1st Special Air Service Brigade (1st SAS) was a fictional brigade during the Second World War. It was first formed in Cairo in 1941, as part of a deception by Brigadier Dudley Clarke, to play on Italian fears of airborne attacks. Clarke used documents, photographs, news reports and even fake SAS soldiers to plant information about the brigade – he even named the Cairo-based deception department, 'A' Force, to bolster evidence of their existence.
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| - 1st Special Air Service Brigade (1st SAS) was a fictional brigade during the Second World War. It was first formed in Cairo in 1941, as part of a deception by Brigadier Dudley Clarke, to play on Italian fears of airborne attacks. Clarke used documents, photographs, news reports and even fake SAS soldiers to plant information about the brigade – he even named the Cairo-based deception department, 'A' Force, to bolster evidence of their existence.
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| - Fictional unit, part of Operation Cascade
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| - 1st Special Air Service Brigade (1st SAS) was a fictional brigade during the Second World War. It was first formed in Cairo in 1941, as part of a deception by Brigadier Dudley Clarke, to play on Italian fears of airborne attacks. Clarke used documents, photographs, news reports and even fake SAS soldiers to plant information about the brigade – he even named the Cairo-based deception department, 'A' Force, to bolster evidence of their existence. In the summer of 1941, when David Stirling was pitching his idea for a dedicated airborne commando unit (which later evolved into the Special Air Service) he obtained Clarke's support partly by promising to use the SAS name. From late 1942, Clarke used the 1st SAS in his major order of battle deception (codenamed Operation Cascade). The brigade formed part of the fictional 4th Airborne Division; between then and the end of the war it was used to mislead Axis commanders about the strength of Allied forces in North Africa, and as part of several specific tactical deceptions.
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