acts, the subject does not acquire all at once a firm and difficultly changeable disposition; virtue is "the limit of power" "virtue is good use of free-will." But use of free-will is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an act. we do merit by our virtues. Therefore virtues are not habits, but acts. natural virtues are not habits, but powers. two ways. in us love is set in order by virtue. Natural powers are of themselves determinate to one act: not so the rational powers. as health and beauty belong to the body, so virtue belongs to the soul. human virtue is referred not only to act, but also to being. Mode of action follows on the disposition of the agent: Virtue which is referred to being is not proper to man; As God's substance is His act, the highest likeness of man to God is in respect of some operation. there is a virtue even of sin; power is not only referred to good, but also to evil: metaphorically The evil of drunkenness and excessive drink, consists in a falling away from the order of reason. good is more common than quality, since it is convertible with being. many are proud of virtue, virtue called good, because by it something is good. reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of virtue. one cannot make bad use of virtue as principle of action, He works in every will and in every nature. we live by the essence of the soul, and not by a power of the soul. virtue does not belong to the power, any more than to the essence of the soul. two ways. one accident inheres to substance by means of another, one act proceeds in various way from several powers: prudence is in the reason since it is "the right reason of things to be done" (Ethic. vi, 5). And it is also in the will: moral virtue is essentially in the appetite. Prudence is really subjected in reason: but it presupposes as its principle the rectitude of the will, good is not the object of the intellect, but of the appetitive power. a man is not said to be a good man on account of his science or his art. it depends in some way on love, to know truth is the good act of the intellect. these powers are common to us and dumb animals. the good of virtue cannot be in man's body: "the principal act of moral virtue is choice" (Ethic. viii, 13). Now choice is not an act of the irascible and concupiscible powers, but of the rational power, in so far as they are rational by participation, and are obedient to the reason, they are proper to man. the irascible and concupiscible powers, of themselves indeed, have not the good of virtue, but rather the infection of the _fomes:_ the body obeys the soul blindly without any contradiction, But the irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey the reason blindly; on the contrary, they have their own proper movements, by which, at times, they go against reason, moral virtues which are concerned with the passions are in the irascible and concupiscible powers, the powers of imagination, of cogitation, and of memory [*Cf. I, Q. 78, A. 4] act at the command of reason. prudence is a virtue, of which Cicero (De Invent. Rhetor. ii) says that memory is a part. the act of knowledge is terminated in the intellect; one of the conditions required for prudence is a good memory; it is of the very essence of the will, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42), to tend to that which is good, every virtue is either intellectual or moral (Ethic. i, 13; ii, 1). But intellectual virtue is subjected in the intellect and reason, and not in the will: while moral virtue is subjected in the irascible and concupiscible powers which are rational by participation. Therefore no virtue is subjected in the will. the will is included in the appetitive power. "happiness is the reward of virtue" science and virtue are distinct from one another two kinds, two ways. Science is contrasted with virtue taken in the second sense, wherein it belongs to the appetitive faculty. a species is a kind of science, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 7. Therefore wisdom should not be condivided with science among the intellectual virtues. diversity of habits is taken, not from their material objects, but from the formal aspect of those objects. Therefore as science, which is the result of a demonstrative syllogism, is set down as an intellectual virtue, so also should opinion be. Wisdom is a kind of science, in so far as it has that which is common to all the sciences; viz. to demonstrate conclusions from principles. But since it has something proper to itself above the other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all, not only as to their conclusions, but also as to their first principles, therefore it is a more perfect virtue than science. wisdom, as obtaining the highest place, and containing beneath itself both understanding and science, the good of the intellect is truth, and falsehood is its evil. Wherefore those habits alone are called intellectual virtues, whereby we tell the truth and never tell a falsehood. But opinion and suspicion can be about both truth and falsehood: and so, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 3, they are not intellectual virtues. one may make bad use of art: for a craftsman can work badly according to the knowledge of his art. Therefore art is not a virtue. liberal arts excel the mechanical arts. it falls short of being a perfect virtue, the good use of art requires a moral virtue. "liberal" arts, in order to distinguish them from those arts that are ordained to works done by the body, which arts are, in a fashion, servile, inasmuch as the body is in servile subjection to the soul, and man, as regards his soul, is free (_liber_). prudence is also right reason about works, prudence has more in common with art than the speculative habits have; for they are both "about contingent matters that may be otherwise than they are" (Ethic. vi, 4, 5). Now some speculative habits are called arts. counselling takes place in certain arts also, prudence is right reason about human acts themselves: if we consider them as virtues, then art has more in common with the speculative habits, only those are simply prudent who give good counsel about all the concerns of life. Neither, therefore is prudence necessary to man in order to lead a good life, after he has become virtuous; it is enough that he follow the counsels of prudent men. an intellectual virtue is one by which one always tells the truth, and never a falsehood. But this does not seem to be the case with prudence: prudence is necessary to man, that he may lead a good life, When a man does a good deed, not of his own counsel, but moved by that of another, his deed is not yet quite perfect, the truth of the speculative intellect depends on conformity between the intellect and the thing. And since the intellect cannot be infallibly in conformity with things in contingent matters, but only in necessary matters, therefore no speculative habit about contingent things is an intellectual virtue, but only such as is about necessary things. _eubulia_ is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is prudence itself. _synesis_ is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is a principal virtue. there is no need, besides _synesis,_ of the virtue of _gnome_. Prudence makes us be of good counsel, not as though its immediate act consisted in being of good counsel, but because it perfects the latter act by means of a subordinate virtue, viz. _euboulia_. The matter does not attain to its final complement until the reason has commanded aright in the point of what has to be done. _gnome_ bases its judgment on the natural law, Memory, understanding and foresight, as also caution and docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from prudence: but are, as it were, integral parts thereof, in so far as they are all requisite for perfect prudence. moral virtue is so called from the Latin _mos,_ i.e. custom. the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that moral virtue is "a habit of choosing the rational mean." some authors put science in the definition of virtues: thus some define perseverance as a "science or habit regarding those things to which we should hold or not hold"; and holiness as "a science which makes man to be faithful and to do his duty to God." All such definitions, by whomsoever given, were based on the Socratic theory, Right reason which is in accord with prudence is included in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its essence, but as something belonging by way of participation to all the moral virtues, in so far as they are all under the direction of prudence. prudence seems to be a mean between moral and intellectual virtue, continency, perseverance, and patience are not reckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet neither are they moral virtues; faith, hope, and charity are virtues. Yet they are not intellectual virtues: Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue. Continency and perseverance are, however, perfections of the rational faculty, and withstand the passions lest reason be led astray. But they fall short of being virtues: Faith, hope, and charity are superhuman virtues: men are virtuous and acceptable to God, without being vigorous in the use of reason. some, without depending on the judgment of reason, have a natural inclination to do good works. the inclination of moral virtue is with choice: and consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires that reason be perfected by intellectual virtue. those who seem to be simple, through lack of worldly cunning, may possibly be prudent, although moral virtue be not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it "according to right reason," reason precedes and moves the sensitive appetite. morals are the matter of prudence, many are of good counsel without having the moral virtues. understanding of principles is the foundation on which the syllogism of the reason is based. It does not depend on the disposition of our appetite whether we judge well or ill of the principles of art, as it does, when we judge of the end which is the principle in moral matters: in the former case our judgment depends on reason alone. This is not possible unless the impediment of the passions, destroying the judgment and command of prudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue. moral virtue is a mean between two passions. some passions are virtues. pity is a passion, since it is sorrow for another's ills, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 8). Now "Cicero the renowned orator did not hesitate to call pity a virtue," Virtue is a mean between passions, not by reason of its essence, but on account of its effect; because, to wit, it establishes the mean between passions. virtue is not freedom from passion. When a passion forestalls the judgment of reason, so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and the judgment of reason. But when it follows that judgment, as through being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution of reason's command. a hindrance to good works is incompatible with virtue. he sorrows for anything that hinders wisdom. Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful: but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow. moderate sorrow is the mark of a well-conditioned mind, Not only the sensitive appetite which is the subject of the passions, is rational by participation, but also the will, where there are no passions, Some virtues have passions as their proper matter, but some virtues not. at its highest point of perfection it is altogether without passion. God does all things without passion at all. Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces ordinate passion. It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to sin. there is no sensitive appetite in God and the angels, there is only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz. prudence. the formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one thing, viz. the mean defined by reason. there is but one common end of all moral virtues, viz. happiness, the object of the appetitive power is the appetible good, which varies in kind This formal element is one generically, on account of the unity of the agent: but it varies in species, Moral matters do not receive their species from the last end, the rectitude of all external operations seems to belong to justice. diversity of operations does not cause a diversity of moral virtues. it is the function of justice to establish rectitude in various kinds of commutations, and again in distributions, common right differs from private right; it may be that distributive justice is of another species from commutative justice; the passions all concur in one source, viz. love; it needs a greater difference to differentiate habits than acts. more or less do not change a species. temperance is about desires for the pleasure of touch, operations do not thwart reason as the passions do. Passions are not differentiated by the same rule as virtues are, More and less do not cause a difference of species, unless they bear different relations to reason. there is but one virtue, meekness, for every form of anger; all the virtues are opposite members of the division of the genus "virtue." the theological virtues are about the end; while the moral virtues are about the means. the intellectual virtues belong to that which is essentially rational: the notion of being is applied to substance principally in relation to accident. The theological virtues are above man, prudence alone is a principal virtue. in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not to rank above all the others, but above some. The others are principal, each in its own genus. That part of the soul which is rational by participation is threefold, All the other virtues among which one ranks before another, are reducible to the above four, "magnanimity has a great influence on all the virtues" humility seems above all to be a principal virtue. patience should be reckoned a principal virtue. these four virtues qualify one another by a kind of overflow. Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "it is absurd to ascribe justice, fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God." the aforesaid virtues cannot be without passions. the "perfecting" virtues are those of the man "who flies from human affairs and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God." The Philosopher is speaking of these virtues according as they relate to human affairs; the virtues of those who have attained to perfect bliss are without passions. To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. the theological virtues are not virtues of a man. there is no need for any habits of theological virtue, two ways. These virtues are called Divine, not as though God were virtuous by reason of them, but because of them God makes us virtuous, and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but exemplate virtues. the reason and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him among the intellectual virtues there is one which directs us to God: love is charity, which is a theological virtue. Theological virtue, on the other hand, is about those same things so far as they surpass human reason. Though charity is love, yet love is not always charity. Now among the virtues directed to the connatural end there is but one natural virtue, viz. the understanding of principles. faith is not reckoned among the intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is imperfect knowledge. Likewise hope is not reckoned among the moral virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion. there should be only two theological virtues, one perfecting the intellect, the other, the will. The intellect requires intelligible species whereby to understand: consequently there is need of a natural habit in addition to the power. faith and hope in things which are above the capacity of human nature surpass all virtue there must needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely, hope and charity. charity is the root of all the virtues, faith precedes charity, and charity hope. charity, which is love, precedes hope. hope is increased by love. that which accords with reason is natural to man; virtues are in some from birth: faith cannot be acquired by means of works, but is caused in us by God, one sinful act does not destroy a habit of acquired virtue, certain seeds or principles of acquired virtue pre-exist in us by nature. intellectual and moral virtues can be caused in us by our acts, less superfluity is found in God's works than in the works of nature. Some moral and intellectual virtues can indeed be caused in us by our actions: but such are not proportionate to the theological virtues. soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things, yet in relation to God. Because acquired and infused virtues, according to what has been said (A. 3), do not differ seemingly, save in relation to the last end. Infused and acquired virtue differ not only in relation to the ultimate end, but also in relation to their proper objects, acquired and infused temperance moderate desires for pleasures of touch, but for different reasons, as stated: wherefore their respective acts are not identical. the nature of virtue is to be something extreme; some moral virtues tend to a maximum: virginity, which abstains from all sexual pleasure, observes the extreme, and is the most perfect chastity: and to give all to the poor is the most perfect mercy or liberality. Therefore it seems that it is not essential to moral virtue that it should observe the mean. moral virtue does not observe a mean between apprehensions, but rather a mean between operations or passions. a mean that is observed according to arithmetical or geometrical proportion is a real mean. Now such is the mean of justice, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 3. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational, but the real mean. the intellectual virtues are in reason itself, so that they seem to have no higher rule. indefinite series there seems to be no contrariety in the intellect; Intellectual virtues also have their measure, the measure and rule of intellectual virtue is not another kind of virtue, but things themselves. there is in the intellect contrariety of affirmation and negation, which are contraries, It would seem that theological virtue observes the mean. The good of intellectual and moral virtues consists in a mean of reason by conformity with a measure that may be exceeded: whereas this is not so in the case of theological virtue, considered in itself, Moral and intellectual virtues perfect our intellect and appetite in relation to a created measure and rule; whereas the theological virtues perfect them in relation to an uncreated rule and measure. human opinion itself takes a middle position between contrary opinions, man can exercise himself in the acts of one virtue, without exercising himself in the acts of some other virtue. if the moral virtues are mutually connected, this can only be because they are united together in prudence. But this does not suffice to connect the moral virtues together. The intellectual virtues are about divers matters having no relation to one another, the lack of prudence in one department of things to be done, would result in a deficiency affecting other things to be done: charity cannot be had otherwise than by infusion, charity does not depend on prudence; indeed, it surpasses prudence, if we take moral virtue in its perfect state, "it makes its possessor good," and consequently cannot be in the wicked. This argument holds good of virtue in the sense of acquired virtue. prudence depends on charity, as stated: and consequently so do all the infused moral virtues. charity alone suffices for the fulfilment of all the works of virtue, Now many have charity, being free from mortal sin, and yet they find it difficult to do works of virtue; there are some saints who are without certain virtues. This difficulty does not occur in respect of acquired moral virtue: because the repeated acts by which they are acquired, remove also the contrary dispositions. Certain saints are said not to have certain virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues, for the reason stated; although they have the habits of all the virtues. infused moral virtues cannot be without charity. "there can be no hope without love." But love is charity: not even infused prudence has the character of prudence without charity; it is possible for us to love God naturally, He had neither faith nor hope: Charity is not any kind of love of God, but that love of God, by which He is loved as the object of bliss, to which object we are directed by faith and hope. faith and hope as such are the precursors of charity, He had manifest vision, and instead of hope, full comprehension the nature of virtue consists in a maximum, perfect, viz. infused virtues, are from God Whose power is uniform and infinite. He bestows on men various measures of virtue, a man is more pleased and ready to make use of one virtue than of another. One saint is praised chiefly for one virtue, another saint for another virtue, on account of his more admirable readiness for the act of one virtue than for the act of another virtue. the moral virtues are "more lasting even than the sciences" man is said to be good in respect of moral virtue, moral virtue is more excellent than prudence, which is the intellectual virtue that regards moral matters. it is evident that the objects of the sciences, which are necessary and invariable, are more lasting than the objects of moral virtue, the end of each moral virtue is to attain the mean in the matter proper to that virtue; which mean is appointed according to the right ruling of prudence, liberality is apparently a greater virtue than justice. it would seem that patience is greater than justice. it magnifies even justice. liberality is greater relatively whoever is brave is patient; but the converse does not hold, so that relatively it is greater than all the others, but not simply. prudence seems to command wisdom, wisdom takes no notice of human acts, whereby man attains happiness. we can have more perfect knowledge of human affairs, Since prudence is about human affairs, and wisdom about the Supreme Cause, it is impossible for prudence to be a greater virtue than wisdom, the act of wisdom is a beginning or participation of future happiness, "it is better to know a little about sublime things, than much about mean things." wisdom makes use of indemonstrable principles which are the object of understanding, not only by drawing conclusions from them, as other sciences do, but also by passing its judgment on them, and by vindicating them against those who deny them. since faith is in the intellect, while hope and charity are in the appetitive power, it seems that faith is compared to hope and charity, as intellectual to moral virtue. hope is greater than charity. faith and hope are the cause of charity: in things that are above man, to love them is more excellent than to know them. charity implies love of friendship, to which we are led by hope, An efficient cause is more noble than its effect: but not a disposing cause. it is absurd to put moral virtues in the angels the irrational parts of the soul are corrupted, The Philosopher is speaking there of these moral virtues, as to their material element; thus he speaks of justice, as regards "commutations and distributions"; of fortitude, as to "matters of terror and danger"; of temperance, in respect of "lewd desires." Justice, however, will remain because it is in the will. the knowledge of science is in part, i.e. imperfect; there seems to be no act of the intellect after this life, since "the soul understands nothing without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, text. 30); and, after this life, the phantasms do not remain, The saying of the Apostle is to be understood as referring to the material element in science, and to the mode of understanding; because, to it, neither do the phantasms remain, when the body is destroyed; nor will science be applied by turning to the phantasms. Sickness destroys the habit of science as to its material element, viz. the phantasms, but not as to the intelligible species, which are in the "possible" intellect. the separated soul has a mode of understanding, other than by turning to the phantasms. It would seem that faith remains after this life. if faith remains not after this life, no other virtue remains. faith also is compatible with the knowledge of glory. hope perfects the human appetite in a more excellent manner than the moral virtues. in the Blessed, filial fear, which abides for ever--in the lost, the fear of punishment. fear is never without some hope of escape: and the lost have no such hope. there can be no desire in the Blessed, a candle is not extinguished when the sun's rays appear. the habit of faith can still remain. the imperfection of faith and the perfection of glory are opposed to one another and regard the same subject. so such a habit would remain to no purpose. the charity of the wayfarer is imperfect. apprehension of the present life differs from the apprehension of the life to come, the charity of the wayfarer can never attain to equality with the charity of heaven, however much it be increased. The imperfection of charity is accidental to it; because imperfection is not included in the nature of love. Now although that which is accidental to a thing be withdrawn, the substance remains. Hence the imperfection of charity being done away, charity itself is not done away. its object is the thing known, which remains the same, viz. God Himself. the more perfectly we know God, the more perfectly we love Him. the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are virtues. a gift is "an unreturnable giving," Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue, so far as it proceeds from the judgment of reason: but it is called a gift, according as its work proceeds from the Divine prompting. it is not necessary for man's salvation that he should attain to a perfection surpassing the ordinary standard of virtue; it is enough, for man's salvation, that he behave well in matters concerning God and matters concerning man. The gifts surpass the ordinary perfection of the virtues, not as regards the kind of works (as the counsels surpass the commandments), but as regards the manner of working, in respect of man being moved by a higher principle. By the theological and moral virtues, man is not so perfected in respect of his last end, as not to stand in continual need of being moved by the yet higher promptings of the Holy Ghost, Whether we consider human reason as perfected in its natural perfection, or as perfected by the theological virtues, it does not know all things, nor all possible things. Consequently it is unable to avoid folly and other like things mentioned in the objection. to be perfected by a habit is befitting, not an instrument, but a principal agent. prophecy is not a habit: man is not an instrument of that kind; for he is so acted upon, by the Holy Ghost, that he also acts himself, in so far as he has a free-will. Prophecy is one of those gifts which are for the manifestation of the Spirit, nothing is set down corresponding to art, which is the fifth intellectual virtue. justice itself, and not piety, ought to have been set down. some gifts, corresponding to the theological virtues, should have been included. some gift should have been added for the purpose of directing fear. The gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in matters concerning a good life: whereas art is not directed to such matters, but to external things that can be made, Justice is so called from the rectitude of the reason, and so it is more suitably called a virtue than a gift. all the gifts correspond to these three virtues, the object of fear is evil, which can nowise apply to God: hence fear does not denote union with God, but withdrawal from certain things through reverence for God. the principal reason for fearing God is taken from a consideration of the Divine excellence, which wisdom considers. the gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to divers men, it is possible to have one gift without another. these gifts are in all who are possessed of charity. Augustine is speaking there of knowledge, while expounding the passage of the Apostle quoted above (Obj. 1): hence he is referring to knowledge, in the sense already explained, as a gratuitous grace. if understanding were without wisdom, it would not be a gift; there will be no temptations in heaven, habits are of no use, where their acts are impossible. the active life ends with this in the state of glory, where all evil will have ceased, we shall be perfected in good by the gifts of the Holy Ghost. all the gifts will have their respective acts about things pertaining to the contemplative life, which is the life of heavenly bliss. God requires of man fear, more than the other gifts: piety, which is given the last place but one, seems to be the most excellent gift. knowledge is a more excellent gift than counsel; knowledge is a more excellent gift than fortitude; man departs from evil on account of fear it is possible to make evil use of the gifts, Charity is a theological virtue; and such we grant to be more perfect than the gifts. two ways the gifts perfect him in relation to the eternal law of the Holy Ghost, among the beatitudes are included meekness, justice, and mercy, which are said to be virtues. no other habits, besides the virtues and gifts, rectify human conduct. some are said to be happy because they hope for a reward, frequently men are not punished in this life, our Divine sonship will be made manifest, they suffer spiritual punishment. the "kingdom of heaven," as Augustine says (loc. cit.), can denote the beginning of perfect wisdom, no beatitude is assigned to the act of contemplation, none of the beatitudes seems to be directly connected with the acts of knowledge or counsel. nothing is included directly connected with justice. there are seven gifts of the Holy Ghost: whereas eight beatitudes are indicated. only four beatitudes are indicated in the sixth chapter of Luke. the acts of the gifts pertaining to the contemplative life are indicated in the rewards, beatitude implies something ultimate, two things. All the beatitudes mentioned in Holy Writ must be reduced to these, The eighth beatitude is a confirmation and declaration of all those that precede. Luke relates Our Lord's sermon as addressed to the multitude (Luke 6:17). Hence he sets down the beatitudes according to the capacity of the multitude, once given the kingdom of heaven, no other rewards should be mentioned. the kingdom of heaven is assigned as the reward, both of the first and of the eighth beatitude. all these rewards are one in reality, viz. eternal happiness, which the human intellect cannot grasp. we have many things without possessing them firmly and peacefully. indefinitely. virtues are not actions but habits, our works, in so far as they are produced by the Holy Ghost working in us, are fruits: but, in so far as they are referred to the end which is eternal life, they should rather be called flowers: two ways. Sometimes the names of the virtues are applied to their actions: the beatitudes themselves are fruits of the Holy Ghost. fruit