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| - Preparations for the postwar occupation of Germany began in the Allied camp during the second half of 1944, following the beginning of Allied penetration into Germany. Most of the planning was carried out by the European Advisory Commission (EAC) established in early 1944. Already on January 3, 1944, the Working Security Committee in the EAC concluded that It further recommended the creation of a tripartite US, Soviet and British agency to conduct German affairs following the surrender of the Third Reich. The British representative at the EAC, Sir William Strang, was undecided on whether a partial occupation of Germany by Allied troops was the most desirable course of action. At the first EAC meeting on January 14, 1944, Strang proposed alternatives that favored the total occupation of Ger
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| abstract
| - Preparations for the postwar occupation of Germany began in the Allied camp during the second half of 1944, following the beginning of Allied penetration into Germany. Most of the planning was carried out by the European Advisory Commission (EAC) established in early 1944. Already on January 3, 1944, the Working Security Committee in the EAC concluded that It further recommended the creation of a tripartite US, Soviet and British agency to conduct German affairs following the surrender of the Third Reich. The British representative at the EAC, Sir William Strang, was undecided on whether a partial occupation of Germany by Allied troops was the most desirable course of action. At the first EAC meeting on January 14, 1944, Strang proposed alternatives that favored the total occupation of Germany, similar to the situation following the First World War when Allied rule was established over the Rhineland. Strang believed that a full occupation would limit the reliance on former Nazis to maintain order within Germany. He also believed that it would make the lessons of defeat more visible to the German population and would enable the Allied governments to carry out punitive policies in Germany, such as transferring territories to Poland. The main arguments against total occupation were that it would create an untold burden on Allied economies and prolong the suffering of the German population, possibly driving new revanchist ideologies. However, his final conclusion was that a total occupation would be most beneficial, at least during the initial phase. In August 1944, the US government established the United States Group to the Control Council for Germany, which served as a liaison group within the EAC for planning the future occupation of Germany. The chairman of this group was Brig. Gen. Cornelius Wendell Wickersham. As the German collapse approached, Sir William Strang became convinced that Germany was about to undergo a total collapse, in which case a total occupation and control would be inevitable. He even proposed a draft declaration to be issued by the Allied governments in case no political authority would remain in Germany due to chaotic conditions. For a brief period, this prospect was feared by some Allied representatives. After the death of Adolf Hitler on April 30, 1945, Karl Dönitz became president of Germany in accordance with Hitler's last political testament. He authorised the signing, at Rheims, of the unconditional surrender of all German forces, which took effect on 8 May 1945, and tried to establish a government under von Krosigk. This government was not recognised by the Allies, and Dönitz and the other members were arrested on 23 May by British forces. The German Instrument of Surrender used by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force at Rheims, was modeled on the one used a few days previously to allow the German forces in Italy to surrender. They did not use the one which had been drafted for the surrender of Germany by the "European Advisory Commission" (EAC). This created a legal problem for the Allies, because although the German armed forces had surrendered unconditionally, the civilian German government had not been included in the surrender. This was considered a very important issue, inasmuch as Hitler had used the surrender of the civilian government, but not of the military, in 1918, to create the "stab in the back" argument. The Allies understandably did not want to give any future hostile German regime any kind of legal argument to resurrect an old quarrel. Eventually they decided not to recognise Dönitz, but to sign a four-power document instead, creating the Allied Control Council. On 5 June 1945, in Berlin, the supreme commanders of the four occupying powers signed a common Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany (the so-called Berlin Declaration of 1945), which formally abolished any German governance over the nation: File:Allied control council.ogg This imposition was in line with Article 4 of the Instrument of Surrender that had been included so that the EAC document, or something similar, could be imposed on the Germans after the military surrender. Article 4 stated that "This act of military surrender is without prejudice to, and will be superseded by any general instrument of surrender imposed by, or on behalf of the United Nations and applicable to GERMANY and the German armed forces as a whole." In reality, of course, all German central civilian authority had ceased to exist with the death of Hitler and the fall of Berlin at the latest. These parts of the Berlin declaration, therefore, merely formalised the de facto status and placed the Allied military rule over Germany on a solid legal basis. An additional agreement was signed on September 20, 1945 and further elaborated the powers of the Control Council. The actual exercise of power was carried out according to the model first laid out in the "Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany" that had been signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union on 14 November 1944 in London based on the work of the European Advisory Commission. Germany was divided into three zones of occupation—American, British, and Soviet—each being ruled by the Commander-in-Chief of the respective occupation forces. (Later a French zone was added.) "Matters that affect Germany as a whole," however, would have to be decided jointly by all three Commanders-in-Chief, who for this purpose would form a single organ of control. This authority was called the Control Council. The purpose of the Allied Control Council in Germany, like the other Allied Control Commissions and Councils which were established by the Allies over every defeated Axis power, was to deal with the central administration of the country (an idea that hardly materialised in the case of Germany, as that administration totally broke down with the end of the war) and to assure that the military administration was carried out with a certain uniformity throughout all of Germany. The Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945 further specified the tasks of the Control Council.
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