| abstract
| - The missiles were launched from American warships in the Red Sea. Several hit the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory, which the United States claimed was helping Osama bin Laden, the mastermind of the embassy attacks, build chemical weapons. One man was killed and ten were wounded in Sudan by the strike. Then United States National Security Council advisor Richard Clarke stated that intelligence existed linking Osama bin Laden to Al-Shifa's current and past operators, namely the Iraqi nerve gas experts and the National Islamic Front in Sudan. The government of Sudan demanded an apology from both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations; but none has been given, since U.S. intelligence still believes the plant had ties to chemical weapons. According to testimony by William Cohen, "...the U.S. intelligence community obtained physical evidence from outside the al-Shifa facility in Sudan that supported long-standing concerns regarding its potential role in Sudanese chemical weapon efforts that could be exploited by al Qaeda." Officials later acknowledged, however, that "the evidence that prompted President Clinton to order the missile strike on the Shifa plant was not as solid as first portrayed." Indeed, officials later said that there was no proof that the plant had been manufacturing or storing nerve gas, as initially suspected by the Americans, or had been linked to Osama bin Laden, who was a resident of Khartoum in the 1990s." The Al-Shifa factory was Sudan's primary source of pharmaceuticals, covering the majority of the Sudanese market. Werner Daum (Germany's ambassador to Sudan 1996–2000) wrote an article in which he estimated that the attack "probably led to tens of thousands of deaths" of Sudanese civilians. The American Bureau of Intelligence and Research wrote a report in 1999 questioning the attack on the factory, suggesting that the connection to bin Laden was not accurate; James Risen reported in the New York Times: "Now, the analysts renewed their doubts and told Assistant Secretary of State Phyllis Oakley that the C.I.A.'s evidence on which the attack was based was inadequate. Ms. Oakley asked them to double-check; perhaps there was some intelligence they had not yet seen. The answer came back quickly: There was no additional evidence. Ms. Oakley called a meeting of key aides and a consensus emerged: Contrary to what the Administration was saying, the case tying Al Shifa to Mr. bin Laden or to chemical weapons was weak." The Chairman of El Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries, who is critical of the Sudanese government, more recently told reporters, "I had inventories of every chemical and records of every employee's history. There were no such [nerve gas] chemicals being made here." Sudan has since invited the U.S. to conduct chemical tests at the site for evidence to support its claim that the plant might have been a chemical weapons factory; so far, the U.S. has refused the invitation to investigate. Nevertheless, the U.S. has refused to officially apologize for the attacks.
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