and beatitude have the same nature, The fruit of eternal life is ultimate and perfect simply: hence it nowise differs from future beatitude. More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit, not all are mentioned either more or fewer fruits might have been mentioned. the Apostle mentions more works of the flesh than fruits of the Spirit. works of vice are contrary to nature, to one virtue many vices are contrary. sin and malice are contrary to virtue. vice does not denote anything relative to power. vice is opposed to virtue properly as such. a thing needs to be well disposed if it has to produce a good work. vice is of wider extent than sickness or disease; some men become habituated to vice. vice is found in the greater number of men; we should say that vice is contrary to the Law, rather than to nature. he follows the inclination of his sensitive nature against the order of his reason. it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the order of human reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law. a vicious habit is more lasting than vicious acts, a bad habit is virtually the cause of many bad acts. a habit is more potent than its act, act surpasses habit both in goodness and in badness. Habit causes act by way of efficient causality: but act causes habit, by way of final causality, contraries cannot be together in the same subject. vice cannot be in the same subject with virtue: no sin occurs in voluntary matters, except through the corruption of some virtue in the soul: sin is incompatible with the act, but not with the habit, of virtue. vice excludes virtue, the virtues of the soul do not produce their acts of necessity; every sin is voluntary, that, unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all." Now nothing can be voluntary, save through an act of the will. Therefore every sin implies an act. he who never does something that he ought to do, ceases continually doing what he ought. Therefore it would follow that he sins continually; and this is untrue. there can be no merit, unless a man do willingly what he ought to do: wherefore there can be no merit without act, whereas there can be sin without act. even not to will may be called voluntary, by omitting to act, a man sins only for the time at which the affirmative precept binds him to act. it was enough to say: "Sin is a desire contrary to the eternal law," "all human wickedness consists in using what we should enjoy, and in enjoying what we should use." it would have been better to say that sin is against reason than to say that it is contrary to the eternal law. "word" and "deed" denote equally what is said and what is not said, what is done and what is not done. The first cause of sin is in the will, which commands all voluntary acts, in which alone is sin to be found: and hence it is that Augustine sometimes defines sin in reference to the will alone. But since external acts also pertain to the substance of sin, through being evil of themselves, as stated, it was necessary in defining sin to include something referring to external action. The theologian considers sin chiefly as an offense against God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary to reason. sins should differ specifically according to their ends rather than according to their objects. sins differ specifically according to their opposites rather than according to their objects. avarice is about different kinds of things. the same sins are both carnal and spiritual, man, who is said to live according to the flesh, when he lives according to himself, the end of these sins, from which they are named, is carnal pleasure. sins derive their being from their causes. Therefore they take their species from them also. of all the causes the material cause seems to have least reference to the species. Now the object in a sin is like its material cause. sin derives both its being and its species from the end. These distinctions of sins are given, not as distinct species of sins, but to show their various causes. it is common to all sins to be against God: whoever sins against his neighbor, sins against himself and against God. specification is not taken from things external. But God and our neighbor are external to us. in so far as order to God surpasses the other two orders, sin against God is a special kind of sin. Although God and our neighbor are external to the sinner himself, they are not external to the act of sin, but are related to it as to its object. temporal punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal punishment to mortal sin; some sins are mortal in virtue of their species [*_Ex genere,_ genus in this case denoting the species], as murder and adultery; and some are venial in virtue of their species, as in an idle word, and excessive laughter. they are also specifically distinct according to the debt of punishment. an idle word, which is, generally speaking, venial, may even be a mortal sin. the punishment is not intended by the sinner, but, on the contrary, is against his will. "'Offenses,' by omitting to do what was commanded, and 'sins,' by doing what was forbidden." in God's law, the affirmative precepts, against which is the sin of omission, are different from the negative precepts, affirmation and negation cannot be in the same species, since negation has no species; This division in respect of commission and omission, is not according to different formal species, but only according to material species, In God's law, the necessity for various affirmative and negative precepts, was that men might be gradually led to virtue, negation is not in a species, yet it is allotted to a species by reduction to the affirmation on which it is based. Sin of thought and sin of word are not distinct from the sin of deed when they are united together with it, "more" and "less" do not diversify a species. neither is the species of sin diversified by straying more or less from the rectitude of reason. excess and deficiency are united in one sin; there are different kinds of falsehood, as is evident of the _boaster,_ who exceeds in telling untruths for the sake of fame, and the _cheat,_ who tells less than the truth, in order to escape from paying his debts. nothing hinders contraries from being in the same subject, in different respects. from the corruption of each circumstance there results a corresponding species of sin. sins are human acts. But human acts sometimes take their species from circumstances, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 10). Therefore sins differ specifically according as different circumstances are corrupted. diverse species are assigned to gluttony, Evil, as such, is a privation, and so it has different species in respect of the thing which the subject is deprived, A circumstance never transfers an act from one species to another, save when there is another motive. In the various species of gluttony there are various motives, self-love, which builds the city of Babylon, is the root of all sins, by committing one sin, he incurs the debt of punishment through his contempt of God, which is the origin of all sins. venial sin does not destroy virtue; while mortal sin destroys infused virtue, vices and sins, which arise from self-love, are not connected together. privations do not admit of more or less. sins are opposed to virtues. But all virtues are equal, as Cicero states (Paradox. iii). Therefore all sins are equal. those which contain a greater inordinateness are more unlawful, This argument looks upon sin as though it were a pure privation. virtues are connected, and vices or sins are not. the gravity of a sin is the intensity of its malice. sins that have different objects are of different kinds. various degrees of malice in sins must needs follow the diversity of those things to which man turns. nothing prevents all sins from being compared with one another. the least grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue. it is a less grievous sin to fail in what is more difficult, hatred which is opposed to charity is a less grievous sin than unbelief or despair This argument considers the opposition which consists in restraining from sin; Charity is not any kind of love, but the love of God: hence not any kind of hatred is opposed to it directly, but the hatred of God, which is the most grievous of all sins. adultery is a more grievous sin than theft: "the devil rejoices chiefly in lust and idolatry." But he rejoices more in the greater sin. "it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger." Adultery belongs not only to the sin of lust, but also to the sin of injustice, The devil is said to rejoice chiefly in the sin of lust, because it is of the greatest adhesion, lust partakes less of reason; sin is lessened by the fact that it is difficult to resist; he who lacks the use of reason, is altogether excused from sin, and he who sins through ignorance, sins less grievously. sin takes its gravity from its species. the malice of a sin is derived from its turning away (from God). But circumstances affect sin on the part of the object to which it turns. Therefore they do not add to the sin's malice. the malice of an act is measured, not only according to the species of that act, but also according to a circumstance. A circumstance may aggravate a sin either way. This turning aside from the rule of reason results from man's turning away from God, to Whom man ought to be united by right reason. the issue of an act does not add to its goodness or malice, If, therefore, sins were aggravated through causing more harm, it would follow that sins against our neighbor are more grievous than sins against God or oneself. a man who leads a woman to commit fornication deprives her of the life of grace by leading her into mortal sin. the result of an action if foreseen and intended adds to the goodness and malice of an act. it is inordinateness which of itself aggravates a sin. no man can of himself be the sufficient cause of another's spiritual death, a virtuous man who bears a wrong with equanimity is less harmed by the wrong done him, than others, who, through being scandalized, are also hurt inwardly. the kinship of a person sinned against does not apparently aggravate a sin, He who inflicts an injury on a virtuous person, so far as he is concerned, disturbs him internally and externally; but that the latter is not disturbed internally is due to his goodness, which does not extenuate the sin of the injurer. it is more grievous for a man to kill himself than another. man becomes great chiefly by cleaving to God, "there is no respect of persons with God" no one should reap disadvantage from good. But he would, if his action were the more blameworthy on account of his goodness. God does not respect persons in punishing the great more severely, because their excellence conduces to the gravity of their sin, The man who excels in anything reaps disadvantage, not from the good which he has, but from his abuse thereof. sin has the character of evil. Therefore sin cannot be in the will. the will is directed either to the good or to what seems good. the will is the efficient cause of sin: Evil is said to be outside the will, because the will does not tend to it under the aspect of evil. when there is in the apprehensive power a defect that is subject to the will, this defect also is deemed a sin. This argument applies to those efficient causes whose actions pass into external matter, and which do not move themselves, but move other things; the contrary of which is to be observed in the will; sin is an evil contrary to reason. every sin is a voluntary act, because, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.], "so true is it that every sin is voluntary, that unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all." Now the acts of the other powers are not voluntary, We do not sin except by the will as first mover; but we sin by the other powers as moved by the will. the internal appetitive powers are compared to reason as free agents, because they both act and are acted upon, sensuality is common to us and irrational animals. "the sensuality ever remains corrupt, so long as we abide in this mortal life; the movement of the sensuality, which is without the deliberation of reason, is not imputed to a man as a sin. a man cannot avoid all such movements, on account of the aforesaid corruption: but it is enough, for the conditions of a voluntary sin, that he be able to avoid each single one. such movement of the sensuality as forestalls the reason, is a venial sin, it is possible to commit a mortal sin about the objects of the sensuality, e.g. about carnal pleasures. since it is natural to contraries to be about the same subject, sensuality can be the subject of mortal sin. venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Now disposition and habit are in the same subject. Since therefore venial sin may be in the sensuality, as stated above (A. 3, ad 3), mortal sin can be there also. mortal sin is imputed, not to the sensuality, but to reason. the act of moral virtue is not without the exercise of choice: wherefore the act of moral virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, is always accompanied by an act of prudence, which perfects the rational power; three ways the fault of the reason is not a sin, on the contrary, it excuses sin: the primary object of sin is the will, as stated above (A. 1). Now reason precedes the will, perfection and defect of reason are not among those things which are under our control: If, however, the defect of reason be about something which a man is able and ought to know, he is not altogether excused from sin, delectation denotes a movement of the appetitive power, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 1). But the appetitive power is distinct from the reason, length of time is no reason why an act should belong to a particular power. actions which do not pass into external matter are subjected in their principles. the reason in deliberating dwells (_immoratur_) thereon, and fails to drive it away, consent is an act of the appetitive power, sometimes consent is given to an act, without consulting the eternal law: since man does not always think about Divine things, whenever he consents to an act. "consent to a pleasure without deciding to fulfil it by deed, belongs to the lower reason," Consent is an act of the appetitive power, not absolutely, but in consequence of an act of reason deliberating and judging, if it thinks of God's law, it holds it in actual contempt: and if not, it neglects it by a kind of omission. The higher reason, by considering the eternal law, can direct or restrain the internal delectation, even as it can direct or restrain the external action: nevertheless, before the judgment of the higher reason is pronounced the lower reason, while deliberating the matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes approves of this delectation: and then the consent to the delectation belongs to the lower reason. If, however, after considering the eternal law, man persists in giving the same consent, such consent will then belong to the higher reason. the judgment of the lower reason is deliberate, and so requires time, during which the higher reason can also deliberate; every mortal sin consists in turning away from the Divine law, as is evident from Augustine's definition of mortal sin, which was quoted above (Q. 71, A. 6). Therefore consent to delectation is not a mortal sin. delectation without deed is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin. Therefore neither is the consent to the delectation a mortal sin. the inward thought is not a mortal sin, nor is the consent to that thought: and therefore neither is the consent to the delectation. he that consents to the delectation does not, for this reason, consent to the inordinateness of the act. Therefore he seems not to sin mortally. it is not a mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from the thought of murder. the Lord's prayer is recited every day for the remission of venial sins, the lower reason may turn away from the eternal types, for, though it is not intent on them, as regulating according to them, which is proper to the higher reason, yet, it is intent on them, as being regulated according to them: and by turning from them in this sense, it may sin mortally; Consent to a sin that is venial in its genus, is itself a venial sin, and accordingly one may conclude that the consent to take pleasure in a useless thought about fornication, is a venial sin. wherefore the act is inordinate, and consequently the delectation will be inordinate also. The Lord's Prayer is to be said in order that we may be preserved not only from venial sin, but also from mortal sin. it seems that there can be no other than mortal sin in the higher reason. the sins of the higher reason are mortal. it would seem impossible to commit even a venial sin, deliberately, without contempt. there is mortal sin in the higher reason whenever the order itself of the higher reason to its proper object which is the eternal law, is destroyed; Deliberate consent to a sin does not always amount to contempt of the Divine law, but only when the sin is contrary to the Divine law. A sin which is against the eternal law, though it be mortal in its genus, may nevertheless be venial, on account of the incompleteness of a sudden action, the reason also can have a sudden movement. sin has the nature of evil, as stated above (Q. 71, A. 6). But evil has no cause, every sin is voluntary. if sin has a cause, this cause is either good or evil. Sin signifies not only the privation of good, which privation is its inordinateness, but also the act which is the subject of that privation, though sin has a cause, it does not follow that this is a necessary cause, since its effect can be impeded. evil is not the cause of the first sin, but some good lacking some other good. If therefore sin had an internal cause, man would always be sinning, since given the cause, the effect follows. nothing intrinsic can be the cause of the first sin. Since therefore the movements that precede it are not always actual, neither is man always actually sinning. It is not true that all the internal acts belong to the substance of sin, for this consists principally in the act of the will; but some precede and some follow the sin itself. sin results in being unnatural from the very fact that the natural rule fails, voluntary acts belong to principles that are within us, in the moral order, sin can arise from no other than an internal cause. From the very fact that the external motive causes of sin do not lead to sin sufficiently and necessarily, it follows that it remains in our power to sin or not to sin. nothing external is a cause of sin, except through the medium of the internal cause, The material and formal cause seems to have no place except in natural bodies, "to produce its like belongs to a perfect thing," as stated in _Meteor._ iv, 2 [*Cf. _De Anima_ ii.]. But sin is essentially something imperfect. indefinitely, Sin, in so far as it is inordinate, has the character of evil; but, in so far as it is an act, it has some good, at least apparent, for its end: so that, as an act, but not as being inordinate, it can be the cause, both final and efficient, of another sin. Sin is something imperfect on account of its moral imperfection on the part of its inordinateness. Nevertheless, as an act it can have natural perfection: and thus it can be the cause of another sin. Not every cause of one sin is another sin; a non-being is not the cause of anything. Now ignorance is a non-being, ignorance seems to savor of _turning away_ from something. the will does not turn to that which is not known, Non-being cannot be the direct cause of anything: but it can be an accidental cause, if something be known in one respect, and unknown in another, the will can will it. ignorance does not denote an act, sin is more directly opposed to grace than to knowledge. the ignorance will not be a sin, but rather a result of sin. every sin is taken away by repentance, nor does any sin, except only original sin, pass as to guilt, yet remain in act. Now ignorance is not removed by repentance, a person in ignorance would be continually sinning, negligence, in as much as ignorance is a sin, is comprised in the above definition of sin; in so far as one omits to say what one ought, or to do what one ought, or to desire what one ought, in order to acquire the knowledge which we ought to have. Although when the guilt has passed away through repentance, the ignorance remains, according as it is a privation of knowledge, nevertheless the negligence does not remain, by reason of which the ignorance is said to be a sin. Just as in other sins of omission, man sins actually only at the time at which the affirmative precept is binding, every sin is voluntary. Now ignorance causes involuntariness, nothing that is done through ignorance in human acts, should be deemed sinful or virtuous. man is the subject of virtue and sin, inasmuch as he is partaker of reason. Now ignorance excludes knowledge which perfects the reason. Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether. Not every ignorance causes involuntariness, So far as voluntariness remains in the ignorant person, the intention of sin remains in him: If the ignorance be such as to exclude the use of reason entirely, it excuses from sin altogether, as is the case with madmen and imbeciles: that which is common to all sins does not diminish sin. Now ignorance is common to all sins, one sin added to another makes a greater sin. But ignorance is itself a sin, ignorance aggravates sin; if any kind of ignorance diminishes a sin, this would seem to be chiefly the case as regards the ignorance which removes the use of reason altogether. Now this kind of ignorance does not diminish sin, but increases it: the two sins do not coincide, but are separate. they may be an allusion to the ignorance of unbelief, The drunken man deserves a "double punishment" for the two sins which he commits, viz. drunkenness, and the sin which results from his drunkenness: and yet drunkenness, on account of the ignorance connected therewith, diminishes the resulting sin, the object of the will is not a passion of the sensitive appetite, but good defined by the reason, the will is an immaterial power, because it does not use a corporeal organ, Although the passion of the sensitive appetite is not the direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change in the judgment about the object of the will, knowledge, on account of its certitude, is the strongest thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a passion, which is weak and soon passes away. a passion never influences the reason against its knowledge. Universal knowledge, which is most certain, does not hold the foremost place in action, but rather particular knowledge, since actions are about singulars: this particular judgment is contrary to the universal knowledge of the reason. an act is directly opposed, not to a habit, but to an act. He that has knowledge in a universal, is hindered, on account of a passion, from reasoning about that universal, so as to draw the conclusion: but he reasons about another universal proposition suggested by the inclination of the passion, vehemence of movements is evidence of strength rather than of weakness. sins of weakness should be those which result from bodily defects, sin committed through passion is not a sin of weakness. Just as in the body the stronger the movement against the order of nature, the greater the weakness, so likewise, the stronger the movement of passion against the order of reason, the greater the weakness of the soul. Sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, which is not hindered by weakness of the body: love of self is a good and right thing in itself: concupiscence is the cause of every sin. as man sins at times through inordinate love of self, so does he sometimes through inordinate love of his neighbor. Well ordered self-love, whereby man desires a fitting good for himself, is right and natural; but it is inordinate self-love, leading to contempt of God, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) reckons to be the cause of sin. Concupiscence, whereby a man desires good for himself, is reduced to self-love as to its cause, A friend is like another self "covetousness [*Douay: 'The desire of money'] is the root of all evils." concupiscence of the eyes should not be condivided with concupiscence of the flesh. "concupiscence of the hearing" and of the other senses should also have been mentioned. its name is transferred to all the other senses, and even to the inner apprehensions, the more intense the passion, the greater the sin. a good passion increases merit: the passion that impels the will makes it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act. an effect is increased by the increase, not of its accidental cause, but of its direct cause. a man is moved to do well, rather by his passion than by the judgment of his reason, such a passion diminishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his action. passion causes ignorance of law in a particular case, by preventing universal knowledge from being applied to a particular act, Bodily disease is involuntary: sin committed from weakness is venial, there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, it belongs to the reason to turn to God, or to turn away from Him, which is the essence of a mortal sin. three ways. indefinitely, a lustful man would wish to enjoy a pleasure without offending God; but with the two set before him to choose from, he prefers sinning and thereby incurring God's anger, to being deprived of the pleasure. we can trace it back to some previous sin, which is not caused by any previous sin, sometimes that a man commits a slight sin through habit, the acts which precede a vicious habit are not committed through certain malice. when a man commits a sin through certain malice, he is glad after having done it, according to Prov. 2:14: "Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things": and this, because it is pleasant to obtain what we desire, and to do those actions which are connatural to us by reason of habit. But those who sin through habit, are sorrowful after committing a sin: Wherefore it is an evil, not simply, but in a relative sense: it may happen that while not using the habit he is sorry for what he has done a man does not fall suddenly into sin from certain malice, and that something is presupposed; but this something is not always a habit, evil is never without some good of nature, whereas good can be perfect without the evil of fault. ignorance is greater in one who sins through certain malice, he that sins through certain malice, is impelled by habit, the impulse of which is stronger than that of passion. Ignorance of choice, to which the objection refers, neither excuses nor diminishes a sin, The impulse due to passion, is, as it were, due to a defect which is outside the will: whereas, by a habit, the will is inclined from within. he that sins through passion, sins while choosing, but not through choosing, God is the cause of the free-will, which itself is the cause of sin. it is not contrary to God's goodness that He should cause the evil of punishment; He inclines the will directly to good; and to evil, in so far as He does not hinder it, God did not make the creatures that they might be an evil to man; if a servant do anything contrary to his master's orders, it is not ascribed to the master there is no comparison between fault and punishment. "the act of sin is not a thing." Now whatever is from God is a thing. If therefore God caused the act of sin, He would be the cause of sin, which is false, In this passage Augustine calls by the name of "thing," that which is a thing simply, viz. substance; for in this sense the act of sin is not a thing. man is the cause of the sin: while God is the cause of the act, acts and habits do not take their species from the privation itself, wherein consists the nature of evil, but from some object, "God does not punish what He causes." Now God punishes the hardened heart, the same effect is not put down to contrary causes. Blindness and hardheartedness, as regards the withholding of grace, are punishments, and therefore, in this respect, they make man no worse. This argument considers hardheartedness in so far as it is a sin. the devil is said to blind, in so far as he induces man to sin. He directs the sin of tyrants to the good of the martyrs, and the punishment of the lost to the glory of His justice. God does not take pleasure in the loss of man, as regards the loss itself, but by reason of His justice, That God directs the blindness of some to their spiritual welfare, is due to His mercy; evil of punishment must be inflicted for the sake of good. the devil induces God causes good things in us by moving the will inwardly, whereas the devil cannot move us in this way. no vital functions can be exercised except by an intrinsic principle, it belongs to God alone to do anything beside the order of nature, the devil cannot impress species on the human intellect, an extrinsic agent can cooperate with them, This apparition of imaginary forms is not altogether outside the order of nature, he can compel man to sin, while he dwells on the earth. man's reason cannot be moved except in respect of things that are offered outwardly to the senses, Not every power that is greater than man, can move man's will; God alone can do this, That which is apprehended by the senses or the imagination does not move the will, of necessity, so long as man has the use of reason; That reason does not resist, is not in the devil's power; whoever commits a sin, has been overcome by the devil. if any men were to sin of their own free-will and without suggestion from any other, their sin would be irremediable: The crowd of demons are the cause of all our evils, as regards their original cause, one who sins of his own accord, becomes the slave of the devil. The devil's sin was irremediable, not only because he sinned without another's suggestion; but also because he was not already prone to sin, he would bear the iniquity if he contracted it from him. the rational soul which is the subject of sin, is not transmitted by way of origin, flesh cannot infect the soul united to it, else the soul could not be cleansed of original sin, so long as it is united to the body. nothing which comes by way of origin is blameworthy or sinful. guilt is transmitted by the way of origin from father to son, he that is born is associated with his first parent in his guilt, the soul is more infected by the semen, the children of those who are guilty of high treason are disinherited. we were likewise in our nearer ancestors, as in principles of our nature, children are never inflicted with spiritual punishment on account of their parents, the actual sins of our nearer ancestors are not transmissible, The first sin infects nature with a human corruption pertaining to nature; whereas other sins infect it with a corruption pertaining only to the person. those who will be still living at the coming of our Lord, will never die, a man who has been baptized has not original sin. the gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam, as the Apostle declares (Rom. 5:15, seqq). But the gift of Christ is not transmitted to all men: neither, therefore, is the sin of Adam. It