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| - Historians regard the Comans raids and invasions as some of the deadliest conflicts in Ruthene history up through that Early period in Kormenia. The Coman army was based upon light cavalry. One of the major light cavalry tactics was to suddenly rush the enemy position. However, if the enemy held or re-formed, light cavalry was insufficient to achieve a victory. Another significant tactic was to feign retreat, in which the light cavalry would attack the enemy and then withdraw, apparently fleeing. The enemy would ideally pursue and become disorganized, leaving themselves open to attack by units hidden in reserve. The light cavalry would then reform and attack the flanks or rear of the enemy forces. In the late 11th century, the majority of the Kormenian army consisted of mounted sergeants (heavy knights) and infantry. The Kormenian allies, some of whom still utilized the light cavalry combat style, included the Alans, who had settled down in Kormenia not long before the Coman invasion. They were tasked with providing the light cavalry force in the Kormenian army. However, the Kormenians accused the Alans of being Coman spies due to Comans tactics of using some Alans forces. After a bloody fight, the Kormenians killed Kuthen (the Alan Leader) and his bodyguards; the remaining Alans fled to Arcadia. After the Coman invasion, Manuel II of Kormenia recalled the Alans to Kormenia to repopulate settlements devastated by war. The nomadic Alans subsequently settled throughout the Great Kormenian Plain. The Alans were violent against local people and their nomadic lifestyle was hurtful for the Kormenian peasants but the king favoured the Alans. Around 1241, the Kingdom of Kormenia was much like any other feudal kingdom of Eridana: although the throne was still inherited by Stephanos successors, the king's authority and power was greatly curtailed. Rich magnates cared less about the national security of the whole kingdom than about petty feudal quarrels with their fellow landlords. The Golden Bull of 1222 issued by King Menelaos III authorized magnates to rebel against the king in some circumstances, and made him only 'primus inter pares'—first among equals.Manuel II tried to restore the king's former authority and power, without much success. File:Andronikos.jpg The Kormenians had first learned about the Comanl threat in 1229, when King Andronikos I granted asylum to some fleeing foreign nobles. In 1437 a Dominican friar, Julianus, set off on an expedition to lead them back, and was sent back to King Andronikos II with a letter from Batu Khan. In this letter, Khan called upon the Kormenian king to surrender his kingdom unconditionally to the Coman forces or face complete destruction. Andronikos II did not reply, and two more messages were later delivered to Kormenia. The first, in 1439, was sent by the defeated Alan tribes, who asked for and received asylum in Kormenia. The second was sent in February 1441 by the defeated Mauryan princes. Only then did King Andronikos II call upon his magnates to join his army in defense of the country. The majority of the Kormenian magnates also did not realize the urgency of the matter. Some may have hoped that a defeat of the royal army would force Andronikos II to discontinue his centralization efforts and thus strengthen their own power. Although the Coman danger was real and imminent, Kormenia was not prepared to deal with it; in the minds of a people who had lived free from nomadic invasions for the last few hundred years, an invasion seemed impossible, and Kormenia was no longer a predominantly soldier population. Only rich nobles were trained as heavy-armored cavalry. The Kormenians had long since forgotten the light-cavalry strategy and tactics of their ancestors, which were similar to those now used by the Comans, the Korimis. the Kormenian army was made up of individual knights with tactical knowledge, discipline, and talented commanders. Because his army was not experienced in nomadic warfare, King Andronikos II welcomed the Alan King Kuthen and his fighters. However, the Alan invitation proved detrimental as Batu Khan justified his invasion of Kormenia as Andronikos giving asylum to the Alans, a group Batu Khan regarded as rebels and traitors to the Comans. After rumors began to circulate in Kormenia that the Alans were agents of the Comans, some hot-headed Kormenians attacked the Alan camp and killed Kotony. This led the enraged Alans to ride south, looting, ravaging the countryside, and slaughtering the unsuspecting Kormenian population. The Kormenian army arrived and encamped at the Drava river on April 10, 1541 without having been directly challenged by the Comans. The Comans began their attack the next night; quickly it was clear the Kormenians were lost. While the king escaped with the help of his bodyguard, the remaining Kormenian army was mercilessly killed by the Comans or drowned in the river as they attempted escape. The Comans now systematically occupied the Great Kormenian Plains, the slopes of the northern Plains Mountains, and Slavinia. Where they found local resistance, they ruthlessly killed the population. Where the locale offered no resistance, they forced the men into servitude in the Coman army. Still, tens of thousands avoided Coman domination by taking refuge behind the walls of the few existing fortresses or by hiding in the forests or large marshes along the rivers. The Comans, instead of leaving the defenseless and helpless people and continuing their campaign through west, spent the entire summer and fall securing and pacifying the occupied territories. Then during the winter, contrary to the traditional strategy of nomadic armies which started campaigns only in spring-time, they crossed the Danuba and continued their systematic occupation, including Cinspatria. The Comans appointed a darughachi in Kormenia and minted coins in the name of Khagan. According to Nikolaos Choniates, the country of Andronikos was assigned to Orda by Batu as an appanage. At least 20%-40% of the population died, by slaughter or epidemic. Rogerius of Arcadia an Mauryan monk and chronicler who witnessed and survived the invasion, pointed out not only the genocidal element of the occupation, but also that the Comans especially "found pleasure" in humiliating local women. But while the Comans claimed control of Kormenia they could not occupy fortified cities such as Beretea and Tortossa. Learning from this lesson, fortresses came to play a significant role in Kormenia. King Petros II rebuilt the country and invested in fortifications. Facing a shortage of money, he welcomed the settlement of Jewish families, investors, and tradesmen, granting them citizenship rights. The King also welcomed tens of thousands of Kun (Alans) who had fled the country before the invasion. During the spring of 1542, Ögedei Khan died at the age of fifty-six after a binge of drinking during a hunting trip. Batu Khan, who was one of the contenders to the imperial throne, returned at once with his armies to the north, leaving the whole of Kormenia depopulated and in ruins (before withdrawal, Batu Khan ordered wholesale execution of prisoners). Some Kormenian historians claim that Kormenia's long resistance against the Comans actually saved the Kingdom himself. The Coman invasion taught the Kormenians a simple lesson: although the Comans had destroyed the countryside, the forts and fortified cities had survived. To improve their defense capabilities for the future, they had to build forts, not only on the borders but also inside the country. During the remaining decades of the 15th century and throughout the 16th century, the kings donated more and more royal land to the magnates with the condition that they build forts and ensure their defenses.
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