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| - The plan and its implementation both remain controversial. While Moltke's modifications certainly played their part in its failure, the plan did also presume a slow Russian mobilisation (Russia mobilised much faster than expected in 1914), and also called for the violation of the neutrality of Belgium (which in turn guaranteed Britain would be an enemy in 1914).
- The German plan is quite simple and Machiavellan. Instead of targeting France and invading France directly the Germans simply invaded Holland and Belgium first and invaded along the Belgian border where the French least expected (unless they had bothered to learn from the time before). In this way not only did were the French caught off guard but the Germans also manage to get most of the continent to support the Low Countries in the war effort.
- The Schlieffen Plan (, ) was the German General Staff's early 20th-century overall strategic plan for victory in a possible future war in which the German Empire might find itself fighting on two fronts: France to the west and Russia to the east. The First World War later became such a war, with both a Western and an Eastern Front.
- The Schlieffen Plan was the name given after World War I to the reasoning behind the German intrusion of France and Belgium in August 1914. Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen was the Chief of the Imperial German General Staff from 1891–1906 and in 1905 and 1906 contrived an arrangement for a war winning hostile, in an one-front war against the French Third Republic. After the war, German official history specialists of the Reichsarchiv and different authors, depicted the arrangement as a diagram for triumph, that was lethally defective in its usage by the successor of Schlieffen, Generaloberst (Colonel-General) Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, the German armed force Commander in Chief from 1906 – September 1914.
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| abstract
| - The Schlieffen Plan was the name given after World War I to the reasoning behind the German intrusion of France and Belgium in August 1914. Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen was the Chief of the Imperial German General Staff from 1891–1906 and in 1905 and 1906 contrived an arrangement for a war winning hostile, in an one-front war against the French Third Republic. After the war, German official history specialists of the Reichsarchiv and different authors, depicted the arrangement as a diagram for triumph, that was lethally defective in its usage by the successor of Schlieffen, Generaloberst (Colonel-General) Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, the German armed force Commander in Chief from 1906 – September 1914. Post-war composing by senior German officers like Hermann von Kuhl, Gerhard Tappen, Wilhelm Groener and the Reichsarchiv antiquarians drove by Wolfgang Foerster figured out how to build up an ordinarily acknowledged story that it was Moltke's inability to take after the diagram, as opposed to German key erroneous conclusion, that sentenced the belligerents to four years of weakening fighting, rather than the fast, unequivocal clash it ought to have been. In 1956, Gerhard Ritter distributed Der Schlieffenplan: Kritik eines Mythos (The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth), which started a time of update, when the points of interest of the assumed Schlieffen Plan were subjected to investigation and contextualisation, which as a rule rejected the perspective that the arrangement had been a diagram, on the grounds that this was in opposition to the convention of Prussian war arranging built up by Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, who held that military operations were intrinsically eccentric. Assembly and organization arrangements could be drawn up however battle arrangements were pointless; as opposed to endeavoring to manage to subordinate officers, the expectation of the operation was given and afterward they were appointed attentiveness in accomplishing it by Auftragstaktik (mission-sort strategies). In the 1990s, John Keegan examined the reasonable parts of actualizing the arrangement and judged that the physical requirements of German, Belgian and French railroads and the Belgian and northern French street systems made it difficult to move enough troops sufficiently far and sufficiently quick for them to battle a definitive fight, if the French withdrew from the outskirts. The majority of the pre-1914 arranging of the General Staff was mystery and records were pulverized when the arrangement arrangements were superseded each April. Inadequate records and different archives got to be accessible after the fall of the German Democratic Republic, that made a layout of German war-arranging feasible surprisingly, demonstrating a great part of the post-1918 written work off-bound.
- The Schlieffen Plan (, ) was the German General Staff's early 20th-century overall strategic plan for victory in a possible future war in which the German Empire might find itself fighting on two fronts: France to the west and Russia to the east. The First World War later became such a war, with both a Western and an Eastern Front. The plan took advantage of Russia's slowness and expected differences in the three countries' speed in preparing for war. In short, it was the German plan to avoid a two-front war by concentrating troops in the West and quickly defeating the French and then, if necessary, rushing those troops by rail to the East to face the Russians before they had time to mobilize fully. The Schlieffen Plan was created by Count Alfred von Schlieffen and modified by Helmuth von Moltke the Younger after Schlieffen's retirement; it was Moltke who actually implemented the plan at the outset of World War I. In modified form, it was executed to near victory in the first month of the war. However, the modifications to the original plan, a French counterattack on the outskirts of Paris (the Battle of the Marne) and surprisingly speedy Russian offensives ended the German offensive and resulted in years of trench warfare. The plan has been the subject of intense debate among historians and military scholars ever since. Schlieffen's last words were "remember to keep the right flank strong," which was significant in that Moltke strengthened the left flank in his modification.
- The plan and its implementation both remain controversial. While Moltke's modifications certainly played their part in its failure, the plan did also presume a slow Russian mobilisation (Russia mobilised much faster than expected in 1914), and also called for the violation of the neutrality of Belgium (which in turn guaranteed Britain would be an enemy in 1914).
- The German plan is quite simple and Machiavellan. Instead of targeting France and invading France directly the Germans simply invaded Holland and Belgium first and invaded along the Belgian border where the French least expected (unless they had bothered to learn from the time before). In this way not only did were the French caught off guard but the Germans also manage to get most of the continent to support the Low Countries in the war effort.
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