is held with greater probability and more commonly that all those that are alive at the coming of our Lord, will die, and rise again shortly, Original sin is taken away by Baptism as to the guilt, man's flesh is entirely corrupted. Therefore a man's soul would contract the infection of original sin, from whatever part of the flesh it was formed. it is not on account of the place of exile, but on account of the sin, that original sin is transmitted to those to whom his active generation extends. The flesh does not corrupt the soul, except in so far as it is the active principle in generation, a man pre-exists in his mother as well as in his father. "the Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin," (of whom Christ was to be born without original sin) "purifying her." The child pre-exists in its father as in its active principle, and in its mother, as in its material and passive principle. privation of original justice is original sin. This prevenient purification in the Blessed Virgin was not needed to hinder the transmission of original sin, original sin is a privation. But privation is opposed to habit. evil habits are not infused, but acquired. Now original sin is not preceded by an act. Therefore original sin is not a habit. original sin denotes the privation of original justice, and besides this, the inordinate disposition of the parts of the soul. Consequently it is not a pure privation, but a corrupt habit. original sin can be a habit, whereas actual sin cannot. it is a habit "inborn" due to our corrupt origin. original sin, even in one man, inclines to various and contrary sins. Since then one sin cannot be in different subjects, it seems that original sin is not one but several. every sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4, 30). But concupiscence is in accordance with nature, original sin is not concupiscence any more than another passion. original sin is ignorance rather than concupiscence. Since, in man, the concupiscible power is naturally governed by reason, the act of concupiscence is so far natural to man, as it is in accord with the order of reason; while, in so far as it trespasses beyond the bounds of reason, it is, for a man, contrary to reason. the irascible passions are reducible to concupiscible passions, as holding the princip[al] place: and of these, concupiscence is the most impetuous in moving, all are not equally prone to acts of concupiscence. original sin is subject to degrees. the act of generation may be more lustful in one than in another. Therefore original sin may be greater in one than in another. the bond of original justice is equally broken in all, the cause of original sin is equal to all, supposing God were to grant to a man to feel no inordinate lust in the act of generation, he would still transmit original sin; the rebellion of the flesh against the mind arises from the corruption of original sin. the soul is infected with the corruption of original sin by the carnal semen. our souls were not in him thus, but only our flesh. God would be the cause of sin, since He is the author of the soul's creation and fusion. the flesh is the subject, not of guilt, but of punishment. original sin was in Adam more fully, since in him it had the nature of actual sin. The soul of any individual man was in Adam, in respect of his seminal power, not indeed as in its effective principle, but as in a dispositive principle: it is better for the soul to be thus, according to its nature, than not to be at all, especially since it can avoid damnation, by means of grace. the soul is moved by the will, not as to its essence but only as to the powers. original justice was in a power of the soul, concupiscence is in the powers of the soul. they are the proper subjects of actual sins, it seems to belong to the generative power more than to the others. If therefore original sin infects all the powers of the soul, it seems that it must first of all infect the intellect, as preceding the others. Original sin, in man, is not caused by the generative power of the child, but by the act of the parental generative power. Consequently, it does not follow that the child's generative power is the subject of original sin. since the will, being the higher power, is more akin to the essence of the soul, the infection of original sin reaches it first. this is the rational part, and chiefly the will. Therefore that power is most infected by original sin. the generative power cannot obey reason, the sight is more infected than touch. in so far as it is transmitted to the offspring, it belongs to the aforesaid powers proximately, and to the will, remotely. the delectation is completed in the touch. riches, the desire for which is called covetousness, are not desired except as being useful for some end, avarice, which is another name for covetousness, arises from other sins; sin arises from the desire of mutable good; they move the appetite more than any individual goods, covetousness is the root of every sin, apostasy from God is a sin. Therefore another sin is the beginning of pride, so that the latter is not the beginning of every sin. self-love and not pride, is the beginning of every sin. it is characteristic of pride to be unwilling to be subject to any superior, it amounts to the same whether we reckon pride or self-love as the beginning of every evil. sin implies privation of order. capital sins are not certain specific sins. there can be order in sin. there are four principal virtues, anger is not a principal passion. pride also should be placed among the capital vices. there is no need for the principal vices to be contrary to the principal virtues. pleasure and sorrow have a prominent place among the capital sins, pride, like a universal vice, is not counted along with the others, but is reckoned as the "queen of them all," all the sins which are due to ignorance, can be reduced to sloth, man's sin is no worse than the devil's. But natural good remains unimpaired in devils after sin, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore neither does sin diminish the good of human nature. when sin has caused a disorder in a voluntary act, nature is not changed on that account, so that the good of nature be diminished. no agent is passive by the very reason of its acting, sin does not diminish the good of nature, since to diminish is to act. Dionysius is speaking of the first-mentioned good of nature, which consists in "being, living and understanding," Although nature precedes the voluntary action, it has an inclination to a certain voluntary action. any finite thing is entirely taken away, if the subtraction be continuous. the lost cannot be restored to virtue here the diminution is made by raising obstacles, Even in the lost the natural inclination to virtue remains, else they would have no remorse of conscience. That it is not reduced to act is owing to their being deprived of grace by Divine justice. one same thing is not both effect and cause of the same thing. malice is the name of a sin. that which is natural should not be reckoned a wound of nature. concupiscence is natural to man, in so far as it is subject to reason: whereas, in so far as it is goes beyond the bounds of reason, it is unnatural to man. sin does not destroy the good of nature. Therefore it does not destroy mode, species and order. Mode, species and order follow one from the other, as explained above: and so they are destroyed or diminished together. original sin, from which especially these defects seem to result, is equal in all, these defects are not removed, when all sin is removed by Baptism or Penance. actual sin does not change the nature of the body by subjecting it to some defect. according to diverse natural temperaments, some men's bodies are subject to more defects, some to fewer, although original sin is equal in all. it behooves that our bodies should remain, for a time, subject to suffering, in order that we may merit the impassibility of glory, in conformity with Christ. actual sin does not cause those defects, as original sin does. whatever is composed of contraries is naturally corruptible, as having within itself the cause of corruption. But such is the human body. Therefore it is naturally corruptible. the human soul is of a much higher nature than mutable things, the soul, by its own action, defiles itself, the act of the will consists in a movement towards things themselves, diverse sins occasion diverse stains. the stain is not a habit or disposition, the shadow does not remain when the body has passed by. every effect depends on its cause. Nothing positive remains in the soul after the act of sin, except the disposition or habit; but there does remain something privative, viz. the privation of union with the Divine light. the debt of punishment is accidentally related to sin, punishment is good, since it is just, and is from God. Therefore it is not an effect of sin, which is evil. indefinitely. "punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment is." the purpose of punishment is to bring man back to the good of virtue, just punishments are from God, as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 82). But sin is not from God, and is an injustice. Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin. the nature of punishment is to be something against the will. But sin is something from the will, as shown above (Q. 74, AA. 1, 2). Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin. sin is temporal. Therefore it does not incur a debt of eternal punishment. no medicine should be infinite, nothing accidental is infinite. But punishment is accidental, In no judgment, however, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11) is it requisite for punishment to equal fault in point of duration. the eternal punishments inflicted by God on the reprobate, are medicinal punishments for those who refrain from sin God does not delight in punishments for their own sake; but He does delight in the order of His justice, which requires them. Although punishment is related indirectly to nature, nevertheless it is essentially related to the disturbance of the order, and to God's justice. to be brought to nothing is an infinite punishment, an infinite punishment is due for a sin committed against God. It would be inconsistent with Divine justice for the sinner to be brought to nothing absolutely, because this would be incompatible with the perpetuity of punishment that Divine justice requires, whereas no sin, apparently, differs infinitely from another, since every sin is a human act, which cannot be infinite. Since therefore some sins incur a debt of everlasting punishment, original sin is the least of all sins, wherefore Augustine says (Enchiridion xciii) that "the lightest punishment is incurred by those who are punished for original sin alone." But original sin incurs everlasting punishment, a venial sin deserves eternal punishment if it be united to a mortal sin in a lost soul, because in hell there is no remission of sins. some sins consist in turning away from the last end, Original sin incurs everlasting punishment, not on account of its gravity, but by reason of the condition of the subject, viz. a human being deprived of grace, without which there is no remission of sin. if the cause be removed the effect is removed. sin is removed by man returning to virtue. Now a virtuous man deserves, not punishment, but reward. a man is not given medicine after being cured of his disease. the debt of punishment also can remain. his very virtue demands that he should do satisfaction for his offenses against God or man. punishment is requisite in order to restore the equality of justice, "He suffered for us." Therefore punishment is not always inflicted by God for sin. Such like defects of those who are born with them, or which children suffer from, are the effects and the punishments of original sin, The very fact that others receive temporal goods, is detrimental to their spiritual good; Christ bore a satisfactory punishment, not for His, but for our sins. Both the passages quoted should, seemingly, be referred to temporal or bodily punishments, every sin is mortal. since to break a commandment is to commit a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally. it is not _against_ the law, since he who sins venially neither does what the law forbids, nor omits what the law prescribes to be done; but he acts _beside_ the law, through not observing the mode of reason, which the law intends. man can love any mutable good, either less than God, which may be a venial sin, or more than God, which is a mortal sin. a sin is called mortal when it is irreparable, venial when it can be repaired. sudden movements occur in every kind of sin. one contrary does not dispose to another. Wherefore an accident can be a disposition to a substantial form, so can a venial sin dispose to mortal. Venial sin is not like mortal sin in species; a venial sin, of its very nature, disposes to mortal sin, a movement in the sensuality before the consent of reason, is a venial sin, but after consent, is a mortal sin, a curable disease may become incurable. a disposition may become a habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to mortal, the movement of the reason in consenting is a mortal sin. venial sin is a transient act, which cannot be taken up again: venial sin is a disposition to something differing generically, anger and drunkenness are not mortal but venial sins generically, moroseness is a circumstance. evil and good differ more than venial and mortal sin, both of which are generically evil. But a circumstance makes a good act to be evil, Length of time is not a circumstance that draws a sin to another species, nor is frequency or custom, Therefore his will be a venial sin; and accordingly a mortal sin can become venial. an act which is evil in itself, can become good; the ignorance itself is a sin, in venial sin, there is an inordinateness of the act and of the affections. in venial sin, the soul is in contact with a temporal thing through inordinate love. In mortal sin the inordinateness of the act destroys the habit of virtue, but not in venial sin. in venial sin, man does not cleave to a creature as his last end: venial sins are something outside a spiritual foundation, those even who love God and their neighbor, and do good works, commit venial sins: there are many more than three differences and degrees of venial sins. in most cases they are cleansed by the fervor of charity: man could sin mortally notwithstanding the integrity of the original state. Therefore he could also sin venially. by venial sin we mean that which is easily forgiven. This vainglory which preceded man's downfall, was his first mortal sin, Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the original state in the fact of its destroying that state: this a venial sin cannot do. an angel could love a created good more than God, and he did, by sinning mortally. Therefore he could also love a creature less than God inordinately, by sinning venially. wicked angels seem to do things which are venial sins generically, by provoking men to laughter, Man does indeed agree with the angels in the mind or intellect, but he differs in his mode of understanding, in all such things they sin mortally, on account of the end they have in view. the fact that believers are subject to concupiscence is not in them a sign of the condemnation due to original sin, as it is in unbelievers. sometimes unbelievers have venial together with original sin, and without mortal sins. it is possible for the child to sin venially during that space of time, however short it may be. Therefore venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone and without mortal sin. Venial sin always precedes mortal sin not as a necessary, but as a contingent disposition, Venial sin is prevented from being with original sin alone, not on account of its want of connection or likeness, but on account of the lack of use of reason, nothing pertaining to reason is in the members; law would cease, when the act of reason ceases, for instance, while we are asleep. law pertains, not to the reason, but to the will; two ways. these propositions are sometimes under our actual consideration, while sometimes they are retained in the reason by means of a habit. in order that the volition of what is commanded may have the nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of reason. commands are directed to certain individual goods. human actions are concerned with particular matters. the law is not only directed to the good of all, but also to the private good of an individual. every man can lead another to virtue. every father of a family governs his household. if his advice be not taken, it has no coercive power, he that governs a family, can indeed make certain commands or ordinances, but not such as to have properly the force of law. the natural law needs no promulgation. the obligation of fulfilling a law touches not only those in whose presence it is promulgated, but also others. promulgation concerns those who are present. The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him naturally. The promulgation that takes place now, extends to future time by reason of the durability of written characters, there was not someone from eternity on whom a law could be imposed: promulgation could not be from eternity: nothing ordained to an end is eternal: both the Divine Word and the writing of the Book of Life are eternal. His law is not distinct from Himself. man acts for an end by his reason and will. other animals are not subject to a natural law, neither is man subject to a natural law. This argument would hold, if the natural law were something different from the eternal law: whereas it is nothing but a participation thereof, every act of appetite in respect of the means is derived from the natural appetite similitude. the natural law suffices for the ordering of all human affairs. Consequently there is no need for a human law. human reason is not a measure of things, but vice versa, no law can emanate from human reason. Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of things: Nor is it necessary for every measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but according as it is possible in its own particular genus. the eternal law is a Divine law, man was left to the direction of his reason. human nature is more self-sufficing than irrational creatures. the additional law given by God, whereby man shares more perfectly in the eternal law. Irrational creatures are not ordained to an end higher than that which is proportionate to their natural powers: where there is one king in one kingdom there is but one law. God intends one and the same thing for all men; the Divine law seems to be more akin to the eternal law, which is one, God, in His one kingdom, gave one law to men, while they were yet imperfect, before His coming it was necessary to give to the people, of whom Christ was to be born, a law containing certain rudiments of righteousness unto salvation, in order to prepare them to receive Him. Hence the necessity for the Divine law to be twofold, the _fomes_ of sin is not based on reason, but deviates from it. man is not called a transgressor, from not following the instigations of the _fomes;_ but rather from his following them. the _fomes_ inclines us, not to the common, but to our own private good. according as it results from the justice of the Divine law: the _fomes_ is not a law in this respect, but by a kind of participation, it is called _fomes_ in so far as it strays from the order of reason. virtue is in man from God alone, the very fact that a man obeys a law is due to his being good. some behave well in things regarding the community, who behave ill in things regarding themselves. some laws are tyrannical, "lawgivers make men good by habituating them to good works." sometimes it is through fear of punishment, and sometimes from the mere dictates of reason, A tyrannical law, through not being according to reason, is not a law, absolutely speaking, but rather a perversion of law; command and precept are the same. counsel aims at a higher good than a command does. if to punish is reckoned an effect of law, so also is to reward. "although a good deed may be done through servile fear, i.e. fear of punishment, it is not done well," every law is a kind of precept. To advise is not a proper act of law, To reward may also pertain to anyone: but to punish pertains to none but the framer of the law, there are many types of things in the Divine mind; Word is a Personal name in God, as stated in the First Part (Q. 34, A. 1): whereas type refers to the Essence. truth is the eternal law. But the idea of truth is not the same as the idea of a type. Therefore the eternal law is not the same as the sovereign type. two points the Divine intellect is true in itself; and its type is truth itself. the eternal law is a type existing in the Divine mind. Therefore it is unknown to all save God alone. all do not know how all things are most orderly. they are made known to us in their effects, each one knows the eternal law according to his own capacity, two ways. there is a law of the _fomes,_ as stated above (Q. 91, A. 6), which is not derived from that Divine law which is the eternal law, some laws are unjust, in so far as it denotes a proneness to sin, it is contrary to the Divine law, and has not the nature of law, even an unjust law, in so far as it retains some appearance of law, though being framed by one who is in power, is derived from the eternal law; Human law is said to permit certain things, not as approving them, but as being unable to direct them. the Son, Who is eternal, is subject to the eternal law. many necessary things are subject to Divine providence: for instance, the stability of incorporeal substances and of the heavenly bodies. two ways. God the Son was not made by God, but was naturally born of God. none but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law; natural contingents do not partake of reason in any way, but are altogether void of reason, in natural contingents defects occur. irrational creatures are moved by God, without, on that account, being rational. the defects of natural things are subject to the eternal law. two ways. in no man does the prudence of the flesh dominate so far as to destroy the whole good of his nature: both the blessed and the damned are under the eternal law. natural law is not an act, but a habit. natural law is held habitually; If therefore there were many precepts of the natural law, it would follow that there are also many natural laws. reason is but one in man. All the inclinations of any parts whatsoever of human nature, e.g. of the concupiscible and irascible parts, in so far as they are ruled by reason, belong to the natural law, whatever can be ruled by reason, is contained under the law of reason. some acts of virtue are ordained to the private good of the individual, every sin is opposed to some virtuous act. If therefore all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law, it seems to follow that all sins are against nature: whereas this applies to certain special sins. acts of virtue are not common to all: Temperance is about the natural concupiscences of food, drink and sexual matters, which are indeed ordained to the natural common good, just as other matters of law are ordained to the moral common good. thus contrary to sexual intercourse, which is natural to all animals, is unisexual lust, which has received the special name of the unnatural crime. This argument considers acts in themselves. different men are naturally inclined to different things; it is universally right for all men, that all their inclinations should be directed according to reason. the slaying of the innocent, adultery, and theft are against the natural law. But we find these things changed by God: as when God commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gen. 22:2); and when he ordered the Jews to borrow and purloin the vessels of the Egyptians (Ex. 12:35); and when He commanded Osee to take to himself "a wife of fornications" (Osee 1:2). Therefore the natural law can be changed. "the possession of all things in common, and universal freedom, are matters of natural law." the natural law was perverted in the hearts of some men, whatever is commanded by God is right; two ways. the law of grace is blotted out by sin. many things are enacted by men, which are contrary to the law of nature. Sin blots out the law of nature in particular cases, not universally, nature is more essential to man, and therefore more enduring. men are more to be induced to be good willingly by means of admonitions, the execution of justice to be entrusted to the decision of judges, men who are evilly disposed are not led to virtue unless they are compelled. As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 1), "it is better that all things be regulated by law, than left to be decided by judges": and this for three reasons. First, because it is easier to find a few wise men competent to frame right laws, than to find the many who would be necessary to judge aright of each single case. Secondly, because those who make laws consider long beforehand what laws to make; whereas judgment on each single case has to be pronounced as soon as it arises: and it is easier for man to see what is right, by taking many instances into consideration, than by considering one solitary fact. Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of future events; whereas those who sit in judgment judge of things present, towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or some kind of cupidity; wherefore their judgment is perverted. Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every man, and since it can be deflected, therefore it was necessary, whenever possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for very few matters to be left to the decision of men. those things which arise from the natural law are not matters of indifference. the law of nature is the same for all; it is possible to give a reason for things which are derived from the natural law. The general principles of the natural law cannot be applied to all men in the same way on account of the great variety of human affairs: "we ought to pay as much attention to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of persons who surpass us in experience, age and prudence, as to their demonstrations." Justice is included in honesty, written law is condivided with custom, it is superfluous to say both "necessary" and "useful." the law of nations is not contained under positive human law, but rather under natural law. it is unreasonable to divide laws according to the names of lawgivers, it is distinct from the natural law, especially it is distinct from the natural law which is common to all animals. decrees are framed about individual actions. human acts are about individual matters. no general proposition can be so certain as not to fail in some individual cases, law would be of no use, if it did not extend further than to one single act. in contingent matters, such as natural and human things, it is enough for a thing to be certain, as being true in the greater number of instances, it would not be held in check sufficiently, unless all evils were repressed by law. a man cannot be virtuous unless he forbear from all kinds of vice. all vices are contrary to the law of nature. Audacity seems to refer to the assailing of others. The purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not suddenly, but gradually. some acts of virtue are ordained, not to the common good, but to private good. it forbids certain acts of each vice, just as it prescribes some acts of each virtue. two ways. There is no virtue whose act is not ordainable to the common good, human law cannot impose its precept in a Divine court, such as is the court of conscience. the judgment of conscience depends chiefly on the commandments of God. This argument is true of laws that are contrary to the commandments of God, which is beyond the scope of (human) power. Wherefore in such matters human law should not be obeyed. This argument is true of a law that inflicts unjust hurt on its subjects. The power that man holds from God does not extend to this: wherefore neither in such matters is man bound to obey the law, provided he avoid giving scandal or inflicting a more grievous hurt. "The law is not made for the just man." "the sovereign is exempt from the laws." the law does not enforce itself upon them as it does on the wicked. spiritual men are subject to law, no man is coerced by himself, it is not right for one who is under the law to disregard the letter of the law, they have no right to interpret the intention of the lawgiver, we should not judge of the intention of the lawgiver otherwise than by the words of the law. He who in a case of necessity acts beside the letter of the law, does not judge the law; He who follows the intention of the lawgiver, does not interpret the law simply; but in a case in which it is evident, by reason of the manifest harm, that the lawgiver intended otherwise. No man is so wise as to be able to take account of every single case; the natural law endures unchangeably. that which is right once is right always. the reason of man is changeable and imperfect: A measure should be as enduring as possible. right is predicated of law with reference to the common weal, to which one and the same thing is not always adapted, in the other arts, the tenets of former times give place to others, the laws of old were crude in many points. we cannot acquire perfect knowledge in singular matters, except by experience, which "requires time," "laws derive very great force from custom," laws ought to be changed: not in view of any improvement, but for the sake of a great benefit or in a case of great urgency, human custom cannot change either the law of nature or the Divine law. law is not abolished by custom, custom grows by the acts of private individuals. The natural and Divine laws proceed from the Divine will, as stated above. Wherefore they cannot be changed by a custom proceeding from the will of man, but only by Divine authority. human laws fail in some cases: although each individual cannot make laws, yet the whole people can. to allow one man to do that which is equally forbidden to all, seems to be respect of persons. no man can dispense from the Divine and natural laws. When a person is dispensed from observing the general law, this should not be done to the prejudice of, but with the intention of benefiting, the common good. when the condition of any person requires that he should reasonably receive special treatment, it is not respect of persons if he be the object of special favor. in the precepts of the Divine law, which are from God, none can dispense but God, or the man to whom He may give special power for that purpose. The Lord refers there to the ceremonial precepts; which are said not to be good, because they did not confer grace unto the remission of sins, "The works of God are perfect." But the Law was imperfect, all the works which God hath made continue for ever." But the Old Law does not continue for ever: the Old Law was an occasion of sin, the Old Law did not suffice to save man, "The law was our pedagogue in Christ." the Old Law was set aside when there came the perfection of grace; they might find themselves to be sinners, and being humbled