This HTML5 document contains 67 embedded RDF statements represented using HTML+Microdata notation.

The embedded RDF content will be recognized by any processor of HTML5 Microdata.

Subject Item

n64:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n11:

n12:

n2:

Subject Item

n34:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n45:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n41:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n38:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n5:

n6:

n2:

Subject Item

n71:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n65:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n60:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n26:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n52:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n55:

n56:

n2:

Subject Item

n32:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n33:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n13:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n62:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n9:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n46:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n28:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n42:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n74:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n50:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n58:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n31:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n69:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n29:

n30:

n2:

Subject Item

n2:

rdfs:label

Algerian War

rdfs:comment

The Algerian War, also known as the Algerian War of Independence or the Algerian Revolution ( Ath-Thawra Al-Jazā’iriyya; , "Algerian War") was a war between France and the Algerian independence movements from 1954 to 1962, which led to Algeria gaining its independence from France. An important decolonization war, it was a complex conflict characterized by guerrilla warfare, maquis fighting, terrorism, the use of torture by both sides, and counter-terrorism operations. The conflict was also a civil war between loyalist Algerians believing in a French Algeria and their insurrectionist Algerian Muslim counterparts. Effectively started by members of the National Liberation Front (FLN) on November 1, 1954, during the Toussaint Rouge ("Red All Saints' Day"), the conflict shook the foundations of

owl:sameAs

dbr:Algerian_War

dcterms:subject

n8: n19: n37: n57: n59: n66: n68: n70:

foaf:homepage

n48:0

n3:wikiPageUsesTemplate

n4: n15: n17: n20: n21: n24: n44: n49: n51: n54: n61: n75: n76: n77:

n72:

French President Charles De Gaulle and the Six-Year War

n39:

gov.archives.arc.649319

n35:abstract

The Algerian War, also known as the Algerian War of Independence or the Algerian Revolution ( Ath-Thawra Al-Jazā’iriyya; , "Algerian War") was a war between France and the Algerian independence movements from 1954 to 1962, which led to Algeria gaining its independence from France. An important decolonization war, it was a complex conflict characterized by guerrilla warfare, maquis fighting, terrorism, the use of torture by both sides, and counter-terrorism operations. The conflict was also a civil war between loyalist Algerians believing in a French Algeria and their insurrectionist Algerian Muslim counterparts. Effectively started by members of the National Liberation Front (FLN) on November 1, 1954, during the Toussaint Rouge ("Red All Saints' Day"), the conflict shook the foundations of the French Fourth Republic (1946–58) and led to its eventual collapse. In 1961, president Charles de Gaulle decided to give up Algeria—which was up to then regarded as an integral part of France—after conducting a referendum showing huge support for Algerian independence. The planned withdrawal led to a state crisis, to various assassination attempts on de Gaulle, and some attempts of military coups. Most of the former were carried out by the Organisation de l'armée secrète (OAS), an underground organization formed mainly from French military personnel supporting a French Algeria, which committed a large number of bombings and murders in both Algeria and the homeland to stop the planned independence. At the time when the independence came into force in 1962, 900.000 European-stemming Algerians (Pieds-noirs) fled to France, in fear of the FLN's revenge, within a few months. The government was totally unprepared for the vast number of refugees who caused significant turmoil in France. The greatest part of the Algerians having worked for the French were deliberately left behind, though de Gaulle himself estimated a ″bloodbath″ among them once the French would be gone. Especially the Harkis, having fought as soldiers on the side of the French army, were regarded as traitors by the FLN. Between 50.000 and 150.000 Harkis and family members, disarmed by their leaving French officers, were murdered by the FLN or lynch-mobs, often after being atrociously abducted and tortured. About 91.000 managed to flee to France, some with help from their French officers acting against orders, and today form a significant part of the Algerian-stemming french population. The Algerian War has long been treated as a taboo by French authorities, only in 1999 the national assembly passed a law officially allowing to use the term "Algerian War" instead of a number of previous euphemistic paraphrases. Today, the conflict is widely regarded as a prototype of a modern asymmetrical war with regular military fighting informal insurgents recruited from the civilian population. The unconventional, often illegal and human rights violating counter-insurgency measures applied by the French military against the FLN, namely torture, forced disappearances and illegal executions, were widely regarded as militarily successful, but also to have significantly weakened the French position due to the ensuing moral and political controversy. Similar measures were later employed in a number of conflicts, especially during the 1970ies and 1980ies era of right-wing military dictatorships in Latin America battling and often killing any potential opposition in what became known under the Argentinian term Dirty War (Guerra Sucia). According to a number of sources, this happened with the official assistance of French military advisors and also exiled OAS-members, besides support from the US military and intelligence agencies such as for the covert multinational search-and-kill Operation Condor. Early during the occupation of Iraq, the Directorate for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict of the Pentagon used the famous 1966 semi-documentary movie The Battle of Algiers as a show case for successfully defeating an insurgency and yet losing the "war of ideas".

Subject Item

n73:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n14:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n16:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n67:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n25:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n18:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n43:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n40:

n30:

n2:

Subject Item

n53:

n6:

n2:

Subject Item

n63:

n10:

n2:

Subject Item

n36:

n6:

n2: