| abstract
| - The conference produced a unified statement of purpose, the "Casablanca Declaration" which announced to the world that the Allies would accept nothing less than the “unconditional surrender” of the Axis powers. Roosevelt had borrowed the term “unconditional surrender” from General Ulysses S. Grant who had communicated this stance to the Confederate commander at Forts Donelson and Henry during the American Civil War. In a radio address Roosevelt made on February 12, 1943, the President laid forth the tenets of “unconditional surrender”: “In our uncompromising policy we mean no harm to the common people of the Axis nations. But we do mean to impose punishment and retribution upon their guilty, barbaric leaders.” Behind the scenes, the United States and Great Britain were not, however, united in the commitment to see the war through to Germany’s capitulation. Some source material contradicts the official, reported accord between Churchill and Roosevelt, indicating Churchill did not fully subscribe to the doctrine of “unconditional surrender.” Drew Middleton, correspondent and military analyst, was in Casablanca reporting on the conference for The New York Times. In his book, “Retreat From Victory,” Middleton provided a revelation, which Churchill had made to him years later: "I was startled by the [public] announcement [of unconditional surrender]. I tried to hide my surprise. But I was his [Roosevelt’s] ardent lieutenant." The former United States ambassador to Moscow, Charles P. Bohlen, wrote that the “Responsibility for this unconditional surrender doctrine rests almost exclusively with President Roosevelt. He announced …: "It is felt that Roosevelt made the announcement in a maneuver to effectuate two goals: One was to keep Soviet forces engaged with Germany on the Russian front, thus depleting German munitions and troops; and secondly [it was] to prevent Stalin from negotiating a separate peace with the Nazi regime." That the war would be fought by the Allies until the total annihilation of enemy forces, was not universally welcomed. Diplomatic insiders were critical that such a stance was too unequivocal, and inflexible, cancelling out any opportunity for political maneuvering, and morally debilitating to French and German resistance groups. The British felt that arriving at some accommodation with Germany would allow the German army to help fight off the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe. To Churchill and the other Allied leaders, the real obstacle to actualizing this mutual strategy with Germany was the leadership of Adolf Hitler. Allen Dulles, the chief of OSS intelligence in Bern, Switzerland, maintained that the "Casablanca Declaration" was “merely a piece of paper to be scrapped without further ado if Germany would sue for peace. Hitler had to go.” There exists evidence that German resistance forces, highly placed anti-Nazi government officials, were working with British intelligence, MI6 to eliminate Hitler and negotiate a peace with the Allies. One such man was Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, head of German intelligence, the Abwehr. His persistent overtures for support from the United States were ignored by Franklin Roosevelt.
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