might have recourse to the help of grace. it was not meet for the Law to be given through the angels, since it is ordained to the salvation of souls. it is that the angel spoke as personating the Lord. he did not see the very Essence of God; and consequently he was not taught by Him immediately. He promulgated it through the angels. salvation was to come not to the Jews alone but to all nations, the way of salvation should not have been opened to one people more than to another. Christ should be born of one people, The benefits of grace are forfeited by man on account of sin: but not the benefits of nature. If therefore other men could be saved without the observance of the Old Law, the Jews would be in a worse plight than other men. it would have been useless to admit strangers to the legal observances according to Divine ordinance, if they could have been saved without the observance of the Law. the more the Jewish people were bound to the worship of God, the greater their excellence The Gentiles obtained salvation more perfectly and more securely under the observances of the Law the Law should have been given immediately after sin. the Law should have been given at once at the time of Abraham. the Old Law should have been given after David, as yet the dictate of the natural law was not darkened by habitual sinning. when Abraham's descendants had multiplied, so as to form a people, and when they had been freed from slavery, it was fitting that they should be given a law; the Law had to be given to the people, not only those, of whom Christ was born, received the Law, but the whole people, The Old Law is said to be one as being ordained to one end: yet it comprises various precepts, love of one's neighbor includes love of God, when we love our neighbor for God's sake. the Old Law is distinct from the law of nature, as stated above (Q. 91, AA. 4, 5; Q. 98, A. 5). But the moral precepts belong to the law of nature. man's reason seems to suffice for the moral precepts. The Old Law is distinct from the natural law, not as being altogether different from it, but as something added thereto. even the letter of the law is said to be the occasion of death, as to the moral precepts; in so far as, to wit, it prescribes what is good, without furnishing the aid of grace for its fulfilment. every law that is given to man is for the purpose of directing human actions. Divine worship is the act of a virtue, Human acts extend also to the Divine worship: that He is to be worshipped by such and such sacrifices, and such and such offerings, belongs to the ceremonial precepts. the things of God are set forth in the Scriptures not only by similitudes expressed in words, as in the case of metaphorical expressions; but also by similitudes of things set before the eyes, which pertains to the ceremonial precepts. a rule of life belongs to the moral precepts. acts of justice, like the acts of other virtues, belong to the moral precepts. Both the moral and the judicial precepts aim at the ordering of human life: sometimes "judgments" comprise both judicial and moral precepts, The act of justice, in general, belongs to the moral precepts; Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the notion of duty. temporal promises and threats seem to be contrary to the intention of a lawgiver: the Divine law should have used, not these, but more lofty means. the attainment of temporal goods which man desires in subordination to God is a road leading the imperfect to the love of the Divine law persuades men by means of rewards or punishments to be received from God. the law of nature is not learnt, but instilled by natural instinct. that which is of faith is above nature. the moral precepts are only about acts of justice. the character of duty belongs to justice alone it is just that man should obey God: or again, inasmuch as it is just that all that belongs to man should be subject to reason. metaphorical these two are not contained in the precepts of the decalogue. among the precepts of the decalogue, one is ceremonial, among the precepts of the decalogue are only such as regard acts of justice; Those two principles are the first general principles of the natural law, worship is a virtue distinct from faith. Worship is merely a declaration of faith: the decalogue does not include any precepts directing man in his relations to himself, in some kinds of sin, namely in theft and adultery, the prohibition of sins of deed, when it is said, "Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steal," is distinct from the prohibition of the sin of thought, the decalogue should have included some precepts forbidding the disorders of the irascible faculty. true self-love consists in directing oneself to God. "Thou shalt not say that Christ is a creature." it is not an immediate dictate of natural reason that a man should do one thing in return for another, The pleasure of adultery and the usefulness of wealth, in so far as they have the character of pleasurable or useful good, are of themselves, objects of appetite: all the passions of the irascible faculty arise from the passions of the concupiscible the first three precepts belong to the love of God, while the other seven pertain to the love of our neighbor. vices should be uprooted before virtues are sown. actions of thought precede actions of word or outward deed. the love of God is the reason for the love of our neighbor, Although sin of thought stands first in the order of execution, yet its prohibition holds a later position in the order of reason. in whatever matter there is an ordinance of a precept of the decalogue, there should have been an affirmative and a negative precept. the reason should have been pointed out in each precept, and not only in the first and third. the promise should have been included in each precept, a threat of punishment should have been included in each, Affirmation of one thing always leads to the denial of its opposite: but the denial of one opposite does not always lead to the affirmation of the other. The reasons for the purely moral precepts are manifest; in those precepts in which it seemed that there would be no useful result, or that some utility might be hindered, it was necessary to add a promise of reward. Punishments are necessary against those who are prone to evil, the failure of law to apply in certain particular cases is a reason for dispensation, superiors can dispense with the precepts of the decalogue. evil-doers or enemies are lawfully slain. Whosoever shall come up to fight against us on the Sabbath-day, we will fight against him." God cannot dispense a man so that it be lawful for him not to direct himself to God, or not to be subject to His justice, it is not undue for evil-doers or foes of the common weal to be slain: a man is not taken to break the Sabbath, if he does something necessary for human welfare; the mode of virtue is that deeds of justice should be done justly, the intention of the lawgiver is directed chiefly to make men virtuous, the mode of virtue seems to consist properly in working willingly and with pleasure. The mode of doing acts of justice, which falls under the precept, is that they be done in accordance with right; twofold. whoever works with sadness works unwillingly. good works do not suffice for entrance into life, except they be done from charity: grace, which is always united to charity. it is not possible, as Pelagius maintained, for man to fulfil the law without grace. It is in virtue of their institution that the ceremonial and judicial precepts are determinations of the precepts of the decalogue, not by reason of a natural instinct, as in the case of the superadded moral precepts. the spiritual life of man is through justice. the Divine law is more efficacious than human law. But human law justifies man; Therefore they are ceremonial precepts. Yet they seem in no way to pertain to the worship of God. some state that the ceremonial precepts are those which pertain to solemnities; as though they were so called from the _cerei_ (candles) which are lit up on those occasions. not only those precepts which pertain to Divine worship are called ceremonial. there is evident reason for many things pertaining to the worship of God; the word "ceremony" is not Greek but Latin. the actions performed in theatres were done to represent the actions of others. Therefore it seems that such things should not be done for the worship of God. the precepts of faith, hope, and charity are not figurative. Divine mysteries should be revealed to uncultured people under a veil of figures, Just as human reason fails to grasp poetical expressions on account of their being lacking in truth, so does it fail to grasp Divine things perfectly, on account of the sublimity of the truth they contain: and therefore in both cases there is need of signs by means of sensible figures. Augustine is speaking there of internal worship; to which, however, external worship should be ordained, the great number of the ceremonial precepts was an occasion of transgression, the ceremonial precepts referred to the outward and bodily worship of God, the ceremonies of the Old Law were weak and imperfect, both for representing the mystery of Christ, on account of its surpassing excellence; and for subjugating men's minds to God. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18, 19): "There is a setting aside of the former commandment because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof, for the law brought nothing to perfection." Consequently these ceremonies needed to be in great number. the fact that they would in consequence find many occasions of disobedience did not prevent God from giving them many ceremonial precepts. The Old Law lessened bodily worship in many ways. Thus it forbade sacrifices to be offered in every place and by any person. the ceremonies of the Old Law foreshadowed Christ. But this was done only by the sacrifices, which foreshadowed the sacrifice in which Christ "delivered Himself an oblation and a sacrifice to God" a "sacred thing" is something dedicated to God: the sacrifices of the Old Law did not contain Christ, The oblations and gifts are counted together with the sacrifices; there was no reason for the ceremonial observances of the Old Law. If therefore there is any reason for the ceremonial precepts, they would not differ from the moral precepts. the decrees of the New Law, which refer chiefly to faith and the love of God, are reasonable from the very nature of the act. The reason for the prohibition concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil was not that this tree was naturally evil: the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause in their relation to something else, among the ceremonial precepts, the chief was circumcision and the sacrifice of the paschal lamb. But neither of these had any but a figurative cause: an effect is proportionate to its cause. But all the ceremonial precepts are figurative, there are certain points in the ceremonial precepts, which appear to be a matter of indifference, as to whether they be done in one way or in another: This argument would avail if the ceremonial precepts had been given merely as figures of things to come, and not for the purpose of worshipping God then and there. God needs no such sustenance; many other animals are more noble than these. it was unfitting for fishes to be excluded from the divine sacrifices. it mattered not how they were slain. unreasonable to forbid the offering of an imperfect animal, unbecoming for the offerers to be denied certain parts of the victims, no female animals was offered up to God as a holocaust, all the peace-offerings seem to be of one kind. one kind of sacrifice should have been offered up for all sins. it does not seem to be suitable that products of the soil should be offered up in various ways; in order to represent the mystery of the Redemption of man by Christ. they are most clean, fish die as soon as they are taken out of water; hence they could not be offered in the temple like other animals. Among turtledoves the older ones are better than the young; while with doves the case is the reverse. the slaying of the animals signified the destruction of sins: and also that man deserved death on account of his sins; as though those animals were slain in man's stead, in order to betoken the expiation of sins. Again the slaying of these animals signified the slaying of Christ. The Law fixed the special manner of slaying the sacrificial animals in order to exclude other ways of killing, whereby idolaters sacrificed animals to idols. unclean animals are wont to be held in contempt The reason for this was, first, in order to prevent idolatry: because idolaters used to drink the blood and eat the fat of the victims, Because the holocaust was the most perfect kind of sacrifice, therefore none but a male was offered for a holocaust: because the female is an imperfect animal. Sins are more grievous by reason of the state of the sinner, the Law had in view the poverty of the offerers; It was therefore unfitting that in the Old Law a tabernacle or temple should be set up for the worship of God. it seems that also under the Old Law there should have been not only one tabernacle or temple, but many. SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 102, Art. 6] Whether There Was Any Reasonable Cause for the Ceremonial Observances? Objection 1: It was therefore unfitting that they should be forbidden to eat certain foods Obj. 2: the Law did not distinguish any herbs from the rest as being unclean Obj. 3: Flesh is generated from blood. Since therefore all flesh was not prohibited as unclean, it seems that in like manner neither should blood have been forbidden as unclean. Obj. 4: there seems to be no reason in what is said, Ex. 23:19: "Thou shalt not boil a kid in the milk of its dam." Obj. 5: ? Obj. 6: "A woman shall not be clothed with man's apparel, neither shall a man use woman's apparel": Obj. 7: it is unsuitably prescribed (Deut. 6:8, seqq.) that they should "bind" the commandments of God "as a sign" on their hands; Obj. 8: ? Objection 9: Much less therefore should any distinction have been made about the cultivation of plants. Objection 10: ? Objection 11: it is sometimes an act of piety to marry a loose woman, because she is thereby delivered from sin and infamy. Therefore it seems inconsistent for these things to be forbidden to priests (Lev. 21). Reply Obj. 1: they were allowed to eat those animals which could be procured easily and promptly. Reply Obj. 2: animals were offered to idols, while the products of the soil were not. Reply Obj. 4: heartlessness Reply Obj. 5: The Gentiles offered their gods the first-fruits Reply Obj. 6: man should not adopt the effeminate manners of a woman. Reply Obj. 7: it was necessary for them to be stirred by these sensible things to the observance of the Law. Reply Obj. 8: "The just regardeth the lives of his beasts Reply Obj. 9: the Egyptians in worshipping the stars employed various combinations of seeds Reply Obj. 10: we should recognize the unhappy condition of human nature, and humbly cover and purify the stains of a puffed-up and proud spirit in the deep furrow of self-examination. Reply Obj. 11: Sorcerers and idolatrous priests made use, in their rites, of the bones and flesh of dead men. ________________________ QUESTION 103 OF THE DURATION OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS (In Four Articles) We must now consider the duration of the ceremonial precepts: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the ceremonial precepts were in existence before the Law? (2) Whether at the time of the Law the ceremonies of the Old Law had any power of justification? (3) Whether they ceased at the coming of Christ? (4) Whether it is a mortal sin to observe them after the coming of Christ? ________________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 103, Art. 1] Whether the Ceremonies of the Law Were in Existence Before the Law? Objection 1: sacrifices and holocausts preceded the Law Obj. 2: the erecting and consecrating of the altar were part of the ceremonies relating to holy things. But these preceded the Law. Obj. 3: circumcision preceded the Law Obj. 4: the distinction of clean from unclean animals belongs to the ceremonies of observances, as stated above (Q. 100, 2, A. 6, ad 1). But this distinction preceded the Law Reply Obj. 1: The patriarchs offered up these oblations, sacrifices and holocausts previously to the Law, out of a certain devotion of their own will Reply Obj. 2: yaya Reply Obj. 3: The sacrament of circumcision was established by command of God before the Law. Hence it cannot be called a sacrament of the Law as though it were an institution of the Law, but only as an observance included in the Law Reply Obj. 4: The distinction of clean from unclean animals was in vogue before the Law, not with regard to eating them, since it is written (Gen. 9:3): "Everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat for you": but only as to the offering of sacrifices ________________________ SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 103, Art. 2] Whether, at the Time of the Law, the Ceremonies of the Old Law Had Any Power of Justification? Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power of justification at the time of the Law. Because expiation from sin and consecration pertains to justification. Obj. 2: ? Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: yaya Reply Obj. 3: ? ________________________ THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 103, Art. 3] Whether the Ceremonies of the Old Law Ceased at the Coming of Christ? Objection 1: scripture Obj. 2: Further, the offering made by a leper after being cleansed was a ceremony of the Law. But the Gospel commands the leper, who has been cleansed, to make this offering (Matt. 8:4). Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law did not cease at Christ's coming. Obj. 3: ? Obj. 4: legal solemnities should not have ceased. Reply Obj. 1: The Old Law is said to be "for ever" simply and absolutely, as regards its moral precepts; but as regards the ceremonial precepts it lasts for even in respect of the reality which those ceremonies foreshadowed. Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord, before His Passion, commanded the leper to observe the legal ceremonies. Reply Obj. 3: yaya Reply Obj. 4: Baptism, which, in this respect, took the place of circumcision ________________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 103, Art. 4] Whether Since Christ's Passion the Legal Ceremonies Can Be Observed Without Committing Mortal Sin? Objection 1: the apostles observed the legal ceremonies after the coming of the Holy Ghost Obj. 2: yaya Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 1: Augustine Reply Obj. 2: Augustine Reply Obj. 3: yaya ________________________ QUESTION 104 OF THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS (In Four Articles) We must now consider the judicial precepts: and first of all we shall consider them in general; in the second place we shall consider their reasons. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What is meant by the judicial precepts? (2) Whether they are figurative? (3) Their duration; (4) Their division. ________________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 104, Art. 1] Whether the Judicial Precepts Were Those Which Directed Man in Relation to His Neighbor? Objection 1: yaya Obj. 2: yaya Obj. 3: yaya Reply Obj. 1: yaya Reply Obj. 2: yaya Reply Obj. 3: the relations of man to his neighbor are more subject to reason than the relations of man to God ________________________ SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 104, Art. 2] Whether the Judicial Precepts Were Figurative? Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not figurative. Because it seems proper to the ceremonial precepts to be instituted as figures of something else. Therefore, if the judicial precepts are figurative, there will be no difference between the judicial and ceremonial precepts. Obj. 2: ? Obj. 3: Further, those things which relate to the divine worship had to be taught under certain figures, because the things of God are above our reason, as stated above (Q. 101, A. 2, ad 2). But things concerning our neighbor are not above our reason. Therefore the judicial precepts which direct us in relation to our neighbor should not have been figurative. Reply Obj. 1: The ceremonial precepts are not figurative in the same way as the judicial precepts Reply Obj. 2: The Jewish people were chosen by God that Christ might be born of them Reply Obj. 3: ? ________________________ THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 104, Art. 3] Whether the Judicial Precepts of the Old Law Bind for Ever? Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts of the Old Law bind for ever. Because the judicial precepts relate to the virtue of justice: since a judgment is an execution of the virtue of justice. Now "justice is perpetual and immortal" (Wis. 1:15). Therefore the judicial precepts bind for ever. Obj. 2: Further, Divine institutions are more enduring than human institutions. But the judicial precepts of human laws bind for ever. Therefore much more do the judicial precepts of the Divine Law. Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 1: The obligation of observing justice is indeed perpetual. But the determination of those things that are just, according to human or Divine institution, must needs be different, according to the different states of mankind. Reply Obj. 2: The judicial precepts established by men retain their binding force for ever, so long as the state of government remains the same. Reply Obj. 3: in Christ there was no distinction between Gentile and Jew ________________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 104, Art. 4] Whether It Is Possible to Assign a Distinct Division of the Judicial Precepts? Objection 1: ? Obj. 2: yaya Obj. 3: the Law contains no allusion to a division of the judicial precepts. Reply Obj. 1: yaya Reply Obj. 2: yaya Reply Obj. 3: ? ________________________ QUESTION 105 OF THE REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS (In Four Articles) We must now consider the reason for the judicial precepts: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Concerning the reason for the judicial precepts relating to the rulers; (2) Concerning the fellowship of one man with another; (3) Concerning matters relating to foreigners; (4) Concerning things relating to domestic matters. ________________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 105, Art. 1] Whether the Old Law Enjoined Fitting Precepts Concerning Rulers? Objection 1: the Law contains no precept relating to the institution of the chief ruler Obj. 2: the best ordering of a state or of any nation is to be ruled by a king: because this kind of government approaches nearest in resemblance to the Divine government Obj. 3: it should have forbidden the kingdom to be divided under two kings Obj. 4: ? Obj. 5: when the Lord appointed the king, He established a tyrannical law Reply Obj. 1: the Lord reserved to Himself the institution of the chief ruler Reply Obj. 2: A kingdom is the best form of government of the people, so long as it is not corrupt. Reply Obj. 3: The division of the kingdom, and a number of kings, was rather a punishment Reply Obj. 4: the rulers, as stated above, were chosen from the whole people; wherefore they had their own possessions Reply Obj. 5: a tyrant rules is subjects as though they were his slaves. ________________________ SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 105, Art. 2] Whether the Judicial Precepts Were Suitably Framed As to the Relations of One Man with Another? Objection 1: scripture Obj. 2: Further, one of the chief causes of the downfall of states has been the holding of property by women Obj. 3: in the 50th year of the jubilee all that is sold shall return to the vendor Obj. 4: the law made unsuitable provision in the matter of loans Obj. 5: the precepts of the Old Law observed little caution in regard to deposits Obj. 6: ? Obj. 7: It was therefore unfitting that the Law (Deut. 17:8, 9) should command them to go to a fixed place to ask for judgment on doubtful matters. Obj. 8: Further, it is possible that not only two, but three or more, should agree to tell a lie. Objection 9: the Law fixed unequal punishments for certain faults Objection 10: it seems unreasonable that the Law should not have inflicted the two other punishments, viz. "exile" and "slavery." Objection 11: Further, no punishment is due except for a fault. But dumb animals cannot commit a fault. Therefore the Law is unreasonable in punishing them Objection 12: murder cannot be sufficiently punished by the slaying of a dumb animal Reply Obj. 1: among well-behaved people, the taking of a little does not disturb the peace Reply Obj. 2: The Law did not prescribe that women should succeed to their father's estate except in default of male issue: failing which it was necessary that succession should be granted to the female line in order to comfort the father, who would have been sad to think that his estate would pass to strangers. Reply Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 4: ? Reply Obj. 5: there was a stricter obligation of returning a loan than of restoring goods held in deposit Reply Obj. 6: work men who offer their work for hire are poor men who toil for their daily bread Reply Obj. 7: two ways Reply Obj. 8: the Divine Persons, Who are sometimes mentioned as two, because the Holy Ghost is the bond of the other two Persons Reply Obj. 9: as regards theft of other things which can easily be safeguarded from a thief, the thief restored only twice their value. But sheep cannot be easily safeguarded from a thief, because they graze in the fields: wherefore it happened more frequently that sheep were stolen in the fields. Consequently the Law inflicted a heavier penalty Reply Obj. 10: The punishment of absolute exile was not prescribed by the Law: because God was worshipped by that people alone, whereas all other nations were given to idolatry: wherefore if any man were exiled from that people absolutely, he would be in danger of falling into idolatry. Reply Obj. 11: Reply Obj. 12: in order to avoid this twofold loss, the men of the city would readily make known the murderer ________________________ THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 105, Art. 3] Whether the Judicial Precepts Regarding Foreigners Were Framed in a Suitable Manner? Objection 1: those who are acceptable to God should not be excluded from the Church of God Obj. 2: "an eunuch and one born of a prostitute shalt not enter into the church of the Lord." Obj. 3: the Law unsuitably permitted them (Deut. 23:19, 20) to lend money to the stranger for usury. Obj. 4: yaya Obj. 5: yaya Obj. 6: the timid and faint-hearted are unfittingly excused from the toil of battle (Deut. 20:8). Reply Obj. 1: The Law excluded the men of no nation from the worship of God Reply Obj. 2: For this reason bastards, by reason of their base origin, were excluded from the _ecclesia,_ i.e. from the popular assembly, down to the tenth generation. The same applies to eunuchs, who were not competent to receive the honor due to a father Reply Obj. 3: It was not the intention of the Law to sanction the acceptance of usury from strangers, but only to tolerate it Reply Obj. 4: yaya Reply Obj. 5: yaya Reply Obj. 6: The timid were sent back home, not that they might be the gainers thereby; but lest the people might be the losers by their presence, since their timidity and flight might cause others to be afraid and run away. ________________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 105, Art. 4] Whether the Old Law Set Forth Suitable Precepts About the Members of the Household? Objection 1: it was unfitting for the Law to command (Ex. 21:2) that slaves should "go out free" in the seventh year. Obj. 2: scripture Obj. 3: scripture Obj. 4: it was unfitting for the Law to allow a man to sell his daughter to be a servant or handmaid (Ex. 21:7). Obj. 5: ? Obj. 6: it was unfitting to allow them to marry captive women from strange nations (Deut. 21:10, seqq.). Obj. 7: Further, the Lord forbade them to marry within certain degrees of consanguinity and affinity, according to Lev. 18. Therefore it was unsuitably commanded (Deut. 25:5) that if any man died without issue, his brother should marry his wife. Obj. 8: Further, as there is the greatest familiarity between man and wife, so should there be the staunchest fidelity. But this is impossible if the marriage bond can be sundered. Therefore it was unfitting for the Lord to allow (Deut. 24:1-4) a man to put his wife away, by writing a bill of divorce; and besides, that he could not take her again to wife. Reply Obj. 1: they were slaves, not absolutely but in a restricted sense Reply Obj. 2: This commandment is to be understood as referring to a servant whom his master seeks to kill Reply Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 4: similar to R1 Reply Obj. 5: ? Reply Obj. 6: When, however, the woman was willing to renounce idolatry, and become an adherent of the Law, it was lawful to take her in marriage Reply Obj. 7: in marrying the wife of his dead brother, he took his dead brother's place. Objection 9: it seems to have been superfluous for the Law to prescribe the "sacrifice of jealousy" Reply Obj. 9: Wives break their conjugal faith by adultery, both easily, for motives of pleasure, and hiddenly, since "the eye of the adulterer observeth darkness" (Job 24:15). But this does not apply to a son in respect of his father, or to a servant in respect of his master: because the latter infidelity is not the result of the lust of pleasure, but rather of malice: nor can it remain hidden like the infidelity of an adulterous woman. ________________________ QUESTION 106 OF THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL, CALLED THE NEW LAW, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (In Four Articles) In proper sequence we have to consider now the Law of the Gospel which is called the New Law: and in the first place we must consider it in itself; secondly, in comparison with the Old Law; thirdly, we shall treat of those things that are contained in the New Law. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What kind of law is it? i.e. Is it a written law or is it instilled in the heart? (2) Of its efficacy, i.e. does it justify? (3) Of its beginning: should it have been given at the beginning of the world? (4) Of its end: i.e. whether it will last until the end, or will another law take its place? ________________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 106, Art. 1] Whether the New Law Is a Written Law? Objection 1: the Gospel is set forth in writing Obj. 2: If therefore the law of the Gospel were instilled in our hearts, it would not be distinct from the law of nature. Obj. 3: the law that is instilled in the heart is common to those who are in the New Testament and to those who are in the Old Testament Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: a thing is instilled into man by being, as it were, added on to his nature by a gift of grace. In this way the New Law is instilled into man, not only by indicating to him what he should do, but also by helping him to accomplish it. Reply Obj. 3: by faith in Christ man belongs to the New Testament ________________________ SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 106, Art. 2] Whether the New Law Justifies? Objection 1: the Gospel does not always cause men to believe in it Obj. 2: much more did the New Law increase transgression Obj. 3: the Old Law was from God just as the New Law Reply Obj. 1: This argument holds true of the New Law, not as to its principal, but as to its secondary element: i.e. as to the dogmas and precepts outwardly put before man either in words or in writing. Reply Obj. 2: as far as it is concerned it gives man sufficient help to avoid sin. Reply Obj. 3: Augustine ________________________ THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 106, Art. 3] Whether the New Law Should Have Been Given from the Beginning of the World? Objection 1: the Law of the Gospel should have been given from the beginning of the world, in order that it might bring succor to all. Obj. 2: yaya Obj. 3: yaya Reply Obj. 1: Mankind on account of the sin of our first parents deserved to be deprived of the aid of grace Reply Obj. 2: at all times there have been some persons belonging to the New Testament Reply Obj. 3: Things pertaining to the health of the body are of service to man as regards his nature, which sin does not destroy: whereas things pertaining to the health of the soul are ordained to grace, which is forfeit through sin. ________________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 106, Art. 4] Whether the New Law Will Last Till the End of the World? Objection 1: the New Law is to be done away, and will be succeeded by a more perfect state. Obj. 2: we must look forward to another state, wherein all truth will be revealed by the Holy Ghost. Obj. 3: ? Obj. 4: the Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of the kingdom, but another Gospel, that of the Holy Ghost, is to come yet, like unto another Law. Reply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v), there is a threefold state of mankind; the first was under the Old Law; the second is that of the New Law; the third will take place not in this life, but in heaven. But as the first state is figurative and imperfect in comparison with the state of the Gospel; so is the present state figurative and imperfect in comparison with the heavenly state, with the advent of which the present state will be done away as expressed in that very passage (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face." Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: the New Law corresponds not only to Christ, but also to the Holy Ghost Reply Obj. 4: two ways ________________________ QUESTION 107 OF THE NEW LAW AS COMPARED WITH THE OLD (In Four Articles) We must now consider the New Law as compared with the Old: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the New Law is distinct from the Old Law? (2) Whether the New Law fulfils the Old? (3) Whether the New Law is contained in the Old? (4) Which is the more burdensome, the New or the Old Law? ________________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 107, Art. 1] Whether the New Law Is Distinct from the Old Law? Objection 1: the faith of olden times and of nowadays is the same Obj. 2: Augustine Obj. 3: yaya Reply Obj. 1: faith had a different state in the Old and in the New Law Reply Obj. 2: although the Old Law contained precepts of charity, nevertheless it did not confer the Holy Ghost by Whom "charity . . . is spread abroad in our hearts" (Rom. 5:5). Reply Obj. 3: the New Law does not consist chiefly in these latter things, as did the Old Law ________________________ SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 107, Art. 2] Whether the New Law Fulfils the Old? Objection 1: the New Law voids or excludes the observances of the Old Law Obj. 2: Our Lord seems to have done away with the precepts of the Old Law relating to the different kinds of foods Obj. 3: He seems to have frequently broken the sabbath Obj. 4: Our Lord (Matt. 5) fulfilled the Law in some respects, but without mentioning the judicial and ceremonial precepts Reply Obj. 1: The New Law does not void observance of the Old Law except in the point of ceremonial precepts Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord, in order to impress the fact that a wife ought not easily to be put away, allowed no exception save in the case of fornication Reply Obj. 3: Our Lord, Who healed the leper, could not contract an uncleanness Reply Obj. 4: He taught that the intention of the Law was that retaliation should be sought out of love of justice, and not as a punishment out of revengeful spite ________________________ THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 107, Art. 3] Whether the New Law Is Contained in the Old? Objection 1: the New Law consists chiefly in faith Obj. 2: yaya Obj. 3: yaya Reply Obj. 1: yaya Reply Obj. 2: Nothing, however, prevents the greater from being contained in the lesser virtually Reply Obj. 3: What is set forth implicitly needs to be declared explicitly ________________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 107, Art. 4] Whether the New Law Is More Burdensome Than the Old? Objection 1: the commandments of Christ are difficult to accomplish, for instance: Thou shalt not give way to anger, or to lust. Obj. 2: many kinds of trouble ensue to those who observe the New Law Obj. 3: the New Law is something added to the Old Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted speaks expressly of the difficulty of the New Law as to the deliberate curbing of interior movements. Reply Obj. 2: The tribulations suffered by those who observe the New Law are not imposed by the Law itself Reply Obj. 3: The object of these additions to the precepts of the Old Law was to render it easier to do what it prescribed ________________________ QUESTION 108 OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE NEW LAW (In Four Articles) We must now consider those things that are contained in the New Law: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or to forbid any outward works? (2) Whether the New Law makes sufficient provision in prescribing and forbidding external acts? (3) Whether in the matter of internal acts it directs man sufficiently? (4) Whether it fittingly adds counsels to precepts? ________________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 108, Art. 1] Whether the New Law Ought to Prescribe or Prohibit Any External Acts? Objection 1: "The kingdom of God is within you" Obj. 2: yaya Obj. 3: yaya Reply Obj. 1: all external acts that are incompatible with righteousness, peace, and spiritual joy, are in opposition to the kingdom of God; and consequently should be forbidden Reply Obj. 2: the grace of the Holy Ghost is like an interior habit bestowed on us and inclining us to act aright Reply Obj. 3: The New Law, by restraining the mind from inordinate movements, must needs also restrain the hand from inordinate acts, which ensue from inward movements. ________________________ SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 108, Art. 2] Whether the New Law Made Sufficient Ordinations About External Acts? Objection 1: the New Law declared explicitly certain points of faith which were not set forth explicitly in the Old Law; for instance, belief in the Trinity Obj. 2: Further, in the Old Law not only were sacraments instituted, but also certain sacred things, as stated above (Q. 101, A. 4; Q. 102, A. 4). But in the New Law, although certain sacraments are instituted by Our Lord; for instance, pertaining either to the sanctification of a temple or of the vessels, or to the celebration of some particular feast. Therefore the New Law made insufficient ordinations about external matters. Obj. 3: certain observances pertaining to the faithful should also have been instituted in the New Law. Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: in the sacred things no grace is given Reply Obj. 3: Our Lord gave the apostles those precepts not as ceremonial observances, but as moral statutes Obj. 4: in the New Law there are no judicial precepts Reply Obj. 4: Judicial precepts also, are not essential to virtue in respect of any particular determination, but only in regard to the common notion of justice ________________________ THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 108, Art. 3] Whether the New Law Directed Man Sufficiently As Regards Interior Actions? Objection 1: Our Lord partly fulfilled only three of them: as regards, namely, the prohibition of murder, of adultery, and of perjury Obj. 2: Our Lord ordained nothing in the Gospel, except in the matter of divorcing a wife, of punishment by retaliation, and of persecuting one's enemies Obj. 3: Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and judicial, there were ceremonial precepts about which Our Lord made no ordination. Therefore it seems that He ordained insufficiently. Obj. 4: ? Obj. 5: ? Obj. 6: Our Lord unbecomingly forbade judgment Reply Obj. 1: it is better to speak without oaths, unless necessity forces us to have recourse to them. Reply Obj. 2: this precept was given that justice might be safeguarded, not that man might seek revenge Reply Obj. 3: the entire bodily worship which was fixed by the Law, was to be changed into spiritual worship Reply Obj. 4: works of virtue should not be done for human glory Reply Obj. 5: Our Lord forbade, not necessary, but inordinate solicitude Reply Obj. 6: Our Lord did not forbid the judgment of justice, without which holy things could not be withdrawn from the unworthy. But he forbade inordinate judgment ________________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 108, Art. 4] Whether Certain Definite Counsels Are Fittingly Proposed in the New Law? Objection 1: the same things are not expedient for all Obj. 2: ? Obj. 3: it was unfitting that no counsel of obedience should be contained in the Gospel. Obj. 4: ? Reply Obj. 1: The aforesaid counsels, considered in themselves, are expedient to all Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: Even the counsel of obedience is understood to have been given by Our Lord Reply Obj. 4: ? ________________________ TREATISE ON GRACE (QQ. 109-114) ________________________ QUESTION 109 OF THE NECESSITY OF GRACE (In Ten Articles) We must now consider the exterior principle of human acts, i.e. God, in so far as, through grace, we are helped by Him to do right: and, first, we must consider the grace of God; secondly, its cause; thirdly, its effects. The first point of consideration will be threefold: for we shall consider (1) The necessity of grace; (2) grace itself, as to its essence; (3) its division. Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether without grace man can know anything? (2) Whether without God's grace man can do or wish any good? (3) Whether without grace man can love God above all things? (4) Whether without grace man can keep the commandments of the Law? (5) Whether without grace he can merit eternal life? (6) Whether without grace man can prepare himself for grace? (7) Whether without grace he can rise from sin? (8) Whether without grace man can avoid sin? (9) Whether man having received grace can do good and avoid sin without any further Divine help? (10) Whether he can of himself persevere in good? ________________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 1] Whether Without Grace Man Can Know Any Truth? Objection 1: the Holy Ghost dwells in us by grace Obj. 2: the human mind, however perfect, cannot, by reasoning, know any truth without Divine light Obj. 3: scripture Reply Obj. 1: Every truth by whomsoever spoken is from the Holy Ghost as bestowing the natural light Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: We always need God's help for every thought, inasmuch as He moves the understanding to act; for actually to understand anything is to think, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7). ________________________ SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 2] Whether Man Can Wish or Do Any Good Without Grace? Objection 1: man is master of his acts, and especially of his willing Obj. 2: deeds of virtue are according to his nature Obj. 3: The Philosopher Reply Obj. 1: man's free-will is moved by an extrinsic principle, which is above the human mind, to wit by God Reply Obj. 2: it can fall into non-existence, unless it is upheld by God. Reply Obj. 3: human nature is more corrupt by sin in regard to the desire for good, than in regard to the knowledge of truth. ________________________ THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 3] Whether by His Own Natural Powers and Without Grace Man Can Love God Above All Things? Objection 1: man cannot of himself possess charity Obj. 2: to love God above all things is to tend above oneself Obj. 3: without grace man is not capable of giving God the best love Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: When it is said that nature cannot rise above itself, we must not understand this as if it could not be drawn to any object above itself, for it is clear that our intellect by its natural knowledge can know things above itself, as is shown in our natural knowledge of God. But we are to understand that nature cannot rise to an act exceeding the proportion of its strength. Now to love God above all things is not such an act; for it is natural to every creature, as was said above. Reply Obj. 3: the highest degree of love is that whereby charity loves God as the giver of beatitude ________________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 4] Whether Man Without Grace and by His Own Natural Powers Can Fulfil the Commandments of the Law? Objection 1: scripture Obj. 2: Jerome Obj. 3: scripture Reply Obj. 1: Augustine Reply Obj. 2: yaya Reply Obj. 3: Man cannot, with his purely natural endowments, fulfil the precept of the love of God ________________________ FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 5] Whether Man Can Merit Everlasting Life Without Grace? Objection 1: scripture Obj. 2: since man is master of his works, it seems that it is within his power to reach everlasting life. Obj. 3: everlasting life is the last end of human life Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: ? ________________________ SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 109, Art. 6] Whether a Man, by Himself and Without the External Aid of Grace, Can Prepare Himself for Grace? Objection 1: to prepare for grace is nothing more than to turn to God Obj. 2: scripture Obj. 3: infinite regress Obj. 4: scripture Reply Obj. 1: free-will can only be turned to God, when God turns it Reply Obj. 2: Man can do nothing unless moved by God Reply Obj. 3: God is the First Mover Reply Obj. 4: he does not do this without the help of God moving him, and drawing him to Himself ________________________ SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 7] Whether Man Can Rise from Sin Without the Help of Grace? Objection 1: scripture Obj. 2: yaya Obj. 3: sin is an act against nature Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: he requires the light of grace to be poured upon him anew, as if the soul were infused into a dead body for its resurrection. Reply Obj. 3: human nature undone by reason of the act of sin, remains no longer perfect, but corrupted ________________________ EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 8] Whether Man Without Grace Can Avoid Sin? Objection 1: Augustine Obj. 2: If therefore a man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin, correction would seem to be given to no purpose Obj. 3: it is still in his power to choose good or evil Reply Obj. 1: Man can avoid each but not every act of sin, except by grace Reply Obj. 2: out of the sorrow of correction may spring the wish to be regenerate Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Hypognosticon iii [*Among the spurious works of St. Augustine]), this saying is to be understood of man in the state of perfect nature, when as yet he was not a slave of sin ________________________ NINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 9] Whether One Who Has Already Obtained Grace, Can, of Himself and Without Further Help of Grace, Do Good and Avoid Sin? Objection 1: a thing is useless or imperfect, if it does not fulfil what it was given for. Now grace is given to us that we may do good and keep from sin. Hence if with grace man cannot do this, it seems that grace is either useless or imperfect. Obj. 2: scripture Obj. 3: on to infinity Reply Obj. 1: man will need the Divine help even in the state of glory Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: This argument merely proves that man needs no further habitual grace. ________________________ TENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 10] Whether Man Possessed of Grace Needs the Help of Grace in Order to Persevere? Objection 1: ? Obj. 2: perseverance is given to the other infused virtues. Obj. 3: Further, as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:20) more was restored to man by Christ's gift, than he had lost by Adam's sin. But Adam received what enabled him to persevere; and thus man does not need grace in order to persevere. Reply Obj. 1: This objection regards the first mode of perseverance, as the second objection regards the second. Hence the solution of the second objection is clear. Reply Obj. 3: the restoration by Christ's grace, although it is already begun in the mind, is not yet completed in the flesh, as it will be in heaven ________________________ QUESTION 110 OF THE GRACE OF GOD AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE (In Four Articles) We must now consider the grace of God as regards its essence; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether grace implies something in the soul? (2) Whether grace is a quality? (3) Whether grace differs from infused virtue? (4) Of the subject of grace. ________________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 110, Art. 1] Whether Grace Implies Anything in the Soul? Objection 1: when we say that a man has the grace of God, nothing is implied in his soul Obj. 2: nothing can come as a medium between God and the soul Obj. 3: the remission of sin implies nothing in the soul Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: God is the life of the soul after the manner of an efficient cause; but the soul is the life of the body after the manner of a formal cause Reply Obj. 3: Augustine ________________________ SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 110, Art. 2] Whether Grace Is a Quality of the Soul? Objection 1: grace acts upon the soul, by justifying it Obj. 2: Furthermore, substance is nobler than quality. But grace is nobler than the nature of the soul Obj. 3: Furthermore, no quality remains after it has ceased to be in its subject. But grace remains Reply Obj. 1: Grace, as a quality, is said to act upon the soul, not after the manner of an efficient cause, but after the manner of a formal cause Reply Obj. 2: grace is above human nature, it cannot be a substance or a substantial form, but is an accidental form of the soul Reply Obj. 3: As Boethius [*Pseudo-Bede, Sent. Phil. ex Artist.] says, the "being of an accident is to inhere." ________________________ THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 110, Art. 3] Whether Grace Is the Same As Virtue? Objection 1: Augustine Obj. 2: yaya Obj. 3: Further, grace is a quality. Now it is clearly not in the _fourth_ species of quality; viz. _form_ which is the "abiding figure of things," since it does not belong to bodies. Nor is it in the _third,_ since it is not a "passion nor a passion-like quality," which is in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in _Physic._ viii; and grace is principally in the mind. Nor is it in the _second_ species, which is "natural power" or "impotence"; since grace is above nature and does not regard good and evil, as does natural power. Therefore it must be in the _first_ species which is "habit" or "disposition." Now habits of the mind are virtues; since even knowledge itself is a virtue after a manner, as stated above (Q. 57, AA. 1, 2). Therefore grace is the same as virtue. Reply Obj. 1: Augustine calls "faith that worketh by charity" grace, since the act of faith of him that worketh by charity is the first act by which sanctifying grace is manifested. Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: Grace is a certain disposition which is presupposed to the infused virtues, as their principle and root. ________________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 110, Art. 4] Whether Grace Is in the Essence of the Soul As in a Subject, or in One of the Powers? Objection 1: Augustine Obj. 2: Augustine Obj. 3: every soul would be capable of grace Obj. 4: ? Reply Obj. 1: grace is compared to the will as the mover to the moved, which is the same comparison as that of a horseman to the horse--but not as an accident to a subject. And thereby is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection. For grace is the principle of meritorious works through the medium of virtues, as the essence of the soul is the principal of vital deeds through the medium of the powers. Reply Obj. 3: the soul differs specifically in its essence from other souls, viz. of dumb animals, and of plants Reply Obj. 4: ? ________________________ QUESTION 111 OF THE DIVISION OF GRACE (In Five Articles) We must now consider the division of grace; under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether grace is fittingly divided into gratuitous grace and sanctifying grace? (2) Of the division into operating and cooperating grace; (3) Of the division of it into prevenient and subsequent grace; (4) Of the division of gratuitous grace; (5) Of the comparison between sanctifying and gratuitous grace. ________________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 111, Art. 1] Whether Grace Is Fittingly Divided into Sanctifying Grace and Gratuitous Grace? Objection 1: there is no sanctifying grace. Obj. 2: to be gratuitously given is not fittingly set down as a difference of grace, since it is found outside the genus of grace. Obj. 3: scripture Reply Obj. 1: Grace is said to make pleasing, not efficiently but formally Reply Obj. 2: two ways Reply Obj. 3: Sanctifying grace adds to the notion of gratuitous grace something pertaining to the nature of grace, since it makes man pleasing to God. And hence gratuitous grace which does not do this keeps the common name, as happens in many other cases; and thus the two parts of the division are opposed as sanctifying and non-sanctifying grace. ________________________ SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 111, Art. 2] Whether Grace Is Fittingly Divided into Operating and Cooperating Grace? Objection 1: no accident can act upon its subject Obj. 2: Augustine Obj. 3: scripture Obj. 4: to operate and to cooperate are not opposed Reply Obj. 1: Inasmuch as grace is a certain accidental quality, it does not act upon the soul efficiently, but formally, as whiteness makes a surface white. Reply Obj. 2: God does not justify us without ourselves, because whilst we are being justified we consent to God's justification (_justitiae_) by a movement of our free-will Reply Obj. 3: the end being already intended, grace cooperates with us. Reply Obj. 4: Operating and cooperating grace are the same grace ________________________ THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 111, Art. 3] Whether Grace Is Fittingly Divided into Prevenient and Subsequent Grace? Objection 1: God's love is never subsequent Obj. 2: the same thing cannot be before and after Obj. 3: infinite effects Reply Obj. 1: grace signifies a temporal effect Reply Obj. 2: The division into prevenient and subsequent grace does not divide grace in its essence, but only in its effects Reply Obj. 3: Although the effects of grace may be infinite in number, even as human acts are infinite, nevertheless all are reduced to some of a determinate species ________________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 111, Art. 4] Whether Gratuitous Grace Is Rightly Divided by the Apostle? Objection 1: ? Obj. 2: it is not right to place faith amongst the gratuitous graces Reply Obj. 1: not all the benefits divinely conferred upon us are called gratuitous graces Reply Obj. 2: ? Obj. 3: scripture Obj. 4: yaya Reply Obj. 3: The grace of healing is distinguished from the general working of miracles because it has a special reason for inducing one to the faith Reply Obj. 4: ? ________________________ FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 111, Art. 5] Whether Gratuitous Grace Is Nobler Than Sanctifying Grace? Objection 1: gratuitous grace is ordained to the common good of the whole Church Obj. 2: it is a greater power that is able to act upon another, than that which is confined to itself Obj. 3: gratuitous grace is the proper gift of the more exalted members of the Church Reply Obj. 1: sanctifying grace is ordained to the separate common good, which is God Reply Obj. 2: by gratuitous grace a man cannot cause another to have union with God Reply Obj. 3: Feeling is ordained to reason, as to an end ________________________ QUESTION 112 OF THE CAUSE OF GRACE (In Five Articles) We must now consider the cause of grace; and under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether God alone is the efficient cause of grace? (2) Whether any disposition towards grace is needed on the part of the recipient, by an act of free-will? (3) Whether such a disposition can make grace follow of necessity? (4) Whether grace is equal in all? (5) Whether anyone may know that he has grace? ________________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 112, Art. 1] Whether God Alone Is the Cause of Grace? Objection 1: It would seem that God alone is not the cause of grace. For it is written (John 1:17): "Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Now, by the name of Jesus Christ is understood not merely the Divine Nature assuming, but the created nature assumed. Therefore a creature may be the cause of grace. Obj. 2: the sacraments of the New Law cause grace Obj. 3: Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect both lesser angels and men Reply Obj. 1: Christ's humanity does not cause grace by its own power Reply Obj. 2: grace is instrumentally caused by the sacraments, and principally by the power of the Holy Ghost working in the sacraments Reply Obj. 3: Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect angels or men, by instruction ________________________ SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 112, Art. 2] Whether Any Preparation and Disposition for Grace Is Required on Man's Part? Objection 1: scripture Obj. 2: as is clear in the case of Paul, who received grace Obj. 3: an agent of infinite power needs no disposition in matter Reply Obj. 1: A certain preparation of man for grace is simultaneous with the infusion of grace Reply Obj. 2: it is of no account whether anyone arrive at perfect preparation instantaneously, or step by step Reply Obj. 3: ? ________________________ THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 112, Art. 3] Whether Grace Is Necessarily Given to Whoever Prepares Himself for It, or to Whoever Does What He Can? Objection 1: Hence he receives grace of necessity. Obj. 2: the reason why God does not bestow grace on the devil, is that he did not wish, nor was he prepared, to receive it Obj. 3: yaya Reply Obj. 1: yaya Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: Even in natural things, the form does not necessarily ensue the disposition of the matter ________________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 112, Art. 4] Whether Grace Is Greater in One Than in Another? Objection 1: scripture Obj. 2: grace is the greatest possible, since it joins us with our last end Obj. 3: grace is the soul's life Reply Obj. 1: God by His care provides greater gifts to some, and lesser gifts for others. Reply Obj. 2: there may be diversity of intensity and remissness Reply Obj. 3: man partakes of the life of grace accidentally ________________________ FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 112, Art. 5] Whether Man Can Know That He Has Grace? Objection 1: Augustine Obj. 2: yaya Obj. 3: sin, which is spiritual darkness, may be known with certainty by one that is in sin Obj. 4: the man who receives grace by the Holy Spirit, by the same Holy Spirit knows the grace given to him. Obj. 5: scripture Reply Obj. 1: Those things which are in the soul by their physical reality, are known through experimental knowledge Reply Obj. 2: It is an essential condition of knowledge that a man should have certitude of the objects of knowledge Reply Obj. 3: the object or end of grace is unknown to us Reply Obj. 4: we do not know for certain that we have grace to enable us to merit them Reply Obj. 5: What was said to Abraham may refer to experimental knowledge ________________________ QUESTION 113 OF THE EFFECTS OF GRACE (In Ten Articles) We have now to consider the effect of grace; (1) the justification of the ungodly, which is the effect of operating grace; and (2) merit, which is the effect of cooperating grace. Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) What is the justification of the ungodly? (2) Whether grace is required for it? (3) Whether any movement of the free-will is required? (4) Whether a movement of faith is required? (5) Whether a movement of the free-will against sin is required? (6) Whether the remission of sins is to be reckoned with the foregoing? (7) Whether the justification of the ungodly is a work of time or is sudden? (8) Of the natural order of the things concurring to justification; (9) Whether the justification of the ungodly is God's greatest work? (10) Whether the justification of the ungodly is miraculous? ________________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 1] Whether the Justification of the Ungodly Is the Remission of Sins? Objection 1: not even remission of sin is justification Obj. 2: remission of sins ought to be named after faith or charity rather than justice. Obj. 3: one is called before being justified Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: justice implies a general rectitude of order Reply Obj. 3: this motion of God is not the remission of sins, but its cause. ________________________ SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 2] Whether the Infusion of Grace Is Required for the Remission of Guilt, i.e., for the Justification of the Ungodly? Objection 1: there is the middle state of innocence wherein a man has neither grace nor guilt Obj. 2: scripture Obj. 3: whoever is subject to the sin of wastefulness is not simultaneously subject to the sin of miserliness Reply Obj. 1: God's goodwill is said to be restored to man by the gift of grace Reply Obj. 2: it proceeds from the Divine love, that sin is not imputed to a man by God. Reply Obj. 3: the act of sin passes, but the guilt remains ________________________ THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 3] Whether for the Justification of the Ungodly Is Required a Movement of the Free-will? Objection 1: by the sacrament of Baptism, infants and sometimes adults are justified without a movement of their free-will Obj. 2: Solomon received from God the gift of wisdom when asleep Obj. 3: grace is preserved in man without a movement of his free-will Reply Obj. 1: it is by the mere infusion of their souls that God moves them to justice Reply Obj. 2: yaya Reply Obj. 3: the conservation of grace is without transmutation ________________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 4] Whether a Movement of Faith Is Required for the Justification of the Ungodly? Objection 1: the movement of faith is no more required for the justification of the ungodly, than the movements of the aforesaid virtues. Obj. 2: a man may know God in other ways Reply Obj. 1: The movement of faith is not perfect unless it is quickened by charity Reply Obj. 2: the gift of wisdom presupposes the knowledge of faith Obj. 3: there are several articles of faith Reply Obj. 3: an act of faith is required in order that a man may believe that God justifies man through the mystery of Christ. ________________________ FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 5] Whether for the Justification of the Ungodly There Is Required a Movement of the Free-will Towards Sin? Objection 1: charity alone suffices to take away sin Obj. 2: yaya Obj. 3: a man could not obtain the forgiveness of such sins as he had forgotten Reply Obj. 1: it belongs to charity to love God, so likewise, to detest sin whereby the soul is separated from God. Reply Obj. 2: he ought to recall them to mind, in order to detest them Reply Obj. 3: he would be sorry even for those he does not remember, if they were present to his memory ________________________ SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 6] Whether the Remission of Sins Ought to Be Reckoned Amongst the Things Required for Justification? Objection 1: ? Obj. 2: ? Obj. 3: yaya Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: two ways Reply Obj. 3: yaya ________________________ SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 7] Whether the Justification of the Ungodly Takes Place in an Instant or Successively? Objection 1: deliberation implies a certain reasoning process, and this implies succession Obj. 2: it is impossible to understand many things actually and at once Obj. 3: grace may be greater or less Obj. 4: grace is first infused, and then the free-will is moved towards God and to detest sin Obj. 5: they must be two successive instants; between which there must be time Reply Obj. 1: The movement of the free-will, which concurs in the justification of the ungodly, is a consent to detest sin, and to draw near to God; and this consent takes place suddenly Reply Obj. 2: in the same manner can the free-will be moved to two things at once in so far as one is ordained to the other Reply Obj. 3: The reason why a form is not received instantaneously in the matter is not the fact that it can inhere more or less; But the reason is to be sought on the part of the disposition of the matter or subject Reply Obj. 4: The same instant the form is acquired, the thing begins to operate with the form Reply Obj. 5: the human mind, which is justified, is, in itself, above time, but is subject to time accidentally, inasmuch as it understands with continuity and time ________________________ EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 8] Whether the Infusion of Grace Is Naturally the First of the Things Required for the Justification of the Ungodly? Objection 1: the remission of sin is naturally before the infusion of grace. Obj. 2: the disposition naturally precedes the form to which it disposes Obj. 3: sin hinders the soul from tending freely to God Reply Obj. 1: Both Reply Obj. 2: The disposition of the subject precedes the reception of the form, in the order of nature; yet it follows the action of the agent, whereby the subject is disposed. Reply Obj. 3: Aristotle ________________________ NINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 9] Whether the Justification of the Ungodly Is God's Greatest Work? Objection 1: the glorification of angels and men is a greater work than the justification of the ungodly. Obj. 2: the creation of heaven and earth is a greater work than the justification of the ungodly. Obj. 3: in the work of creation something is made from nothing Reply Obj. 2: the good of grace in one is greater than the good of nature in the whole universe. Reply Obj. 3: This objection rests on the manner of acting, in which way creation is God's greatest work. ________________________ TENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 10] Whether the Justification of the Ungodly Is a Miraculous Work? Objection 1: Augustine Obj. 2: when God works in natural things against their inclination of their nature, it is a miraculous work Obj. 3: it is miraculous that anyone should suddenly obtain wisdom from God without study Reply Obj. 1: Certain miraculous works, although they are less than the justification of the ungodly, as regards the good caused, are beyond the wonted order of such effects Reply Obj. 2: no other cause save God can justify the ungodly, even as nothing save fire can heat water. Hence the justification of the ungodly by God is not miraculous in this respect. Reply Obj. 3: a man does not naturally acquire justifying grace by his own action, but by God's. ________________________ QUESTION 114 OF MERIT (In Ten Articles) We must now consider merit, which is the effect of cooperating grace; and under this head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether a man can merit anything from God? (2) Whether without grace anyone can merit eternal life? (3) Whether anyone with grace may merit eternal life condignly? (4) Whether it is chiefly through the instrumentality of charity that grace is the principle of merit? (5) Whether a man may merit the first grace for himself? (6) Whether he may merit it for someone else? (7) Whether anyone can merit restoration after sin? (8) Whether he can merit for himself an increase of grace or charity? (9) Whether he can merit final perseverance? (10) Whether temporal goods fall under merit? ________________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 1] Whether a Man May Merit Anything from God? Objection 1: we cannot make sufficient return to God, since yet more is His due Obj. 2: by acting well, a man profits himself or another man, but not God Obj. 3: God is no one's debtor Reply Obj. 1: Man merits, inasmuch as he does what he ought, by his free-will Reply Obj. 2: we merit from God, not that by our works anything accrues to Him, but inasmuch as we work for His glory. Reply Obj. 3: it does not follow that God is made our debtor simply, but His own, inasmuch as it is right that His will should be carried out. ________________________ SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 2] Whether Anyone Without Grace Can Merit Eternal Life? Objection 1: man by his natural endowments and without grace can merit beatitude Obj. 2: yaya Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 1: God ordained human nature to attain the end of eternal life, not by its own strength, but by the help of grace Reply Obj. 2: the more perfect the principle, the more perfect the action Reply Obj. 3: a man can merit nothing from God except by His gift ________________________ THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 3] Whether a Man in Grace Can Merit Eternal Life Condignly? Objection 1: scripture Obj. 2: God leads us to life everlasting of His own mercy and not by our merits Obj. 3: no act of the present life can equal everlasting life Reply Obj. 1: yaya Reply Obj. 2: our merit is a subsequent cause. Reply Obj. 3: by grace of the Holy Ghost dwells in man; and He is a sufficient cause of life everlasting ________________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 4] Whether Grace Is the Principle of Merit Through Charity Rather Than the Other Virtues? Objection 1: every virtue is equally a principle of merit. Obj. 2: charity lessens rather than increases the labor Obj. 3: the acts of faith and patience or fortitude would seem to be the most meritorious Reply Obj. 1: Charity, inasmuch as it has the last end for object, moves the other virtues to act Reply Obj. 2: the greatness of the work pertains to the increase of merit Reply Obj. 3: The act of faith is not meritorious unless "faith . . . worketh by charity" ________________________ FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 5] Whether a Man May Merit for Himself the First Grace? Objection 1: ? Obj. 2: God gives grace only to the worthy Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 1: Augustine Reply Obj. 2: by His grace He makes them worthy Reply Obj. 3: Man's every good work proceeds from the first grace ________________________ SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 6] Whether a Man Can Merit the First Grace for Another? Objection 1: a man can merit the first grace for another. Obj. 2: scripture Obj. 3: scripture Reply Obj. 1: yaya Reply Obj. 2: condign merit rests on justice Reply Obj. 3: by these good works of mercy, exercised towards the poor, we merit ________________________ SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 7] Whether a Man May Merit Restoration After a Fall? Objection 1: Augustine Obj. 2: ? Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 1: The desire whereby we seek for restoration after a fall is called just, and likewise the prayer whereby this restoration is besought is called just, because it tends to justice; and not that it depends on justice by way of merit, but only on mercy. Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: by subsequent sin, there arises an impediment to the preceding merit ________________________ EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 8] Whether a Man May Merit the Increase of Grace or Charity? Objection 1: when anyone receives the reward he merited no other reward is due to him Obj. 2: ? Obj. 3: scripture Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: just as eternal life is not given at once, but in its own time, so neither is grace increased at once, but in its own time ________________________ NINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 9] Whether a Man May Merit Perseverance? Objection 1: men obtain perseverance by asking it of God Obj. 2: Much more, therefore, may we merit not to sin, i.e. to persevere. Obj. 3: Much more, therefore, may he merit perseverance in the grace he has already. Reply Obj. 1: it does not fall under merit. Reply Obj. 2: ? ________________________ TENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 10] Whether Temporal Goods Fall Under Merit? Objection 1: temporal goods were promised in the Old Law as the reward of justice Obj. 2: God sometimes bestows temporal goods on men for services done for Him Obj. 3: yaya Reply Obj. 1: Augustine Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: to the just who are aided by these evils they are not punishments but medicines FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 1] Whether the Object of Faith Is the First Truth? Objection 1: the object of faith is not only the First Truth. Obj. 2: the object of faith is not only the First Truth, but also created truth. Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 1: Things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under faith, in so far as by them we are directed to God Reply Obj. 3: Charity also loves our neighbor on account of God, so that its object, properly speaking, is God _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 2] Whether the Object of Faith Is Something Complex, by Way of a Proposition? Objection 1: the object of faith is the First Truth. Now the First Truth is something simple Obj. 2: the object of faith is not a proposition but a thing. Obj. 3: the object of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is the Divine Essence Reply Obj. 1: yaya Reply Obj. 2: the act of the believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing Reply Obj. 3: that vision will not be by way of a proposition but by way of a simple understanding _______________________ THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 3] Whether Anything False Can Come Under Faith? Objection 1: many hope to have eternal life, who will not obtain it Obj. 2: ? Obj. 3: ? Obj. 4: it might happen that the bread was not rightly consecrated Reply Obj. 1: a man hopes to obtain eternal life, not by his own power (since this would be an act of presumption), but with the help of grace Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: yaya Reply Obj. 4: The faith of the believer is not directed to such and such accidents of bread, but to the fact that the true body of Christ is under the appearances of sensible bread _______________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 4] Whether the Object of Faith Can Be Something Seen? Objection 1: scripture Obj. 2: what is believed is seen. Obj. 3: ? Obj. 4: Augustine Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: two ways Reply Obj. 3: The light of faith makes us see what we believe Reply Obj. 4: ? _______________________ FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 5] Whether Those Things That Are of Faith Can Be an Object of Science [*Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration]? Objection 1: ? Obj. 2: science is acquired by reasons Obj. 3: certain matters of faith have been demonstrated by the philosophers, such as the Existence and Unity of God Obj. 4: opinion is further from science than faith is Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: The reasons employed by holy men to prove things that are of faith, are not demonstrations Reply Obj. 3: those who do not known them by demonstration must know them first of all by faith. Reply Obj. 4: ? _______________________ SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 6] Whether Those Things That Are of Faith Should Be Divided into Certain Articles? Objection 1: yaya Reply Obj. 1: Some things are proposed to our belief are in themselves of faith, while others are of faith, not in themselves but only in relation to others Obj. 2: material differences can be multiplied indefinitely, and therefore art should take no notice of them Obj. 3: "no man believes against his will." Reply Obj. 2: two ways Reply Obj. 3: faith is exacted of no man by a necessity of coercion, since belief is a voluntary act, yet it is exacted of him by a necessity of end _______________________ SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 7] Whether the Articles of Faith Have Increased in Course of Time? Objection 1: at all times, the same things are to be believed. Obj. 2: knowledge of matters of faith was perfect from the beginning Obj. 3: nature always makes a beginning with perfect things Obj. 4: the apostles were most fully instructed about the mysteries Reply Obj. 1: those who were nigh to Christ's advent had a more distinct knowledge of the good things to be hoped for. Reply Obj. 2: two ways Reply Obj. 3: in the order of the material cause, the imperfect comes first Reply Obj. 4: the perfection of manhood comes in youth _______________________ EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 8] Whether the Articles of Faith Are Suitably Formulated? Objection 1: it can be known by demonstration that there is one God Obj. 2: among the articles of faith, mention should have been made of God's wisdom and providence Obj. 3: yaya Obj. 4: yaya Obj. 5: the articles of faith should contain some work appropriated to the Son in respect of His Godhead. Obj. 6: yaya Reply Obj. 1: By faith we hold many truths about God, which the philosophers were unable to discover by natural reason, for instance His providence and omnipotence, and that He alone is to be worshiped, all of which are contained in the one article of the unity of God. Reply Obj. 2: in beings having an intellect, power does not work save by the will and knowledge Reply Obj. 3: knowledge of the Father does indeed, in a way, include knowledge of the Son, for He would not be Father, had He not a Son; the bond whereof being the Holy Ghost Reply Obj. 4: there are more articles about the Persons of the Son and Holy Ghost than about the Person of the Father, Who is never sent Reply Obj. 5: The sanctification of a creature by grace, and its consummation by glory, is also effected by the gift of charity, which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, and by the gift of wisdom, which is appropriated to the Son: so that each work belongs by appropriation, but under different aspects, both to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. Reply Obj. 6: Two things _______________________ NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 9] Whether It Is Suitable for the Articles of Faith to Be Embodied in a Symbol? Objection 1: ? Obj. 2: there is but "one faith." Obj. 3: ? Obj. 4: the descent into hell is one of the articles of faith Obj. 5: the Catholic Church is merely a created being Obj. 6: ? Reply Obj. 1: in order to gather the truth of faith from Holy Writ, one needs long study and practice, which are unattainable by all those who require to know the truth of faith, many of whom have no time for study, being busy with other affairs Reply Obj. 2: It was this that gave rise to the necessity of formulating several symbols, which nowise differ from one another, save that on account of the obstinacy of heretics, one contains more explicitly what another contains implicitly. Reply Obj. 3: the faith of the Church is living faith Reply Obj. 4: No error about the descent into hell had arisen among heretics Reply Obj. 5: the Holy Ghost, Who sanctifies the Church Reply Obj. 6: the symbol of the Fathers is an explanation of the symbol of the Apostles _______________________ TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 10] Whether It Belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff to Draw Up a Symbol of Faith? Objection 1: this reason ceased with the advent of the New Law, there is no need for the articles of faith to be more and more explicit Obj. 2: it was forbidden under pain of anathema by the universal Church, to make a new edition of the symbol Obj. 3: Athanasius was not the Sovereign Pontiff Reply Obj. 1: it was necessary as time went on to express the faith more explicitly against the errors which arose. Reply Obj. 2: This prohibition and sentence of the council was intended for private individuals Reply Obj. 3: it was accepted by the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff _______________________ QUESTION 2 OF THE ACT OF FAITH (In Ten Articles) We must now consider the act of faith, and (1) the internal act; (2) the external act. Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) What is "to believe," which is the internal act of faith? (2) In how many ways is it expressed? (3) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in anything above natural reason? (4) Whether it is necessary to believe those things that are attainable by natural reason? (5) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe certain things explicitly? (6) Whether all are equally bound to explicit faith? (7) Whether explicit faith in Christ is always necessary for salvation? (8) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity explicitly? (9) Whether the act of faith is meritorious? (10) Whether human reason diminishes the merit of faith? _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 1] Whether to Believe Is to Think with Assent? Objection 1: thinking has no place in the act of faith. Obj. 2: to think is an act of the cogitative power, which belongs to the sensitive faculty Obj. 3: to believe is an act of the intellect, since its object is truth. But assent seems to be an act not of the intellect, but of the will Reply Obj. 1: Faith has not that research of natural reason which demonstrates what is believed, but a research into those things whereby a man is induced to believe Reply Obj. 2: "To think" is not taken here for the act of the cogitative power, but for an act of the intellect Reply Obj. 3: assent is taken here for an act of the intellect as determined to one object by the will. _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 2] Whether the Act of Faith Is Suitably Distinguished As Believing God, Believing in a God and Believing in God? Objection 1: faith is one habit since it is one virtue Obj. 2: yaya Obj. 3: unbelievers can be said to believe in a God Obj. 4: movement towards the end belongs to the will, whose object is the good and the end. Now to believe is an act, not of the will, but of the intellect Reply Obj. 1: yaya Reply Obj. 3: "to know simple things defectively is not to know them at all." Reply Obj. 4: the will moves the intellect and the other powers of the soul to the end _______________________ THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 3] Whether It Is Necessary for Salvation to Believe Anything Above the Natural Reason? Objection 1: the salvation and perfection of a thing seem to be sufficiently insured by its natural endowments Obj. 2: it is dangerous for man to assent to matters Obj. 3: those things which are clearly seen by the understanding are not an object of belief Reply Obj. 1: man's nature is dependent on a higher nature Reply Obj. 2: by the light of faith which God bestows on him, a man assents to matters of faith Reply Obj. 3: In many respects faith perceives the invisible things of God in a higher way than natural reason does _______________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 4] Whether It Is Necessary to Believe Those Things Which Can Be Proved by Natural Reason? Objection 1: it would be superfluous to receive by faith, things that can be known by natural reason. Obj. 2: science and faith are not about the same object Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 1: The researches of natural reason do not suffice mankind for the knowledge of Divine matters Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: they do not all alike lead man to beatitude _______________________ FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 5] Whether Man Is Bound to Believe Anything Explicitly? Objection 1: it is not in man's power to believe a thing explicitly Obj. 2: it is enough if he be ready to believe whatever God proposes to be believed. Obj. 3: similar to O2 Reply Obj. 1: If we understand those things alone to be in a man's power, which we can do without the help of grace, then we are bound to do many things which we cannot do without the aid of healing grace, such as to love God and our neighbor Reply Obj. 2: yaya Reply Obj. 3: ? _______________________ SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 6] Whether All Are Equally Bound to Have Explicit Faith? Objection 1: all are bound to those things which are necessary for salvation Obj. 2: simple persons are sometimes tested in reference to the slightest articles of faith Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 1: The unfolding of the articles of faith is not equally necessary for the salvation of all, since those of higher degree, whose duty it is to teach others, are bound to believe explicitly more things than others are. Reply Obj. 2: Simple persons should not be put to the test about subtle questions of faith, unless they be suspected of having been corrupted by heretics Reply Obj. 3: ? _______________________ SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 7] Whether It Is Necessary for the Salvation of All, That They Should Believe Explicitly in the Mystery of Christ? Objection 1: even the angels were in ignorance of the mystery of the Incarnation Obj. 2: John the Baptist does not appear to have known the mystery of Christ explicitly Obj. 3: many gentiles obtained salvation through the ministry of the angels Reply Obj. 1: yaya Reply Obj. 2: it is not to be believed that he was ignorant of Christ's future Passion Reply Obj. 3: ? _______________________ EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 8] Whether It Is Necessary for Salvation to Believe Explicitly in the Trinity? Objection 1: one can believe this without believing in the Trinity Obj. 2: before the coming of Christ it was not known that Paternity and Filiation were in the Godhead Obj. 3: the object of heavenly happiness is the sovereign good, which can be understood to be in God, without any distinction of Persons Reply Obj. 1: Explicit faith in those two things was necessary at all times and for all people: but it was not sufficient at all times and for all people. Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: the mission of the Divine Persons brings us to heavenly happiness. _______________________ NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 9] Whether to Believe Is Meritorious? Objection 1: the principle of all merit is charity, as stated above (I-II, Q. 114, A. 4). Now faith, like nature, is a preamble to charity Obj. 2: the considerations of science are not meritorious, nor on the other hand is opinion Obj. 3: If he has a sufficient motive for his belief, this does not seem to imply any merit Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: scientific consideration may be meritorious if it be referred to the end of charity Reply Obj. 3: ? _______________________ TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 10] Whether Reasons in Support of What We Believe Lessen the Merit of Faith? Objection 1: If, therefore, human reason provides sufficient proof, the merit of faith is altogether taken away Obj. 2: human reasoning seems to diminish the measure of the virtue of faith, since it is essential to faith to be about the unseen Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 1: when a man has the will to believe what is of faith on the authority of God alone, although he may have reasons in demonstration of some of them, e.g. of the existence of God, the merit of his faith is not, for that reason, lost or diminished. Reply Obj. 2: The reasons which are brought forward in support of the authority of faith, are not demonstrations which can bring intellectual vision to the human intellect, wherefore they do not cease to be unseen. But they remove obstacles to faith, by showing that what faith proposes is not impossible Reply Obj. 3: Whatever is in opposition to faith, whether it consist in a man's thoughts, or in outward persecution, increases the merit of faith, in so far as the will is shown to be more prompt and firm in believing _______________________ QUESTION 3 OF THE OUTWARD ACT OF FAITH (In Two Articles) We must now consider the outward act, viz. the confession of faith: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether confession is an act of faith? (2) Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation? _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 3, Art. 1] Whether Confession Is an Act of Faith? Objection 1: Now confession belongs to penance of which it is a part. Therefore it is not an act of faith. Obj. 2: it seems that confession is not an act of faith, but rather of fortitude or constancy. Obj. 3: other external works are not reckoned acts of faith. Therefore neither is confession an act of faith. Reply Obj. 1: threefold Reply Obj. 2: That which removes an obstacle is not a direct, but an indirect, cause Reply Obj. 3: ? _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 3, Art. 2] Whether Confession of Faith Is Necessary for Salvation? Objection 1: the proper end of faith is the union of the human mind with Divine truth, and this can be realized without any outward confession Obj. 2: it seems that the simple folk are not bound to confess the faith. Obj. 3: confession of faith sometimes causes a disturbance among unbelievers Reply Obj. 1: when God's honor and our neighbor's good demand, man should not be contented with being united by faith to God's truth, but ought to confess his faith outwardly. Reply Obj. 2: Both Reply Obj. 3: Both _______________________ QUESTION 4 OF THE VIRTUE ITSELF OF FAITH (In Eight Articles) We must now consider the virtue itself of faith, and, in the first place, faith itself; secondly, those who have faith; thirdly, the cause of faith; fourthly, its effects. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) What is faith? (2) In what power of the soul does it reside? (3) Whether its form is charity? (4) Whether living (_formata_) faith and lifeless (_informis_) faith are one identically? (5) Whether faith is a virtue? (6) Whether it is one virtue? (7) Of its relation to the other virtues; (8) Of its certitude as compared with the certitude of the intellectual virtues. _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 1] Whether This Is a Fitting Definition of Faith: "Faith Is the Substance of Things to Be Hoped For, the Evidence of Things That Appear Not?" Objection 1: no quality is a substance: whereas faith is a quality, since it is a theological virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 3). Therefore it is not a substance. Obj. 2: different virtues have different objects Obj. 3: faith is perfected by charity rather than by hope Obj. 4: "substance" and "evidence" are different genera Obj. 5: it seems to imply a contradiction to speak of "evidence of things that appear not" Reply Obj. 1: the first thing in a genus contains the others virtually Reply Obj. 2: Since faith pertains to the intellect as commanded by the will, it must needs be directed, as to its end, to the objects of those virtues which perfect the will, among which is hope Reply Obj. 3: hope is always of the absent and the unseen. Reply Obj. 4: yaya Reply Obj. 5: evidence taken from Divine authority does not make a thing apparent in itself _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 2] Whether Faith Resides in the Intellect? Objection 1: "faith resides in the believer's will." Obj. 2: the assent of faith to believe anything, proceeds from the will obeying God Obj. 3: the intellect is either speculative or practical. Now faith is not in the speculative intellect, since this is not concerned with things to be sought or avoided, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 9, so that it is not a principle of operation, whereas "faith . . . worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6). Likewise, neither is it in the practical intellect Reply Obj. 1: yaya Reply Obj. 2: there needs to be a habit of virtue not only in the commanding will but also in the assenting intellect. Reply Obj. 3: Faith resides in the speculative intellect _______________________ THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 3] Whether Charity Is the Form of Faith? Objection 1: faith and charity are stated to be opposite members of a division Obj. 2: faith is in the intellect, while charity is in the will Obj. 3: obedience rather than charity, is the form of faith. Reply Obj. 1: Charity is called the form of faith because it quickens the act of faith Reply Obj. 2: similar to R1 Reply Obj. 3: Even obedience, and hope likewise, and whatever other virtue might precede the act of faith, is quickened by charity _______________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 4] Whether Lifeless Faith Can Become Living, or Living Faith, Lifeless? Objection 1: when living faith comes, lifeless faith is done away Obj. 2: a dead thing does not become a living thing Obj. 3: by coming to an unbeliever it causes the habit of faith Obj. 4: as Boethius says (In Categ. Arist. i), "accidents cannot be altered." Now faith is an accident Reply Obj. 1: lifelessness is not essential to faith, but is accidental Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: grace is not less effective when it comes to a believer Reply Obj. 4: When living faith becomes lifeless, faith is not changed, but its subject, the soul, which at one time has faith without charity, and at another time, with charity. _______________________ FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 5] Whether Faith Is a Virtue? Objection 1: faith is directed to the true Obj. 2: Further, infused virtue is more perfect than acquired virtue. Now faith, on account of its imperfection, is not placed among the acquired intellectual virtues, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3). Much less, therefore, can it be considered an infused virtue. Obj. 3: lifeless faith is not a virtue Obj. 4: faith is numbered among the gratuitous graces Reply Obj. 1: The truth is itself the good of the intellect, since it is its perfection Reply Obj. 2: the faith of which we are speaking is based on the Divine Truth, which is infallible, and consequently its object cannot be anything false; so that faith of this kind can be a virtue. Reply Obj. 3: Living and lifeless faith do not differ specifically, as though they belonged to different species. But they differ as perfect and imperfect within the same species Reply Obj. 4: ? _______________________ SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 6] Whether Faith Is One Virtue? Objection 1: wisdom is about eternal things, and knowledge about temporal things Obj. 2: confession of faith is not one and the same for all Obj. 3: similar to O2 Reply Obj. 1: Temporal matters which are proposed to be believed, do not belong to the object of faith, except in relation to something eternal Reply Obj. 2: yaya Reply Obj. 3: yaya _______________________ SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 7] Whether Faith Is the First of the Virtues? Objection 1: fortitude is the foundation of faith Obj. 2: hope is a virtue Obj. 3: similar to O2 Obj. 4: charity is the foundation yet more than faith is (for the foundation is the first part of a building) and consequently it seems to precede faith. Obj. 5: similar to O4 Reply Obj. 2: hope does not tend to the impossible Reply Obj. 3: twofold Reply Obj. 4: faith without charity cannot be the foundation Reply Obj. 5: the will cannot tend to God with perfect love, unless the intellect possesses right faith about Him. _______________________ EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 8] Whether Faith Is More Certain Than Science and the Other Intellectual Virtues? Objection 1: the believer may sometimes suffer a movement of doubt Obj. 2: yaya Obj. 3: understanding is more perfect than faith Reply Obj. 1: we do not fully grasp matters of faith with our intellect. Reply Obj. 2: yaya Reply Obj. 3: The gifts of understanding and knowledge are more perfect than the knowledge of faith in the point of their greater clearness _______________________ QUESTION 5 OF THOSE WHO HAVE FAITH (In Four Articles) We must now consider those who have faith: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their original state? (2) Whether the demons have faith? (3) Whether those heretics who err in one article, have faith in others? (4) Whether among those who have faith, one has it more than another? _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 1] Whether There Was Faith in the Angels, or in Man, in Their Original State? Objection 1: the first man, while in the state of innocence, seemingly had his eyes open to contemplation Obj. 2: in their original state there was not obscurity either in the angels or in man, because it is a punishment of sin Obj. 3: scripture Reply Obj. 1: their contemplation was of a higher order than ours Reply Obj. 2: every creature is darkness in comparison with the immensity of the Divine light Reply Obj. 3: In the original state there was no hearing anything from man speaking outwardly, but there was from God inspiring inwardly _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 2] Whether in the Demons There Is Faith? Objection 1: Since then no deliberate will of the demons is good, as stated above (I, Q. 64, A. 2, ad 5), it seems that in the demons there is no faith. Obj. 2: the demons lost their gifts of grace by sinning Obj. 3: if the demons have faith, some men would be guilty of a sin graver than that of the demons, which seems unreasonable. Therefore in the demons there is no faith. Reply Obj. 1: The demons are, in a way, compelled to believe, by the evidence of signs Reply Obj. 2: similar to R1 Reply Obj. 3: The very fact that the signs of faith are so evident, that the demons are compelled to believe, is displeasing to them, so that their malice is by no means diminished by their belief. _______________________ THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 3] Whether a Man Who Disbelieves One Article of Faith, Can Have Lifeless Faith in the Other Articles? Objection 1: it seems that heretics cannot believe any articles of faith without the gift of lifeless faith. Obj. 2: a man may possess the science of geometry as to some geometrical conclusions, and yet be ignorant of other conclusions Obj. 3: a man can obey some commandments, and disobey others Reply Obj. 1: A heretic does not hold the other articles of faith, about which he does not err, in the same way as one of the faithful does Reply Obj. 2: whoever abandons this mean is altogether lacking in faith. Reply Obj. 3: their primary motive, which is perfect obedience to God, in which a man fails whenever he breaks one commandment _______________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 4] Whether Faith Can Be Greater in One Man Than in Another? Objection 1: by failing in one point, a man loses his faith altogether Obj. 2: faith consists in something supreme Obj. 3: the understanding of principles is possessed in equal degree by all men Reply Obj. 1: he is prepared to believe all, has that habit Reply Obj. 2: some submit to it with greater certitude and devotion than others Reply Obj. 3: faith results from the gift of grace, which is not equally in all _______________________ QUESTION 6 OF THE CAUSE OF FAITH (In Two Articles) We must now consider the cause of faith, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether faith is infused into man by God? (2) Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God? _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 6, Art. 1] Whether Faith Is Infused into Man by God? Objection 1: Augustine Obj. 2: scripture Obj. 3: Augustine Reply Obj. 1: both Reply Obj. 2: both Reply Obj. 3: man's will needs to be prepared by God with grace _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 6, Art. 2] Whether Lifeless Faith Is a Gift of God? Objection 1: ? Obj. 2: yaya Obj. 3: yaya Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: acts that are good generically, though not quickened by charity, as is frequently the case in sinners, are from God. Reply Obj. 3: sometimes it is granted by God to a man to believe, and yet he is not granted the gift of charity _______________________ QUESTION 7 OF THE EFFECTS OF FAITH (In Two Articles) We must now consider the effects of faith: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether fear is an effect of faith? (2) Whether the heart is purified by faith? _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 7, Art. 1] Whether Fear Is an Effect of Faith? Objection 1: scripture Obj. 2: Now fear and hope are contraries, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2): and faith begets hope Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 1: Fear of God cannot altogether precede faith Reply Obj. 2: faith begets hope, in so far as it enables us to appreciate the prize which God awards to the just, while it is the cause of fear, in so far as it makes us appreciate the punishments which He intends to inflict on sinners. Reply Obj. 3: ? _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 7, Art. 2] Whether Faith Has the Effect of Purifying the Heart? Objection 1: faith is in the intellect Obj. 2: faith is compatible with the impurity of sin Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: The obscurity of faith does not pertain to the impurity of sin, but rather to the natural defect of the human intellect _______________________ QUESTION 8 OF THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING (In Eight Articles) We must now consider the gifts of understanding and knowledge, which respond to the virtue of faith. With regard to the gift of understanding there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Ghost? (2) Whether it can be together with faith in the same person? (3) Whether the understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is only speculative, or practical also? (4) Whether all who are in a state of grace have the gift of understanding? (5) Whether this gift is to be found in those who are without grace? (6) Of the relationship of the gift of understanding to the other gifts. (7) Which of the beatitudes corresponds to this gift? (8) Which of the fruits? _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 1] Whether Understanding Is a Gift of the Holy Ghost? Objection 1: understanding is a natural habit of the soul Obj. 2: Dionysius Obj. 3: no gift of the Holy Ghost is called after the will Reply Obj. 1: man needs to reach to certain higher truths, for which he requires the gift of understanding. Reply Obj. 2: The discourse of reason always begins from an understanding and ends at an understanding Reply Obj. 3: ? _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 2] Whether the Gift of Understanding Is Compatible with Faith? Objection 1: the thing which is believed is not comprehended Obj. 2: faith is of things that appear not Obj. 3: yaya _______________________ THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 3] Whether the Gift of Understanding Is Merely Speculative or Also Practical? Objection 1: the practical intellect is occupied, not with exalted, but with inferior things Obj. 2: Aristotle Obj. 3: the gift of understanding enlightens the mind in matters which surpass natural reason Reply Obj. 1: The things with which human actions are concerned are not surpassingly exalted considered in themselves, but, as referred to the rule of the eternal law, and to the end of Divine happiness, they are exalted so that they can be the matter of understanding. Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: the knowledge of human actions, as ruled by the eternal law, surpasses the natural reason _______________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 4] Whether the Gift of Understanding Is in All Who Are in a State of Grace? Objection 1: many who are in a state of grace suffer from dulness of mind Obj. 2: the gift of understanding is not in everyone that has faith Obj. 3: the grace of understanding and of the other gifts sometimes withdraws itself Reply Obj. 1: with regard to those that are necessary for salvation, they are sufficiently instructed by the Holy Ghost Reply Obj. 2: Although not all who have faith understand fully the things that are proposed to be believed, yet they understand that they ought to believe them, and that they ought nowise to deviate from them. Reply Obj. 3: With regard to things necessary for salvation, the gift of understanding never withdraws _______________________ FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 5] Whether the Gift of Understanding Is Found Also in Those Who Have Not Sanctifying Grace? Objection 1: Augustine Obj. 2: there can be prophecy without sanctifying grace Obj. 3: the gift of understanding responds to the virtue of faith Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: The understanding that is requisite for prophecy, is a kind of enlightenment of the mind with regard to the things revealed to the prophet: but it is not an enlightenment of the mind with regard to a right estimate about the last end, which belongs to the gift of understanding. Reply Obj. 3: understanding implies a certain perception of the truth _______________________ SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 6] Whether the Gift of Understanding Is Distinct from the Other Gifts? Objection 1: Gregory Obj. 2: the gift of understanding is not about any self-evident principles Obj. 3: Further, all intellectual knowledge is either speculative or practical. Now the gift of understanding is related to both, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore it is not distinct from the other intellectual gifts, but comprises them all. Reply Obj. 1: Gregory Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: The gift of understanding is related to both kinds of knowledge, viz. speculative and practical, not as to the judgment, but as to apprehension, by grasping what is said. _______________________ SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 7] Whether the Sixth Beatitude, "Blessed Are the Clean of Heart," etc., Responds to the Gift of Understanding? Objection 1: cleanness of heart seems to belong chiefly to the appetite Obj. 2: the aforesaid beatitude is related to the virtue of faith Obj. 3: the sight of God does not belong to the present life _______________________ EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 8] Whether Faith, Among the Fruits, Responds to the Gift of Understanding? Objection 1: ? Obj. 2: faith seems to precede understanding Obj. 3: among the fruits, only one pertains to the intellect Reply Obj. 1: Understanding is the fruit of faith, taken as a virtue Reply Obj. 2: Faith cannot altogether precede understanding Reply Obj. 3: speculative knowledge has its fruit in its very self _______________________ QUESTION 9 OF THE GIFT OF KNOWLEDGE (In Four Articles) We must now consider the gift of knowledge, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether knowledge is a gift? (2) Whether it is about Divine things? (3) Whether it is speculative or practical? (4) Which beatitude responds to it? _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 1] Whether Knowledge Is a Gift? Objection 1: knowledge implies an effect of natural reason: for the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that a "demonstration is a syllogism which produces knowledge." Obj. 2: the gifts of the Holy Ghost are common to all holy persons Obj. 3: yaya Reply Obj. 1: in God, there is a sure judgment of truth, without any discursive process, by simple intuition Reply Obj. 2: twofold Reply Obj. 3: it is not unreasonable if several gifts are ordained to one theological virtue. _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 2] Whether the Gift of Knowledge Is About Divine Things? Objection 1: Augustine Obj. 2: there is an acquired knowledge about Divine things, for instance, the science of metaphysics Obj. 3: scripture Reply Obj. 1: the gift of wisdom corresponds more to charity Reply Obj. 2: yaya Reply Obj. 3: yaya _______________________ THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 3] Whether the Gift of Knowledge Is Practical Knowledge? Objection 1: Augustine Obj. 2: the gift of knowledge is not speculative but practical. Obj. 3: the gifts of the Holy Ghost are only in the righteous, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 5). But speculative knowledge can be also in the unrighteous Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 3: they alone have the gift of knowledge, who judge aright about matters of faith and action _______________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 4] Whether the Third Beatitude, "Blessed Are They That Mourn," etc. Corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge? Objection 1: knowledge brings good to light rather than evil Obj. 2: there is no sorrow in the consideration of truth Obj. 3: in so far as it consists in speculation, sorrow does not correspond to it Reply Obj. 1: the resulting consolation, as the reward; which is begun in this life, and is perfected in the life to come. Reply Obj. 2: Man rejoices in the very consideration of truth; yet he may sometimes grieve for the thing, the truth of which he considers Reply Obj. 3: beatitude relating to contemplation is not ascribed to knowledge, but to understanding and wisdom _______________________ QUESTION 10 OF UNBELIEF IN GENERAL (In Twelve Articles) In due sequence we must consider the contrary vices: first, unbelief, which is contrary to faith; secondly, blasphemy, which is opposed to confession of faith; thirdly, ignorance and dulness of mind, which are contrary to knowledge and understanding. As to the first, we must consider (1) unbelief in general; (2) heresy; (3) apostasy from the faith. Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether unbelief is a sin? (2) What is its subject? (3) Whether it is the greatest of sins? (4) Whether every action of unbelievers is a sin? (5) Of the species of unbelief; (6) Of their comparison, one with another; (7) Whether we ought to dispute about faith with unbelievers? (8) Whether they ought to be compelled to the faith? (9) Whether we ought to have communications with them? (10) Whether unbelievers can have authority over Christians? (11) Whether the rites of unbelievers should be tolerated? (12) Whether the children of unbelievers are to be baptized against their parents' will? _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 1] Whether Unbelief Is a Sin? Objection 1: unbelief seems not to be contrary to nature Obj. 2: it is not in a man's power to avoid unbelief Obj. 3: there are seven capital sins, to which all sins are reduced. But unbelief does not seem to be comprised under any of them Reply Obj. 1: it is part of human nature that man's mind should not thwart his inner instinct Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: the vices opposed to the theological virtues are not reduced to the capital vices. _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 2] Whether Unbelief Is in the Intellect As Its Subject? Objection 1: unbelief resides in the will Obj. 2: contempt pertains to the will Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 2: The will's contempt causes the intellect's dissent Reply Obj. 3: ? _______________________ THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 3] Whether Unbelief Is the Greatest of Sins? Objection 1: Augustine Obj. 2: unbelief excuses or diminishes sin Obj. 3: a greater punishment is due to believers than to unbelievers Reply Obj. 1: yaya Reply Obj. 2: Unbelief includes both ignorance Reply Obj. 3: An unbeliever is more severely punished for his sin of unbelief _______________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 4] Whether Every Act of an Unbeliever Is a Sin? Objection 1: scripture Obj. 2: ? Obj. 3: yaya Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: even the light of natural reason can direct the intention in respect of a connatural good. Reply Obj. 3: Unbelief does not so wholly destroy natural reason in unbelievers _______________________ FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 5] Whether There Are Several Species of Unbelief? Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several species of unbelief Obj. 2: it would seem to follow that there is an infinite number of species of unbelief Obj. 3: diversity of errors does not make a diversity of species of unbelief Reply Obj. 1: two ways Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: ? _______________________ SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 6] Whether the Unbelief of Pagans or Heathens Is Graver Than Other Kinds? Objection 1: the heathens deviate by believing in many gods Obj. 2: the heathens deny the faith in more numerous and more important points Obj. 3: Further, every good diminishes evil. Now there is some good in the Jews, since they believe in the Old Testament as being from God, and there is some good in heretics, since they venerate the New Testament. Therefore they sin less grievously than heathens, who receive neither Testament. _______________________ SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 7] Whether One Ought to Dispute with Unbelievers in Public? Objection 1: scripture Obj. 2: all matters of faith have been decided by the holy councils Obj. 3: things that are of faith, being most certain Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle does not entirely forbid disputations, but such as are inordinate, and consist of contentious words rather than of sound speeches. Reply Obj. 2: That law forbade those public disputations about the faith, which arise from doubting the faith, but not those which are for the safeguarding thereof. Reply Obj. 3: One ought to dispute about matters of faith, not as though one doubted about them, but in order to make the truth known _______________________ EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 8] Whether Unbelievers Ought to Be Compelled to the Faith? Objection 1: scripture Obj. 2: Further, we read in the Decretals (Dist. xlv can., De Judaeis): "The holy synod prescribes, with regard to the Jews, that for the future, none are to be compelled to believe." Therefore, in like manner, neither should unbelievers be compelled to the faith. Obj. 3: Augustine Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: Aquinas agrees Obj. 4: scripture Reply Obj. 3: keeping the faith, when once one has received it, is a matter of obligation Reply Obj. 4: Augustine _______________________ NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 9] Whether It Is Lawful to Communicate with Unbelievers? Objection 1: scripture Obj. 2: scripture Obj. 3: Christians can have unbelievers, either Jews, or pagans, or Saracens, for servants Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: There is more probability that a servant who is ruled by his master's commands, will be converted to the faith of his master who is a believer _______________________ TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 10] Whether Unbelievers May Have Authority or Dominion Over the Faithful? Objection 1: scripture Obj. 2: ? Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: the Church permits Christians to work on the land of Jews _______________________ ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 11] Whether the Rites of Unbelievers Ought to Be Tolerated? Objection 1: not to prevent a sin, when one can, seems to imply consent therein Obj. 2: the rites of the Jews are compared to idolatry Obj. 3: yaya _______________________ TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 12] Whether the Children of Jews and Other Unbelievers Ought to Be Baptized Against Their Parents' Will? Objection 1: ? Obj. 2: the children of Jews and other unbelievers are in danger of everlasting death Obj. 3: kings and princes have the power to do what they will with Jewish children Obj. 4: every man belongs more to God, from Whom he has his soul, than to his carnal father Obj. 5: Much more therefore, if Jewish children are lost through not being baptized are they accounted guilty of sin, who could have baptized them and did not. Reply Obj. 1: this does not apply to a child before it comes to the use of reason Reply Obj. 2: no one ought to break the order of the natural law, whereby a child is in the custody of its father Reply Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 4: it is for them to dispose of the child in all matters relating to God. Reply Obj. 5: to provide the sacraments of salvation for the children of unbelievers is the duty of their parents _______________________ QUESTION 11 OF HERESY (In Four Articles) We must now consider heresy: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether heresy is a kind of unbelief? (2) Of the matter about which it is; (3) Whether heretics should be tolerated? (4) Whether converts should be received? _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 11, Art. 1] Whether Heresy Is a Species of Unbelief? Objection 1: heresy would seem not to pertain to the understanding, but rather to the appetitive power Obj. 2: heresy is a species of pride rather than of unbelief. Obj. 3: heresy belongs to the works of the flesh Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: the proximate end of heresy is adherence to one's own false opinion, and from this it derives its species Reply Obj. 3: heresy and sect are the same thing _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 11, Art. 2] Whether Heresy Is Properly About Matters of Faith? Objection 1: heresy is not properly about matters of faith Obj. 2: "heresies spring up from words spoken amiss." Obj. 3: the holy doctors differing even about matters pertaining to the faith Reply Obj. 1: yaya Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: Accordingly, certain doctors seem to have differed either in matters the holding of which in this or that way is of no consequence, so far as faith is concerned, or even in matters of faith, which were not as yet defined by the Church _______________________ THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 11, Art. 3] Whether Heretics Ought to Be Tolerated? Objection 1: if heretics are not tolerated but put to death, they lose the opportunity of repentance Obj. 2: heresies are necessary Obj. 3: scripture Reply Obj. 1: This very modesty demands that the heretic should be admonished a first and second time Reply Obj. 2: we should consider what they directly intend, and expel them Reply Obj. 3: A man is excommunicated, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:5) that his "spirit may be saved in the day of Our Lord." _______________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 11, Art. 4] Whether the Church Should Receive Those Who Return from Heresy? Objection 1: scripture Obj. 2: scripture Obj. 3: heresy is a kind of unbelief. Now other unbelievers who wish to be converted are received by the Church Reply Obj. 1: she does not debar them from the way of salvation, but neither does she protect them from the sentence of death. Reply Obj. 2: even in this matter the law prescribes limits according as God's honor or our neighbor's good demands. Reply Obj. 3: When other unbelievers, who have never received the faith are converted, they do not as yet show signs of inconstancy in faith, as relapsed heretics do; hence the comparison fails. _______________________ QUESTION 12 OF APOSTASY (In Two Articles) We must now consider apostasy: about which there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief? (2) Whether, on account of apostasy from the faith, subjects are absolved from allegiance to an apostate prince? _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 12, Art. 1] Whether Apostasy Pertains to Unbelief? Objection 1: apostasy seems to be the origin of every sin, for it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): "The beginning of the pride of man is apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off'] from God," and further on, (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning of all sin." Obj. 2: apostasy seems rather to consist in some outward deed or utterance Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: "he sows discord," endeavoring to sever others from the faith even as he severed himself. Reply Obj. 3: apostasy does not imply a special kind of unbelief, but an aggravating circumstance thereof _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 12, Art. 2] Whether a Prince Forfeits His Dominion Over His Subjects, on Account of Apostasy from the Faith, So That They No Longer Owe Him Allegiance? Objection 1: Augustine Obj. 2: certain holy men served unbelieving masters Obj. 3: Further, just as by apostasy from the faith, a man turns away from God, so does every sin. Consequently if, on account of apostasy from the faith, princes were to lose their right to command those of their subjects who are believers, they would equally lose it on account of other sins: which is evidently not the case. Therefore we ought not to refuse allegiance to a sovereign on account of his apostatizing from the faith. Reply Obj. 1: At that time the Church was but recently instituted, and had not, as yet, the power of curbing earthly princes Reply Obj. 2: it is not a question of those unbelievers who have never received the faith. Reply Obj. 3: Apostasy from the faith severs man from God altogether _______________________ QUESTION 13 OF THE SIN OF BLASPHEMY, IN GENERAL (In Four Articles) We must now consider the sin of blasphemy, which is opposed to the confession of faith; and (1) blasphemy in general, (2) that blasphemy which is called the sin against the Holy Ghost. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith? (2) Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin? (3) Whether blasphemy is the most grievous sin? (4) Whether blasphemy is in the damned? _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 13, Art. 1] Whether Blasphemy Is Opposed to the Confession of Faith? Objection 1: this pertains to ill-will against God rather than to unbelief Obj. 2: Further, on Eph. 4:31, "Let blasphemy . . . be put away from you," a gloss says, "that which is committed against God or the saints." Reply Obj. 1: He that speaks against God, with the intention of reviling Him, disparages the Divine goodness, not only in respect of the falsehood in his intellect, but also by reason of the wickedness of his will Reply Obj. 2: yaya Obj. 3: there are three kinds of blasphemy Reply Obj. 3: the sin of blasphemy is not in this way divided into three species _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 13, Art. 2] Whether Blasphemy Is Always a Mortal Sin? Objection 1: Therefore blasphemy is comprised among the lesser, i.e. venial, sins. Obj. 2: Further, every mortal sin is opposed to one of the precepts of the decalogue. But, seemingly, blasphemy is not contrary to any of them. Therefore blasphemy is not a mortal sin. Obj. 3: blasphemy sometimes occurs without deliberation of the reason Reply Obj. 1: This gloss is not to be understood as meaning that all the sins which follow, are mortal, but that whereas all those mentioned previously are more grievous sins, some of those mentioned afterwards are less grievous; and yet among the latter some more grievous sins are included. Reply Obj. 2: "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . God in vain" Reply Obj. 3: two ways _______________________ THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 13, Art. 3] Whether the Sin of Blasphemy Is the Greatest Sin? Objection 1: the sin of murder is more grievous than that of blasphemy. Obj. 2: perjury is a more grievous sin than blasphemy. Obj. 3: scripture Reply Obj. 1: as the blasphemer intends to do harm to God's honor, absolutely speaking, he sins more grievously that the murderer Reply Obj. 2: he calls God to witness to a falsehood, not that he deems God a false witness, but in the hope, as it were, that God will not testify to the matter by some evident sign. Reply Obj. 3: To excuse oneself for sin is a circumstance that aggravates every sin, even blasphemy itself: and it is called the most grievous sin, for as much as it makes every sin more grievous. _______________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 13, Art. 4] Whether the Damned Blaspheme? Objection 1: the damned are undergoing these punishments, so that they abhor them yet more Obj. 2: ? Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 1: in hell, the damned have no hope of escape, so that, in despair, they are borne towards whatever their wicked will suggests to them. Reply Obj. 2: in the damned, evil is not demeritorious, but is part of the punishment of damnation. Reply Obj. 3: yaya _______________________ QUESTION 14 OF BLASPHEMY AGAINST THE HOLY GHOST (In Four Articles) We must now consider in particular blasphemy against the Holy Ghost: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether blasphemy or the sin against the Holy Ghost is the same as the sin committed through certain malice? (2) Of the species of this sin; (3) Whether it can be forgiven? (4) Whether it is possible to begin by sinning against the Holy Ghost before committing other sins? _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 14, Art. 1] Whether the Sin Against the Holy Ghost Is the Same As the Sin Committed Through Certain Malice? Objection 1: not every sin committed through certain malice is a sin of blasphemy Obj. 2: ? Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 1: blasphemy against the Holy Ghost can be uttered in word, thought and deed. Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: two ways _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 14, Art. 2] Whether It Is Fitting to Distinguish Six Kinds of Sin Against the Holy Ghost? Objection 1: by despair, a man rejects God's mercy, and by presumption, His justice. Therefore each of these is a kind of unbelief rather than of the sin against the Holy Ghost. Obj. 2: past and future time do not diversify the species of virtues or vices Obj. 3: yaya Obj. 4: ? Reply Obj. 1: The sins of despair and presumption consist, not in disbelieving in God's justice and mercy, but in contemning them. Reply Obj. 2: Obstinacy and impenitence differ not only in respect of past and future time, but also in respect of certain formal aspects by reason of the diverse consideration of those things which may be considered in sin Reply Obj. 3: Grace and truth were the work of Christ through the gifts of the Holy Ghost which He gave to men. Reply Obj. 4: a feigned repentance belongs to impenitence _______________________ THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 14, Art. 3] Whether the Sin Against the Holy Ghost Can Be Forgiven? Objection 1: Augustine Obj. 2: ? Obj. 3: yaya Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: ? _______________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 14, Art. 4] Whether a Man Can Sin First of All Against the Holy Ghost? Objection 1: man comes to commit this sin through committing lesser sins. Obj. 2: Aristotle Obj. 3: there is no repentance, except about past sins Reply Obj. 1: one man can begin from a greater (good or evil) than another man does Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the sin which is committed through certain malice, when it proceeds from the inclination of a habit. Reply Obj. 3: it is possible for a man who has never sinned to have the purpose either of repenting or of not repenting, if he should happen to sin. _______________________ QUESTION 15 OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING (In Three Articles) We must now consider the vices opposed to knowledge and understanding. Since, however, we have treated of ignorance which is opposed to knowledge, when we were discussing the causes of sins (I-II, Q. 76), we must now inquire about blindness of mind and dulness of sense, which are opposed to the gift of understanding; and under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether blindness of mind is a sin? (2) Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of mind? (3) Whether these vices arise from sins of the flesh? _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 15, Art. 1] Whether Blindness of Mind Is a Sin? Objection 1: that which excuses from sin is not itself a sin Obj. 2: blindness of mind is a punishment Obj. 3: blindness of mind is not voluntary Reply Obj. 1: The blindness that excuses from sin is that which arises from the natural defect of one who cannot see. Reply Obj. 2: yaya Reply Obj. 3: To understand the truth is, in itself, beloved by all; and yet, accidentally it may be hateful to someone, in so far as a man is hindered thereby from having what he loves yet more. _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 15, Art. 2] Whether Dulness of Sense Is a Sin Distinct from Blindness of Mind? Objection 1: It seems that dulness of sense is not a distinct sin from blindness of mind. Because one thing has one contrary. Now dulness is opposed to the gift of understanding, according to Gregory (Moral. ii, 49); and so is blindness of mind, since understanding denotes a principle of sight. Therefore dulness of sense is the same as blindness of mind. Obj. 2: Now dulness of sense in respect of understanding seems to be the same as a defect in understanding, which pertains to blindness of mind. Obj. 3: dulness of sense is a natural defect _______________________ THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 15, Art. 3] Whether Blindness of Mind and Dulness of Sense Arise from Sins of the Flesh? Objection 1: Augustine Obj. 2: the flesh does not act on the soul, but rather the reverse Obj. 3: all things are more passive to what is near them than to what is remote Reply Obj. 1: their uncleanness is a clog on their knowledge. Reply Obj. 2: The flesh acts on the intellective faculties, not by altering them, but by impeding their operation in the aforesaid manner. Reply Obj. 3: It is owing to the fact that the carnal vices are further removed from the mind, that they distract the mind's attention to more remote things, so that they hinder the mind's contemplation all the more. _______________________ QUESTION 16 OF THE PRECEPTS OF FAITH, KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING (In Two Articles) We must now consider the precepts pertaining to the aforesaid, and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) The precepts concerning faith; (2) The precepts concerning the gifts of knowledge and understanding. _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 16, Art. 1] Whether in the Old Law There Should Have Been Given Precepts of Faith? Objection 1: a precept is about something due and necessary. Now it is most necessary for man that he should believe Obj. 2: the New Testament is contained in the Old Obj. 3: the Old Law contained many precepts forbidding unbelief Reply Obj. 1: Faith is necessary as being the principle of spiritual life Reply Obj. 2: ? Obj. 4: scripture Obj. 5: ? Reply Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 4: the Old Law could contain precepts relating to the confession and teaching of faith, rather than to faith itself. Reply Obj. 5: yaya _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 16, Art. 2] Whether the Precepts Referring to Knowledge and Understanding Were Fittingly Set Down in the Old Law? Objection 1: yaya Obj. 2: man ought to have been given also some precepts directing him to learn. Obj. 3: the king is commanded to learn knowledge of the Law Obj. 4: it is not possible while asleep to meditate on things pertaining to knowledge Reply Obj. 1: the precepts of the Law had to be given first, and afterwards men had to be led to know and understand them Reply Obj. 2: learning concerned the people of lower degree Reply Obj. 3: the doctrine of God's law is not so bound up with the kingly office Reply Obj. 4: he should meditate on the law of God when he is preparing to sleep _______________________ QUESTION 17 OF HOPE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (In Eight Articles) After treating of faith, we must consider hope and (1) hope itself; (2) the gift of fear; (3) the contrary vices; (4) the corresponding precepts. The first of these points gives rise to a twofold consideration: (1) hope, considered in itself; (2) its subject. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether hope is a virtue? (2) Whether its object is eternal happiness? (3) Whether, by the virtue of hope, one man may hope for another's happiness? (4) Whether a man may lawfully hope in man? (5) Whether hope is a theological virtue? (6) Of its distinction from the other theological virtues? (7) Of its relation to faith; (8) Of its relation to charity. _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 1] Whether Hope Is a Virtue? Objection 1: one may make ill use of hope Obj. 2: Further, no virtue results from merits, since "God works virtue in us without us," as Augustine states (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. xvii). But hope is caused by grace and merits, according to the Master (Sent. iii, D, 26). Therefore hope is not a virtue. Obj. 3: hope is the disposition of an imperfect thing Reply Obj. 1: the hope of which we speak now, is not a passion but a habit of the mind Reply Obj. 2: The habit itself of hope, whereby we hope to obtain happiness, does not flow from our merits, but from grace alone. Reply Obj. 3: both _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 2] Whether Eternal Happiness Is the Proper Object of Hope? Objection 1: hope itself is a movement of the soul. Now eternal happiness surpasses every movement of the human soul Obj. 2: prayer is an expression of hope Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 1: Eternal happiness does not enter into the heart of man perfectly, i.e. so that it be possible for a wayfarer to know its nature and quality; yet, under the general notion of the perfect good Reply Obj. 2: We ought not to pray God for any other goods, except in reference to eternal happiness Reply Obj. 3: to him that hopes for eternal happiness, nothing else appears arduous _______________________ THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 3] Whether One Man May Hope for Another's Eternal Happiness? Objection 1: scripture Obj. 2: scripture Obj. 3: we should not despair of anyone so long as he lives _______________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 4] Whether a Man Can Lawfully Hope in Man? Objection 1: "predestination is furthered by the saints' prayers." Obj. 2: ? Obj. 3: prayer is the expression of hope _______________________ FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 5] Whether Hope Is a Theological Virtue? Objection 1: hope has for its object not only God but also other goods which we hope to obtain from God Obj. 2: hope is a mean between presumption and despair Obj. 3: it seems that hope is not a theological, but a moral virtue. Obj. 4: hope is a moral, and not a theological virtue. Reply Obj. 1: Whatever else hope expects to obtain, it hopes for it in reference to God as the last end, or as the first efficient cause Reply Obj. 2: both Reply Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 4: ? _______________________ SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 6] Whether Hope Is Distinct from the Other Theological Virtues? Objection 1: the object of hope is the same as of the other theological virtues Obj. 2: expectation of future happiness belongs to hope Obj. 3: by hope man tends to God. But this belongs properly to charity Reply Obj. 1: God is the object of these virtues under different aspects Reply Obj. 2: the act of hope presupposes the act of faith Reply Obj. 3: charity, properly speaking, makes us tend to God, by uniting our affections to Him _______________________ SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 7] Whether Hope Precedes Faith? Objection 1: "Hope is the entrance to faith Obj. 2: hope is included in the definition of faith Obj. 3: the act of faith is meritorious Reply Obj. 1: yaya Reply Obj. 2: the proper object of faith, is something not apparent in itself Reply Obj. 3: Hope does not precede every meritorious act _______________________ EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 8] Whether Charity Precedes Hope? Objection 1: Ambrose Obj. 2: Augustine Obj. 3: yaya Reply Obj. 2: not every kind of hope proceeds from charity Reply Obj. 3: yaya _______________________ QUESTION 18 OF THE SUBJECT OF HOPE (In Four Articles) We must now consider the subject of hope, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the virtue of hope is in the will as its subject? (2) Whether it is in the blessed? (3) Whether it is in the damned? (4) Whether there is certainty in the hope of the wayfarer? _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 1] Whether Hope Is in the Will As Its Subject? Objection 1: hope is not in the will but in the irascible. Obj. 2: charity suffices for the perfecting of the will Obj. 3: the act of hope can be at the same time as an act of charity Reply Obj. 1: the object of the virtue of hope is an arduous intelligible, or rather superintelligible. Reply Obj. 2: Charity perfects the will sufficiently with regard to one act, which is the act of loving: but another virtue is required in order to perfect it with regard to its other act, which is that of hoping. Reply Obj. 3: both _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 2] Whether in the Blessed There Is Hope? Objection 1: He had hope Obj. 2: before they obtain happiness, men hope to obtain it. Therefore, after they have obtained it, they can hope to continue in its possession. Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: the blessed do not hope for the continuation of their happiness (for as regards this there is no future) Obj. 3: the blessed who are in heaven hope for the happiness of others Obj. 4: the souls of the saints in heaven, look yet for the glory of their bodies Reply Obj. 3: they hope for the happiness of others indeed, yet not by the virtue of hope, but rather by the love of charity Reply Obj. 4: the glory of the body is a very small thing as compared with the glory of the soul _______________________ THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 3] Whether Hope Is in the Damned? Objection 1: the devil has hope Obj. 2: lifeless faith can be in the devils and the damned Obj. 3: many who are damned, in this life hoped and never despaired. Therefore they will hope in the future life also. Reply Obj. 1: it may refer to the hope whereby he expects to vanquish the saints Reply Obj. 2: hope is only about good things Reply Obj. 3: Lack of hope in the damned does not change their demerit, as neither does the voiding of hope in the blessed increase their merit: but both these things are due to the change in their respective states. _______________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 4] Whether There Is Certainty in the Hope of a Wayfarer? Objection 1: certainty pertains not to the will but to the intellect Obj. 2: it is impossible in this life to know for certain that we are in a state of grace Obj. 3: many a hopeful wayfarer fails to obtain happiness Reply Obj. 2: even he that has not grace, can obtain it Reply Obj. 3: That some who have hope fail to obtain happiness, is due to a fault of the free will _______________________ QUESTION 19 OF THE GIFT OF FEAR (In Twelve Articles) We must now consider the gift of fear, about which there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is to be feared? (2) Of the division of fear into filial, initial, servile and worldly; (3) Whether worldly fear is always evil? (4) Whether servile fear is good? (5) Whether it is substantially the same as filial fear? (6) Whether servile fear departs when charity comes? (7) Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom? (8) Whether initial fear is substantially the same as filial fear? (9) Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost? (10) Whether it grows when charity grows? (11) Whether it remains in heaven? (12) Which of the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it? _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 1] Whether God Can Be Feared? Objection 1: the object of fear is a future evil Obj. 2: we hope in God Obj. 3: Aristotle Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: both Reply Obj. 3: The evil of fault is not from God as its author but from us _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 2] Whether Fear Is Fittingly Divided into Filial, Initial, Servile and Worldly Fear? Objection 1: Damascene Obj. 2: natural fear, which is neither morally good, since it is in the demons, according to James 2:19, "The devils . . . believe and tremble," nor evil Obj. 3: chaste fear, which seems to be that of the wife in comparison with her husband, ought to be distinguished from all these other fears. Obj. 4: ? Obj. 5: "worldly fear," whereby one fears to lose external goods, is distinct from "human fear," Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: natural fear is presupposed to moral good and evil Reply Obj. 3: filial and chaste fear amount to the same Reply Obj. 4: ? Reply Obj. 5: external goods belong to the body _______________________ THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 3] Whether Worldly Fear Is Always Evil? Objection 1: ? Obj. 2: worldly fear seems to have reference to the punishments inflicted by the secular power Obj. 3: it is natural to man to fear detriment to his body Reply Obj. 1: two ways Reply Obj. 2: To fear the secular power in this way is part, not of worldly fear, but of servile or initial fear. Reply Obj. 3: there are certain things, viz. sinful deeds, which no fear should drive us to do _______________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 4] Whether Servile Fear Is Good? Objection 1: the use of servile fear is evil Obj. 2: servile fear grows from a sinful root Obj. 3: mercenary love is always evil. Therefore servile fear is also. Reply Obj. 1: This saying of Augustine is to be applied to a man who does something through servile fear as such, so that he loves not justice, and fears nothing but the punishment. Reply Obj. 2: Servile fear as to its substance is not born of pride Reply Obj. 3: servile fear, as to its substance, implies merely fear of punishment _______________________ FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 5] Whether Servile Fear Is Substantially the Same As Filial Fear? Objection 1: living faith and lifeless faith are substantially the same Obj. 2: they both fear God Obj. 3: filial fear, whereby we fear separation from God, is the same as servile fear whereby we fear His punishments. Reply Obj. 1: servile and filial fear differ as to their objects Reply Obj. 2: Servile fear and filial fear do not regard God in the same light Reply Obj. 3: there is no comparison. _______________________ SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 6] Whether Servile Fear Remains with Charity? Objection 1: Augustine Obj. 2: freedom excludes servitude Obj. 3: love of God drives away self-love Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of fear considered as servile _______________________ SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 6] Whether Fear Is the Beginning of Wisdom? Objection 1: fear is not a part of wisdom Obj. 2: ? Obj. 3: faith precedes fear Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: both _______________________ SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 7] Whether Initial Fear Differs Substantially from Filial Fear? Objection 1: initial fear is the beginning of love Obj. 2: servile fear is distinct from filial fear Obj. 3: initial fear is the mean between servile and filial fear Reply Obj. 1: yaya Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: ? _______________________ NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 9] Whether Fear Is a Gift of the Holy Ghost? Objection 1: fear is opposed to hope Obj. 2: fear is not a gift, but a theological virtue. Obj. 3: Further, fear arises from love. But love is reckoned a theological virtue. Therefore fear also is a theological virtue, being connected with the same matter, as it were. Obj. 4: Gregory Obj. 5: the gifts are more perfect than the virtues Reply Obj. 1: filial fear and hope cling together Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: fear principally regards evil, the avoidance of which it denotes, wherefore it is something less than a theological virtue. Reply Obj. 4: fear cuts off the source of pride for which reason it is bestowed as a remedy against pride. Yet it does not follow that it is the same as the virtue of humility, but that it is its origin _______________________ TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 10] Whether Fear Decreases When Charity Increases? Objection 1: Augustine Obj. 2: charity increases when hope increases Obj. 3: yaya Reply Obj. 1: Augustine speaks there of the fear of punishment. Reply Obj. 2: yaya Reply Obj. 3: both _______________________ ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 11] Whether Fear Remains in Heaven? Objection 1: there will be no fear in heaven. Obj. 2: God fears nothing. Therefore, in heaven, men will have no fear. Obj. 3: Further, hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards good, and fear, evil. Now hope will not be in heaven. Therefore neither will there be fear in heaven. Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: God Who cannot be imitated perfectly Reply Obj. 3: fear implies a natural defect in a creature _______________________ TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 12] Whether Poverty of Spirit Is the Beatitude Corresponding to the Gift of Fear? Objection 1: poverty belongs to the perfection of the spiritual life Obj. 2: the beatitude of mourning corresponds to the gift of fear Obj. 3: ? Obj. 4: none of the fruits correspond to the gift of fear Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: the beatitude of poverty corresponds to fear directly, and the beatitude of mourning, consequently. Reply Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 4: yaya _______________________ QUESTION 20 OF DESPAIR (In Four Articles) We must now consider the contrary vices; (1) despair; (2) presumption. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether despair is a sin? (2) Whether it can be without unbelief? (3) Whether it is the greatest of sins? (4) Whether it arises from sloth? _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 1] Whether Despair Is a Sin? Objection 1: despair includes no conversion to a mutable good Obj. 2: ? Obj. 3: Further, if despair were a sin, it would be a sin also for the damned to despair. But this is not imputed to them as their fault but as part of their damnation. Therefore neither is it imputed to wayfarers as their fault, so that it is not a sin. Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: two ways Reply Obj. 3: ? _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 2] Whether There Can Be Despair Without Unbelief? Objection 1: the certainty of hope is derived from faith Obj. 2: whoever despairs, is an unbeliever. Obj. 3: he that despairs seems to fall into a condemned heresy, viz. that of the Novatians, who say that there is no pardon for sins after Baptism Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: he who despairs judges not thus, but that, for him in that state, on account of some particular disposition, there is no hope of the Divine mercy. _______________________ THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 3] Whether Despair Is the Greatest of Sins? Objection 1: unbelief is the greatest of sins Obj. 2: hatred of God is a greater sin than despair. Obj. 3: yaya _______________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 4] Whether Despair Arises from Sloth? Objection 1: Gregory Obj. 2: sloth arises from despair, and not vice versa. Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 2: both Reply Obj. 3: ? _______________________ QUESTION 21 OF PRESUMPTION (In Four Articles) We must now consider presumption, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What is the object in which presumption trusts? (2) Whether presumption is a sin? (3) To what is it opposed? (4) From what vice does it arise? _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 21, Art. 1] Whether Presumption Trusts in God or in Our Own Power? Objection 1: ? Obj. 2: self-love is the origin of sin Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 1: it is a graver sin to detract from the Divine power than to exaggerate one's own. Reply Obj. 2: both Reply Obj. 3: ? _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 21, Art. 2] Whether Presumption Is a Sin? Objection 1: through presumption some are heard by God Obj. 2: there cannot be excess of that hope which is in God, since His power and mercy are infinite Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: Presumption does not denote excessive hope, as though man hoped too much in God; but through man hoping to obtain from God something unbecoming to Him Reply Obj. 3: both _______________________ THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 21, Art. 3] Whether Presumption Is More Opposed to Fear Than to Hope? Objection 1: ? Obj. 2: ? Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 1: ? Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: ? _______________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 21, Art. 4] Whether Presumption Arises from Vainglory? Objection 1: mercy (_misericordia_) regards unhappiness (_miseriam_) Obj. 2: presumption would seem to arise from pleasure Obj. 3: presumption arises from ignorance _______________________ QUESTION 22 OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO HOPE AND FEAR (In Two Articles) We must now consider the precepts relating to hope and fear: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) The precepts relating to hope; (2) The precepts relating to fear. _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 22, Art. 1] Whether There Should Be a Precept of Hope? Objection 1: man is sufficiently induced by his natural inclination to hope for good Obj. 2: it seems that if any precept of hope were given, it should be found among the precepts of the decalogue. But it is not to be found there Obj. 3: no precept is to be found forbidding despair Reply Obj. 1: the natural reason of man was clouded by the lusts of sin. Reply Obj. 2: there was no need Reply Obj. 3: wherein is implied the prohibition of the opposite. _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 22, Art. 2] Whether There Should Have Been Given a Precept of Fear? Objection 1: things which are a preamble to the Law do not come under a precept of the Law Obj. 2: Augustine Obj. 3: yaya Reply Obj. 1: Filial fear is a preamble to the Law, not as though it were extrinsic thereto, but as being the beginning of the Law Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: yaya _______________________ QUESTION 23 OF CHARITY, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (In Eight Articles) In proper sequence, we must consider charity; and (1) charity itself; (2) the corresponding gift of wisdom. The first consideration will be fivefold: (1) Charity itself; (2) The object of charity; (3) Its acts; (4) The opposite vices; (5) The precepts relating thereto. The first of these considerations will be twofold: (1) Charity, considered as regards itself; (2) Charity, considered in its relation to its subject. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether charity is friendship? (2) Whether it is something created in the soul? (3) Whether it is a virtue? (4) Whether it is a special virtue? (5) Whether it is one virtue? (6) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues? (7) Whether any true virtue is possible without it? (8) Whether it is the form of the virtues? _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 1] Whether Charity Is Friendship? Objection 1: Aristotle Obj. 2: there is no friendship without return of love (Ethic. viii, 2). But charity extends even to one's enemies Obj. 3: Aristotle Reply Obj. 1: there is fellowship between us and both God and the angels Reply Obj. 2: the friendship of charity extends even to our enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God Reply Obj. 3: similar to R2 _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 2] Whether Charity Is Something Created in the Soul? Objection 1: charity is not something created in the soul, but is God Himself. Obj. 2: He quickens it by charity Obj. 3: ? Reply Obj. 1: The Divine Essence Itself is charity, even as It is wisdom and goodness. Wherefore just as we are said to be good with the goodness which is God, and wise with the wisdom which is God (since the goodness whereby we are formally good is a participation of Divine goodness, and the wisdom whereby we are formally wise, is a share of Divine wisdom), so too, the charity whereby formally we love our neighbor is a participation of Divine charity. For this manner of speaking is common among the Platonists, with whose doctrines Augustine was imbued; and the lack of adverting to this has been to some an occasion of error. Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: ? _______________________ THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 3] Whether Charity Is a Virtue? Objection 1: charity is a kind of friendship. Now philosophers do not reckon friendship a virtue Obj. 2: yaya Obj. 3: no accident is more excellent than its subject Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. viii) does not deny that friendship is a virtue Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: charity is superior to the soul, in as much as it is a participation of the Holy Ghost. _______________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 4] Whether Charity Is a Special Virtue? Objection 1: yaya Obj. 2: charity extends to all works of virtue, according to 1 Cor. 13:4: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc.; indeed it extends to all human actions Obj. 3: Augustine Reply Obj. 1: every virtue depends on it in a way Reply Obj. 2: ? Reply Obj. 3: ? _______________________ FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 5] Whether Charity Is One Virtue? Objection 1: there are two objects of charity--God and our neighbor Obj. 2: there are many aspects under which God is an object of love Obj. 3: Aristotle Reply Obj. 1: our neighbor is loved out of charity for God's sake. Reply Obj. 2: charity regards principally but one aspect of lovableness, namely God's goodness Reply Obj. 3: Human friendship of which the Philosopher treats has various ends _______________________ SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 6] Whether Charity Is the Most Excellent of the Virtues? Objection 1: faith, which is in the intellect, is more excellent than charity which is in the will. Obj. 2: "faith . . . worketh by charity," Obj. 3: hope seems to be something additional to charity Reply Obj. 1: it is better to know than to love the things that are beneath us; for which reason the Philosopher gave the preference to the intellectual virtues over the moral virtues (Ethic. x, 7, 8): whereas the love of the things that are above us, especially of God, ranks before the knowledge of such things Reply Obj. 2: Faith works by love, not instrumentally Reply Obj. 3: charity implies union with that good _______________________ SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 7] Whether Any True Virtue Is Possible Without Charity? Objection 1: those who have not charity, do some good actions Obj. 2: in unbelievers, there can be true chastity Obj. 3: science and art are virtues, according to _Ethic._ vi. But they are to be found in sinners Reply Obj. 1: two kinds Reply Obj. 2: there can be no strictly true justice, or chastity Reply Obj. 3: Science and art of their very nature imply a relation to some particular good _______________________ EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 8] Whether Charity Is the Form of the Virtues? Objection 1: yaya Obj. 2: a root or foundation is not the form, but rather the matter of a thing Obj. 3: charity is called the end and the mother of the virtues Reply Obj. 1: Charity is called the form of the other virtues not as being their exemplar or their essential form, but rather by way of efficient cause Reply Obj. 2: Charity is compared to the foundation or root in so far as all other virtues draw their sustenance
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